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INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose of the Study 
The a~m of this study is to present a comparative 
analysis of two contemporary philosophers' conceptions of 
the relation of experience to order, and the consequences 
which ensue from their conceptions. 
These two men are Brand Blanshard and Alfred North 
Whitehead, and their philosophies will be discussed solely 
in terms of the ways in which they represent statements of 
this problem, answers to it, and the part their answers play 
in their general philosophical position. 
If the question of the relation of experience to order 
is regarded in a broad sense, then certainly it is no new 
problem to philosophy. In this sense, the question is older 
than Plato, who clarified the issue 1n his divided line, 
thereby setting the stage for many of the general problems 
in the history of philosophy familiar to us -- the relation 
between Fact and Form, empir~cal and formal, change and 
permanence, particular and universal, etc. 
But more recently the problem of the relation of 
experience to order has often been interpreted to be the 
question of whether order, connection, is derivative from 
our more rudimentary experiences of an external world or 
whether order is ~ported into our experiences by conceptual 
activity. After Kant's "Copernican Revolution," much of 
philosophy in the last century dropped the attempt to find 
order "~n nature. n Order is not derivative from our 
experience ~ an external world but is constructed by 
thought from the data of sense. "Order" is therefore a 
reflection of the structure of human intelligence. Our 
experience is subject to the characters and relations of 
the concepts by which we can interpret it. "Order" ~s a 
precondition of all experience and is bound up with the 
understanding. The "objective" world l.s to some extent 
constructed by the subject experiencing it. 
Since Kant, some idealists, such as Bosanquet and 
Blanshard, rejected, in principle, the resultant ding-~-sich 
but accepted at least the methodological assumption that the 
objective world is constructed by the subject experiencing 
it. Starting in this epistemological context, their argument 
is that the order characteristic of the understanding and 
thought has to be characterist~c of things. Hence the d1ng-
an-s1ch is eliminated as unintelligible and the objectivity 
of critical thought is vindicated. We d~scover the order 
and nature of reality from the condit~ons of its intelligi-
bility. The correct procedure is to analyze the nature of 
our conceptual experience and knowledge and show what the 
ii 
ideal order implied in our knowledge indicates about the 
nature of real1ty. Blanshard's ~Nature or Thought is 
perhaps the clearest statement of this approach and of 
this conception of the relation of order to experience. 
Whitehead is also very much concerned with the problem 
of the relation of order to experience. Much or Whitehead's 
efforts are spent in the analysis of experience, its nature 
and structure, and the relation of experience to our concep-
tual modes or activity. Much of his time is also spent on 
criticism of abstraction and his belief that, in the past, 
philosophy has neglected felt experience, its structure, 
and significance. Whitehead's position that philosophy has 
over-emphasized conceptual modes of experience led him to 
believe that he was, in some sense, denying part of the 
Kantian 11 Copernical Revolution." We must find the requis1te 
connectedness in felt experience. 
A comparative analys1s of the two resultant conceptions 
of the relations of experience to order is the purpose of 
this study. 
iii 
2. Work of Previous Investigators 
Except for the book reviews upon the publication of 
~Nature of ThOUght, little work has been done on Blanshard's 
thought. Since the publication of The Nature of Thought, 
1 Blanshard's work has been mainly confined to articles. 
By comparison, the work done on Whitehead is enormous. 
In the last few years, there have been several introductory 
expositions and interpretations of Whitehead's general 
position: William A. Christian, An Interpreta~ 3£ White-
head's Metaphysics; Nathaniel Lawrence, WlLitehead's 
Philosophl.cal Development; Ivor Leclerc, Whitehead's Meta-
phys1cs; Victor Lowe, Understandl.ng Wh1.tehead; w. Mays, 
The Philos9phy of Wh1.tehead; and, of course, many other booKs 
and artlcles deaL1.ng with Whitehead's var1.ed 1.nterests and 
~ 
wr1.t1ngs. 
But, desplte these many varled spec1.al studl.es, l1.ttle 
worK has been done by way of an extended comparison of 
1. Cf. blbllography. Recently a volume, one of a projected 
three volumes, was published by Blanshard; Reason and 
Analysis (LaSalle: Open Court Publish1.ng Co., 1962r:-
Thl.s volume to a large extent is a crltical study of 
recent trends 1n analytic philosophy. 
2. Besides the well-Known volume of artlcLes ed1.ted by 
Paul Arthur Schllpp, Ivor Leclerc recently editea a 
volume. Cf. Ivor Leclerc, The Relevance of \Vhl.tehead 
(London: George Allen & UnWin Ltd., 1961T7 For other 
artl.cles and booKs, cf. bibliography. 
iv 
Whitehead with the idealist tradition.1 It is hoped that 
this study will partially correct this need. 
1. Two articles should be mentioned here: Gregory Vlastos' 
comparison of some of Whitehead's doctrines with Hegel, 
"Organic Categories in Whitehead" (Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. XXXIV (1937), PP• 253-262); and A. H. JOhnson, 
11Leibniz and Whitehead" (Philosophical and Phenomenological 
Review, Vol. XIX·, No.3 (March, 1959), pp. 285f). 
v 
3. Method Employed in this Study 
The method of th1s study 1s as follows: Chapter I 
w1ll present an exposition of Blanshard's conception of the 
relation of experience to order; Chapter II will present an 
exposition of Whitehead's conception of the relation of 
experience to order; and Chapter III will present a comparative 
analysis and evaluation of their conceptions, based upon the 
expositions. 
The pattern each exposition and the chapter of comparisons 
will take is tr1ad1c: (1) to point up the genes1s of order 
ln ~ediate experience as each of these men conceives it; 
·(1i) since the concept of order, for both Whitehead and Elan-
shard is bound up with the question of the status and function 
of the repeatable aspects of exper1ence (traditionally called 
universals), time will be spent on what they conceive to be 
the nature and funct1on of universals; and (1ii) an exposition 
and comparative analysis of the consequences their differing 
concepts of the genesis of order, and the function of 
universals, have for their general philosophical position. 
vi 
CHAPTER I BRAND BLANSHARD 
1. Introduction 
The follow1ng account of Brand Blanshard 1 s pos1tion 
in regard to exper1ence and order is based solely upon h1s 
two volume worK, The Nature of ThOUght• 
It'or Blanshard, the not1on of order lies at the heart 
of a philosoph1cal pos1tion. Blanshard r1ghtly sees that 
the characterization a th~Ker gives to this notion is one 
of the most important factors in deter~n1ng his ultimate 
position. In Blanshard 1 s words: 
What kind of system? It would be hard to 
asK a philosopher a more critical question than 
this, for upon his answer to it hang h1s concep-
tions of intelligib11ity, of proof, of the tasK 
of ph1losophy, of the v~ry nature and prospects 
of reason in the world. 
Blanshard 1 s aim is not to enumerate all the possible 
k1nds of notions of systems wh1ch have been used in philosophy. 
Rather, his purpose is to correct what he feels to be two 
lacunae in the history of ph1losophy. 
The first lacuna is a precise account of how the logical 
ideal of system actually operates in the movement of reflec-
tion. Book III 1n The Nature of ThOUght is an attempt to deal 
1. Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Tho~t, 2 vols. (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1~39), Vo • II, p. 33. As a 
prelimmary procedure, we are equating the terms "order" 
and "system." For Blanshard, the latter term is h1s 
standard usage, although "order" is often used as an 
equivalent. 
1 
specifically with this issue. It is an ~ttempt to study the 
vicissitudes of thought as it tries to render its object 
intelligible, as it tries to attain to the ideal of system. 
The last three chapters of Boox III show how the ideal operates 
as a criterion of truth. 
The second lacuna is an explicit account of the ideal of 
sys~em itself. Blanshard feels that there ~e some fairly 
good defenses of the coherence theory, but goes on to add: 
Bu~ with the possible excep~ion of 
Bosanquet•s Implication ~nd Linear Inference, 
one misses • • • any simple aocoun~ or the 
ideal of sys~ematic necess1ty and of the 
reasons why it seems so compelling, as com-
pared with empiricism on the one hand and 
formalism on the other.l 
In Boox IV of ~ Nature ~ Thought, Blanshard attempts an 
explicit account of the ideal of sys~em itself. 
Our interests 1n Blanshard are more concerned with how 
he attemp~s to correct the former lacuna. We will mainly try 
to point up the actual function the no~ion of system plays in 
Blanshard's thought ~s exemplified 1n this major work. In 
attempting to do this, we feel that ~ny effort to po1nt out 
the ~ctual use of system by Blanshard entails some account of 
what he means by the ~erm "system," so the latter lacuna is 
also of interest to us here. 
That the function of system and its definition are bound 
up together is especially true of Blanshard's worx. Bu~ it 
1. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 3o • 
........... 
2 
would be unjust to consider The Nature of Thought as just an 
attempt to correct these two lacunae. The Nature of Thought 
is to be seen as an attempt to establish one particular notion 
of system as that ~~d of structure which is present throughout 
the process of reflection and experience. In accordance with 
this, we shall attempt to weave both Blanshard 1 s definition of 
system and its function into one fabric. Our efforts taKe the 
follow1ng outline. Section 2 corresponds roughly to Boo~ I in 
The Nature of Thought except that the function of system on the 
perceptual level is given special emphasis. Section 3 represents 
the continuance of Blanshard 1 s case for this single conception 
of system. As we pass from implicit inference on the part of 
perception to explicit inference on the part of "free ideas," 
we find the character of this notion of system be1ng gradually 
clarified. The central place of Blanshard 1 s view of the nature 
of ideas and universals is po1nted to here. In Section 4, the 
nature of ideas is discussed in relation to problems of an 
epistemological nature and Blanshard's more specific arguments 
for the importance of the notion of system are gone into. The 
ontological status of system for Blanshard is pointed up. In 
the latter parts of this section, the essential features of 
Blanshard 1 s notion of system are emphasized. 
Before we get 1nto an account of how Blanshard uses this 
notion, a word should be added in regard to one main difficulty 
in this account. This difficulty is 1nherent in Blanshard 1 s 
3 
method ltself. Blanshard's method 1s essentlally dialectical. 
~ Nature ~ Thought puts forth a considerat~on of different 
positions in regard to some 1mportant log~cal, epistemological 
and metaphysical problems. After these posltions are given 
consideration and in the main denled, alternative solutions 
to the problems are proposed. Blanshard is an expert at this 
dlalectlc method ~nd much 1s lost if The Nature ~ Thought is 
not read in this light. 
However, our interest is not so much 1n the dialogue but 
1n Blanshard's posltion itself, ~lthough again we cannot maKe 
hard and fast separatlons. It is only after his worK is read 
and studled that there 1s seen a single theme runn1ng through 
these two volumes. The Nature ~Thought was itself meant to 
be a "whole." It was meant to present one total argument for 
one partlcular notlon of system. To extrlcate the dialogue 
from the position, much t1me has been spent on sheer exposltion 
of Blanshard's work. 
4 
2. The Function or Implicit System 10 Perception 
This present section represents ~n attempt to po~nt up 
the fact that the notion or "system" 1S an integral part or 
Blanshard 1 s ~nalysis or the psychological "history" or m1nd. 
From the very beg~nn1ngs or ~~tial experience to the atta~n­
ment or "free ~deas, 11 a structure or order ~s J.mpl~citly or 
expl~citly present either ~s ~ bacKground to these phases or 
as an ideal toward which these phases are directed. As mind 
becomes more independent from the conditions of its genesis, 
it becomes more directed by this ideal of system. But "system" 
is present throughout this history of experiential phases in 
the sense in which, even in the transition from immediate to 
mediate experience, there is an attempt to unify experience 
through the universal into soma kind or connected whole. 
Consequently, we shall find the function of universals in 
~ediate experience or primary importance for our purposes. 
But before we proceed to this analysis, let us add a 
word of caution. !!:! Nature. of Thought is an attempt to hold 
to a single conception or the nature of thought and of truth. 
Hence any part of his analysis has as its background the 
particular conception of thought and, indeed, of system which 
Blanshard is putting forward. His view of the relation between 
perception and experience is no exception. Blanshard holds 
that a study of perception apart from the nature of thought 
is impossible because perception itself is the simplest form 
5 
of thought. Thought is the same from first to last, from 
its first appearance in perception to its achievement of 
systematic insight which is its end or aim. This end of 
thought in an ideal structure is only fully evident when we 
arrive at the end of his analysis, but it is in reference to 
this goal that Blanshard's analysis of immediate experience 
proceeds. What is relevant in this important problem of the 
relation between the sensation and perception is determined 
by Blanshard's view of the goal of thought itself. Blanshard 
is interested 1n showing the kinds of organization within 
experience as rudimentary forms of the kind of organization 
thought has as its end. Hence he views perception as "the 
first stage 1n a long journey, the first halting endeavor 
to introduce into experience, or discover in it, a system 
l that will satisfy intelligence." 
Let us add here that Blanshard is not at this point 
concerned with the logical justification of the forms of 
organization found in experience but rather in a psychological 
account of the genesis of these particular forma. Nor is 
Blanshard's interest in immediate experience by way of a 
complete analysis of the experience itself but is, accordingly, 
only to show how perception arises from it and how immediate 
experience is capable of being ordered, or, to put it in a 
better form, he is interested 1n how we go beyond immediate 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 79. It should be evident from this 
also that a full account of perception can only be given 
when his full analysis of thought has been done. 
experience. He is interested 1n the continuity of the process 
from "pure sensation" to explicit Judgment, from awareness ot 
sense particulars to knowledge ot actual things. Perceptual 
inference, as it is seen by Blanshard, provides the connecting 
link, tor while perceptual inference differs from sensation and 
explicit judgment it still has something common to both. "It 
plainly involves sensat1on, though sensation moulded and 'in• 
terpreted;' it involves judgement, but judgement that is still 
1 in the tmplicit stage." 
But before we attempt to see what Kinds ot organization 
are involved in perceptual inference, let us see how perception 
arises within the context ot experience. 
1. Immediate Experience -- Sensation and Universals 
In explaining the genesis of thought and perception .from 
within ~ediate experience, Blanahard warns us of certain 
errors that may be co.mmitted in any analysis of ~ediate 
experience. His point 1s that if we can avoid these errors 
ot method in regard to treating immediate experience we can 
gain some clue as to the nature ot immediate experience. The 
first three of these are put in negative form; the last one he 
puts in a positive .for.m and it is this last one which seems 
most important for Blanshard. {1) In any analysis of immediate 
experience we must not contuse first reactions with .f1rst 
experiences. We must not identify, .for example, the with-
drawal of the hand with the feeling or pain. Bodily reaction 
1. Brand Blanshard, !!:!_ Nature !?! Thought, Vol. I, p. 54. 
is only a sign by which we go on to infer the nature of the 
accompanying exper1ence.1 (2) Nor must we, 1n our method, 
contuse what is analytically stmplest with what is historically 
first. In this, Blanshard is quite against the method of 
anaJ:yzlDg out of our experience simple sense data as isolated 
particulars and then canblning these elements to explain the 
operation of thought as a whole. This isolation of particular 
sense data requires considerable abstraction and may not be 
historically first 1n our exper 1ence. 2 ( 3) The third danger 
is that of reading acquired meanings into the experiences we 
start with. That is, of course, the psychologist's fallacy. 3 
A counterpart of the above fallacy is another, and for 
Blanshard a more important, point, tor he is mainly concerned 
with the continuity or the immediate-mediate processes. 
(4) ~e must so construe the world we first live in as to 
- ,__.- - -- - - ,_._.-
make escape ~!! eoneeivable."4 We cannot read into immediate 
experience the structure which 1s only involved on the perceptual 
or conceptual level but we can, and must, see ~edlate exper-
ience in light or what comes later. We must avoid, 1n our 
1. cr. ibid., Vol. I, p. ss. 
2. Ct. IDIQ., Vol. I, P• 5o. Blansbard says elsewhere that 
"what must not be done is to say that we begin with the 
sensing of bare particulars in which nothing is identical 
with anything else, and that we somehow find identities as 
we go on. Identities that are not there cannot be round." 
(Ibid., Vol. I, p. 03.) As we shall see later, Blanshard 
is-&gainst the entire metbod of these empiricists who try 
to construct our experience out of atomic units. This is 
his first criticism of such an attempt. 
3. ct. ibid., Vol. I, P• 5o. 
4. Ibid-:;-\'ol. I, p. 57. 
-
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very analysis of sensation and immediate experience, becoming 
closed up 1n our own states ot consciousness. Any theory that 
is to account for the continuity or the ~ediate-mediate 
transition must provide tor this transitl.On 1n the immediate 
exper1e nee • 
Any theory that is to work must • • • provide 
a passage to later exper1ence. This later experience 
involves perceiving things as things or a .1C1nd and 1t 
leads us on continuously to~e recognition of judge-
ment, 'th1s is what I have seen before.• ••• For 
the cla~ ot all these experiences is to take us 
beyond the moment's ~pression, not merely to give us 
a 'this' but to tell us something about l.t. And tfis 
they cannot do if impressions ~re the whole stQry. 
Aga1n, we must avo1d the analytic fallacy or Locke, Berkeley 
and Hume. 
How does Blanshard provl.de tor this passage to later 
experience? How does he account for the 1mmediate-mediate 
transition? He begins by saying that even on tne level or 
~ediate exper1ence all the elements are not completely the 
s~e. On this level there is no proper perception, no memory, 
no recognition, no images, no ideas, no judgment, nor even the 
sense or self and not-selt.2 But this does not mean that on 
~ level there is only or simply a mass or undifferentiated 
sensations. The experience with which we start includes 
affection (pleasure ~d displeasure), emotion, sens~t10n, and 
relat1ons which connect these elements together although the 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 62-63. 
2. ~ibid., Vol. I, P• 67. 
-
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relations are not perceived!! relations.1 
But other factors contribute to breaking up this initial 
continuum. The sensations which do coma to us differ in 
regard to vividness, they vary in regard to force or 1ntensity.2 
And sensations can also gain prominence by their repetition 
in varying contexts. They may gain prominence because they 
present common features in various experiences which tend to 
blur the difference. There is a rudimentary retention on this 
level. Some sensations also have a feeling-meaning which 
others do not have -- some are instinctively favored above 
others as when a dog, for example, instinctively notices the 
presence of meat; for a horse, its presence would meet with 
comparative indifference. Blanshard makes the important 
distinction here between this feeling-meaning and the meaning 
we use on the level of thought. In the former, the animal 
1. 
2. 
This is already an important difference from Bradley's 
analysis at this point. For Bradley, immediate experience 
is non-relational but it does have felt structure. It is 
a felt unity. Cf. Francis H. Bradley, Essays on Truth 
and Reality, (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press,-r914), 
pp; 17~f. Ct. Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Tho,ht, 
Vol. I, P• 66. Blanshard is everywhere concerned o 
keep intelligible connection in his metaphysics. This 
shows up also in Bradley's analysis where feeling is 
retained as the background to discursive thought. For 
Blanshard, feeling doesn't take as much of a functional 
role. cr. Francis H. Bradley, Apaearance and Realit~ (2d ed.), (Oxford: At the Claren on Press;-rs97 l 1 93_7), 
p. 459. Blanshard's view of the immediate is closer to 
Hegel's sein. Hegel was also interested in keeping 
intelligiOii structure in his ultimate view of the 
nature of the world. ct. William Wallace (tr.), The 
Logic of Hegel (2d ed.), (London: Oxford UniversitY 
Press,-r892 I 1873 t). p. 159. 
Brand Blanshard, !§! Nature ~ Thought, Vol. I, p. 68. 
10 
cannot be mistaken. "We are not taking anything ~ anything; 
and hence we are strictly below the level of perceiving, 
1 thinking, or knowing." Meaning as feeling is quite a dif-
ferent thing from meaning as thought.2 
Blanshard's important point here is that on this very 
rudimentary level, there are relations, there are sensations, 
which are invested with prominent features. There is no 
"democracy among the sensations."3 There are factors which 
give prominence and a kind of elemental structure to sensations 
just as there are factors which bring prominence to certain 
kinds of things on the level of perception. We must construe 
immediate experience so as to make escape from it possible. 
There are differences even within immediate experience which 
are foundational to relational consciousness, there are 
elements which are at least functionally present which lend 
themselves to being ordered. 
1. Ibid., P• 71. 
2. PO:riw.hitehead, experience also has an emotional basis 
and has already "affective meaning." "The basic fact 
is the rise of an affective tone originating from things 
whose relevance is given." A1fred North Whitehead, 
Adventures of Ideas, (New·York: The New American Library 
or World Literature, Inc., 1955), P• 178. (First published 
in 1933: New York, The Macmillan Company). In the 
experience of causal efficacy we have a sense of influx 
from the past "modifying, enhancing, inhibiting, diverting, 
the stream of feeling which we are receiving, unifying 
(of. the structure of perception), enjoying, and trans-
mitting. This is our general sense of existence." 
Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Realitt' (New York: 
The Humanities Press, 1955), p. ~ (Firs published in 
1929: New York, The Macmillan Company). But as we shall 
see later, for Whitehead, feeling itself is referential, 
it involves a "vector" character. Cf. ibid., P• 231. 
3. Brand Blanshard, The Nature .2£ Thought,--voi. I, P• 71. 
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There are, then, differences among sensations. But tor 
Blanshard these differences are not enough to provide for the 
trans1t1on to later experience, although the differences are 
functionally present. On the level ot 1mmed1ate experience 
these differences among our sensations are not distinctions. 
It iS true that sounds and pa1ns, every shade 
ot colour and every degree ot heat that enter 1nto 
experience has a character or its own which sets it 
ott from everything else. But to be dlfferent and 
to be distinguished are not the same •••• One can-
not d1st1ngulsh anything untll one has perceived it 
as this rather than that (for otherwise what is dis-
tinct?) and 1n this flrst experience no iniis have 
yet been recognized. Distinctness of characters from 
each other and the use ot universals as universals 
have their beglnnlng together.! 
It is even incorrect to call our immediate experience 
"confused" for lt takes dlst1nct things to be confounded, 
you need at least two things (which is the result of their 
distinction) to be contused. PerceiV1ng a character as such 
is perceiving 1t as this rather than that, which entails the 
"this" to be also related to the "that." 
This us'e of universals and relations in the very same 
process of distinguishing sensations and qualities has a 
significance whlch will carry throughout Blanshard 1 s analysis. 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 64. What Blanshard means by "universal" 
here 1s not a general idea, e.g. "man," nor 1s 1t an 
abstract ldea 1n the sense that we grasp the ldea of red-
ness apart from other qualities ot, say, a ball. What he 
means by the use of a universal is the recognition that 
a quality is not necessarily confined to one context but 
that 1t may be given 1n various contexts. The universal 
is a type wbich may be exemplified 1n other contexts. 
This will be his meaning throughout although he will 
distinguish between kinds of universals. See below P• 76ft. 
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In Blanshard's words: 
To ~ for thought at all is to be d1stinct, 
and to be distinct is to be related to something 
else through space, ttme, degree, or otherwise. 
• • • Here is the first 1nt1mation of a truth 
which • • • will ga1n 1ncreas1ng significance, 
namely to th1nk involves the relating of the 
object thought of to something else w1 thin a 
system. Abstract thinking, in the sense of dealing 
with any character quite alone and apart is not 
only an tmposs1bil1ty; it is a self-contradict1on.1 
Universals are there froa the Deginning and there 1s 
no stage 1n experience 1n which they are not present for 
in so far as 1t 1s anything tor thought it is distinct and 
hence requires universals and relations. Universals are the 
"root condition" upon which depend our power to perceive 
anything as itself, as distinct. And this condition lies at 
the basis of intelligence generally. "This is the power to 
see in things the embodiment of universals. To perceive a 
sound as a sound, you must perceive it as a sound, as an 
- -
example of what might be embodied 1n other sounds.n2 
Although universals are the "root condition" upon whieh 
we can perce1ve anything as this, as distinct, it is only as 
--
sensation is given that we can perceive "this" as a case ot 
one kind, or un1Tersal. The approach to universals must be 
through particulars. This is one side ot the matter. The 
other side 1s that the part1culars must be g1ven El virtue of 
the universal, through the "medium" of a nature that is 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 65. Relation and differen·ea are never 
found apart and, as we shall see later, one is essential 
to the other. cr. p. H. Bradley, AEpearance ~Reality, 
(2d ed.), P• 24. 
2. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 61. 
-
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capable of being exemplified in other ways. We must suppose 
this nature to be present in perception, either 1mpl1c1tly 
or explicitly. 1 
We have, thus far, sensation with dlffering factors 
w~ch makes for the prominence of some sensat1ons over others. 
We have, on the other hand, universals present from the very 
beginning of experience. Perception involves both of these 
factors; it involves sensation but it also goes beyond sensa-
tion to tell us something about the "that" given 1.n sensation. 
Both arise out of ~edl.ate experience together. What comes 
to us through sensation always comes invested with relations 
that carry us beyond 1tselt.2 The distinctions we make we 
must suppose to have existed within the very experiences with 
w~ch we start. But there arises at this point a central 
question. Blanshard h1mself asks it. "Is there any reason 
to suppose that the universals that emerge into explicitness 
through this joint recognition and distinction are the same 
as those present in the l.nitial experience?"3 
Blanshard holds that this question is not answerable 
in terms of 1mmedl.ate experience, for ~edl.ate experience, in 
1. "Implicit" means for Blanshard that the universal is not 
fully present in the focus of consciousness, it is not 
separable from the context of consciousness. This 
distinction will take on added importance because, for 
Blanshard, the history of mind through its various levels 
is a history of the 1mpll.cit gras.p of this nature, or 
universal, to its explicit grasp in the general idea. 
We will return to a discussion of "particulars" when we 
discuss the general idea. See below p. 79ff. 
2. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, P• 76. 
3. Ibid:;-vo1. I, P• 65· 
-
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so far as it is a distinct experience, is no longer "~ed~ate." 
This question, Blanshard holds, must be settled by recourse to 
some general principle. He holds that the 1ssue comes down to 
whether the nature of a thing is affected by being placed in 
new relations, new organizations. His f~nal answer in this 
chapter1 is that "some change in the content of initial exper-
ience is made by explicit ordering and ••• that this change 
is not a total transfor.mation."2 Our next section on Perceptual 
Inference takes up the relation between sensation and universals. 
ii. Perceptual Inference3 
In Blanshard' s chapter on perceptual inference ( Ch. II)·, 
the answer to two earlier statements that we had reference to 
is given at least in outline form. One statement, that "some 
change in the content of initial experience is made by explicit 
ordering and ••• this change is not a total transformation,"4 
refers to the continuity of the immediate-mediate transition 
1n experience and whether the nature of a thing is affected by 
belng ordered. The second statement, implicitly, at least, 
refers to the general principle we must have recourse to in 
1. 
4. 
We have to put ott the question as to whether the nature 
of a term is affected by its relations until we discuss 
his full notlon of system and nature of the relation 
between idea and object. 
Ibid., Vol. I, P• o6. 
xn-understanding of the nature of perceptual inference is 
extremely important for an understanding of Blanshard's 
total work. In his analysis of perceptual inference, he 
gives the structure and elements with which many of his 
later analyses 1n the Nature or~ are golng to be 
concerned. The later analysesmaya so be considered as 
explanations of some of the statements made 1n this section. 
consequently, many of the statements made in his chapter on 
perceptual inference may be cons~dered as "~dden agendas" 
to be taken up at a later point. 
Ib~d., Vol. I, P• 66. 
-
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order to explain the f1rst: "To th1nk involves the relating 
1 
of the object thought of to so.mething else within a system." 
Both of these statements are explained and brought 
together 1n Blanshard's analysis of the function of the 
universal in perceptual inference. Let us turn to this now. 
Perception involves a relation between what is given 
in sense and what 1s judged to be present. But both the 
given and that which is judged to be present are essential 
to percept1on; either may vary greatly as to their influence 
in perception. The perception of a plain sheet of white paper 
may be largely seen as a sensed content with very little of 
the supplemental factor or judgment. Or, to turn these 
influencing factors around, the supplemental factor or judg-
ment may be very great, e.g. when we perceive a dot in the 
sky and take 1t to be an a1rplane. But 1n both cases, the 
two factors are necessary for pereeption. 2 How does the 
perceptual consciousness get from the given in sensation to 
that which is not given? What happens when, on the warrant 
ot something.given, we pass to the perception of a thing? 
(1) Judgment 
The factor of judgment in perception is a central point 
for Blanshard. The presence of judgment is the criterion for 
the presence of thought. Blanshard feels that judgment, or 
perceptual belief, is so central to mind that it is ultimately 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 65. Th1s will be clearer as we go along 
but let us state now that a "thing" 1s not going to have 
any "mean1ng 11 ~ess it is ordered within a "system." 
2. cr. ibid., Vol. I, P• 82 • 
........... 
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indefinable and indescribable.1 A judgment is present wherever 
an idea or universal is functioning within experience and hence 
judgment is present in the very act of making distinctions. 
We have made no attempt to distinguish between 
an earlier use of ideas and the later making of 
judgement, for there really is no distinction; to 
have an idea is to judge from the very first, not 
explicitly or-aeterminately, perhaps, but still to judge.2 
Judgment is that process which confers meaning upon a 
content, it is a process of attaching a nwhat" to a "that" 
to use Bradley's terms and hence goes beyond the that. As 
soon as we make distinctions within immediate experience, we 
break up the experience into a sensory element and a meaning.3 
on this level we are aware also that it is possible to 
have an idea which is not in accordance with what we take to 
be "reality." There is reference to something beyond the 
sensory and in distinction with it. The idea claims to be 
true of something in distinction to it and because it is 
referential error is possible. In fact, the criterion for the 
presence of judgment in perception is the possibility of error. 
"Unless perception involves judgement, it cannot be intelligibly 
true or false; the fact that may obviously be either has made 
1. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, PP• ll2ff. In fact, Blanshard"virtuallytt 
identifies judgment with mind on its intellectual side. 
Ct. ibid., Vol. I, P• 115. Elsewhere, Blanshard says, 
"My iiiiilci, qua knowing, is a judgement." ~., Vol. I, 
P• 406. . -
2. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 542. He later identifies mind on its 
intellectual side with a system of ideas. cr. ~·· 
Vol. II, P• 45. . 
3. cr. ~-, Vol. I, P• 109. 
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the presence in it of judgement an inevitable conclusion."1 
This reference beyond the given is an integral part of 
the idea's function. In judgment, the idea always refers to 
something beyond itself. The idea is a psychic event but it 
also is taken as a content belonging to a systematic world of 
objects independent of my thought. It refers to such a world. 
"we have seen that the mind never simply entertains an idea, 
that to have a thought is always to judge, i.e. to assert 
something about a subject."2 
It is especially important to define at least preliminarily 
at this point what Blanshard means by "reference" of an idea 
in judgment. Judgment does not mean just an "act" but "what 
is asserted, that which is judged true or false, the 'proposi-
tional content, ' that in which two minds would most obviously 
agree if they were making the same judgment. This element can 
quite well be discussed in abstraction from its mental accom-
paniments, whether it can exist apart from them or not."3 
1. 
2. 
Ibid., Vol. I, P• 107. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, P• 85. It is 
lEIS fact of reference which makes error possible. For 
Whitehead, error is only possible on the level of symbolic 
reference where it is incorrectly assumed that the data 
experienced 1n the mode of presentational immediacy charac-
terizes a society experienced in causal efficacy. But, 
again, "reference" is possible on the level of feeling for 
Whitehead. Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and 
Reality, PP• 255ff. ---
Ibid., Vol. II, p. 65. Or, as Bradley would say, there 
are-no "floating ideas," Cf. Francis H. Bradley, Essays 
on Truth and Realit~, Chapter III. 
!Did., vor:-II, p.07. It is important also to distinguish 
t'rom the "intention" of an idea, to distinguish what the 
idea is of (its reference) and what it is about, i.e. what 
it is trYJng to do (its "intention"). Cf. ibid., Vol. II, 
p. 124. This distinction will come up later under the 
headings of the transcendent end and the immanent end of 
thought. Cf. below PP• 89ff. 
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Judgment not only involves the possibility of error 
through its separation of idea and sensuous given, but it 
also involves a cla~ to truth, viz., it holds that the 1dea 
characterizes the real world. Blanshard clarifies the 
feeling-meaning present in immediate exper1ence and the 
meaning present in judgment: 
In the perception of "things" we can see its 
presence plainly. Here that tak1ng of something 
to be, a process which is always present in belief, 
appears as the taking of certain qualities to 
"belong to" an object which has other qualities 
besides them.l 
Thought, even in its primitive for.m of perception, 
cla~s to be a revelation of the real. The idea is not a 
mere psychic event but it points to something as existing 
in the real world. Judgment, or belief, gives mind its 
reference to "reality."2 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 116. 
2. cr.-ibid., Vol. I, P• 304. What Blanshard means by 
"reaii'tY" will concern us later. However, it is important 
here to see this referential character of thought and idea. 
We shall see later that ideas do have an instrumental 
function; , but they also carry an assertion of what is 
and are not just an assertion of acts or operations to 
be performed. The referential character of the idea 
takes us beyond experience to reveal the structure of 
things. In this regard, Blanshard identi.fies himSelf' 
with the rationalist as against the pragmatist: "The 
rational1st conceives of thought as an attempt to 
apprehend and understand the nature of th1ngs, and he 
considers himself to have achieved such understanding in 
the degree to whiCh the matter apprehended exhibits 
logical necess1ty." Ibid., Vol. I, p. 341. Of. ibid., 
Vol. II, p. 44. The ImPOrtant point here and throughout 
is that the idea does refer to something "other" and 
objective; but its standard is, in this very act of 
reference, something internal, the ideal of system. 
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Judgment, then, involves the separation of a "that" 
and a "what," it involves a reference beyond the "that." 
But is this change a "total n transformation or the "that," 
the content of initial experience? BlanShard's answer lies 
in the function of the universal 1n perceptual inference. 
Let us look at this now. 
(2} The Use of Universals in Perceptual Inference 
It is difficult in this prel~inary discussion to give 
an exact account of. what Blanahard means by the term 
"universal" and we will have to defer this to a later sec-
1 tion. Here we shall be mainly concerned with a description 
ot the use ot the universal 1n perceptual inference. Blanshard 
does help us formulate a preliminary definition: 
When we speak of a universal here we mean a 
kind of genus which can be exemplified in various 
ways, and when we say this is used as a middle we 
mean that the passage trom the sensed content to 
the perceptual acceptance ~r judgement is made 
through this generic te~. 
The 11universalu as it is used here supplies the identical 
reference which is necessary for inference, necessary for the 
passage from the sensed con tent taken as a "that'' to the 
assertion of a "what." 
In Blanshard's terms, this passage from sensed content 
to perceptual acceptance is the same problem with whiCh he has 
been concerned and the one which we have been concerned to 
point up. How do we provide for the transition between 
1. For a treatment of his full view, see below p. o9ff. 
2. Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 90-91. 
-
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immediate experience and later experience~ How do we account 
for the f'aot that there is some change in initial experience 
made by its being explicitly ordered and yet this is not a 
total transformation? How do we account for the reference of 
the idea beyond the sensuous given?1 This is the problem of 
inference. 
The significance of the problem of inference for 
Blanshard is as central as it was for his predecessors. In 
a sense, Blanshard's whole work is concerned with it and it 
is, accord1ngly, difficult to get the problem stated in one 
definite passage. But same of h1s predecessors have done this 
very well. Bosanquet calls inference a "paradox" for it con-
sists in asserting a fact or truth on the grounds of certa1n 
facts or truths; the fact asserted must go beyond the ground 
if it is to have sign1f1canee and yet have its basis 1n the 
2 ground. Bradley calls inference a "puzzle." 
It ••• the object ~the what_l does not 
advance beyond its beginni'ng Cthat7_, there is 
clearly no inference. But • • • if the ob jeot 
passes beyond what is itself, the inference is 
destroyed.3 
The answer to the quest1on of the transitiOn lies in the 
universal. The universal is of primary importance in perceptual 
1. His answer is going to lie 1n h1s account of the nature of 
the universal as medium through which inference takes place. 
The nature of the universal is, in a sense, the "general 
principle" referred to above, p. lb. 
Ct. Bernard Bosanquett ~Essentials 2! Logic,· (London: 
Macm1llan & Co., 1920}, PP• 62tt. 
Francis H. Bradley, The Principles of Lo~ic (2d ed. rev.), (London: Oxford Un1vers1ty Press, 1~2, vola.), Vol. II, 
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p. 599. Of. F. H. Bradley, Appearance ~ Reality, pp. 144ft'. 
inference 1n its function as an identity through which 
inf'e.rence takes place. There can be no :Ln.ference f'rom 
particular to particular, a universal mua t always be used 
as grounds of' the 1nf'erence •1 There can be no inference 
except through the medium of an identity or universal which 
acts as a bridge from one case to another. 
Blansbard 1s use or the term "inference" seems to allude 
to nothing more than the !'act of an insight into the connec-
tion between the grounds and the acceptance of' an object. 
The essential thing 1n inference 1s the insight 
into the connection of ground and consequent, and 
this insight is not a whit the less inference because 
it happens to occur 1n a flash. • • • ;-Inference 7 
consists properl! in nothing Whatever Sut the insrght 
into connection. 
Again, 
But the essential thing about inference is 
••• the fact or the passage •••• This passage 
need not be a temporal one in whiCh first there 
is the appear~ce or t~ ground and ~ or the 
conclusion. It may, tor all we can see, be 
instantaneous. When we perceive an orange, we do 
not first catch the sensory cue and then pass to 
the conclusion that an orange is there;cue and 
conclusion seem to present themsglves together 
and blend into a single percept. 
But the insight into connection is done within the 
universal. The universal carries the conclusion. In 
1. Bradley sums up this point by namLng the two conditions 
of inference as identity and the use of a universal. 
There can be no reasoning except on the basis or an 
identity nor is it possible to reason except on the 
basis that at least one pramis is universal. Of. F. H. 
Bradley, The Princi~es of Logie., Vol. II, pp. 28bff. 
This is eii'int!aliy lie '5'isis of one of Blanshard' s maln 
arguments against empiricism. No amount of repetition 
of "1mpress1ons" will yleld a basis for inference. For 
Blanshard's argument that the law of the unifor~ty or 
nature is not justifiable on empirieal grounds, see 
Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Truth, Ch. XXVIII. 
Brand Blanshard, '.l'1ii' Nature t5r 1'!'utll, Vol. I, p. 87. 
Ibid., Vol. I, p .-g'6. -
-
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Blanshard 1s words: 
Between the perceptual acceptance o£ an object, 
say a man, and its basis 1n sensation, there is some-
thing else that leads on to this acceptance and, so 
to speak, carries the conclusion. It l.s not thl.s 
particular shape, behavior, etc., ·that the character 
man is connected wl.th, but th1s .1t:l.nd of shape and 
oenavior, and within the ~ or-tffis kind many 
d1f£erent specializations~d-gi~ cue.l 
Our emphasis upon the "range of the .K:J.nd" 1n the passage 
above is extremely important for, despite the fact that 
Blansbard does no't bring this out as tully as he might in this 
important chapter, this points up an essential point with which 
Blanshard is going to be concerned. The universal does pro-
vide the identity necessary to complete perceptual inference 
but it is not a bare identity. The universal which is used 
as a medium through which lnf'erenee takes place has a range, 
it is an identity with differences -- a nexus of universals. 
In short, it is a "system" o£ universals. 2 
Let us attempt to give an illustration of just how the 
universal functions here : Blanshard holds that 1n every per-
ception of a thing there are three terms, the sensed content, 
a universal, and associated universals. Perception is a pro-
cess of arriving at a judgment from grounds. The process is 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 90. We have italicized "withl.n the 
FS.iiie of this k1.nd. " 
2. We shall have to wait until our section on the concrete 
universal to fUlly explain this. The important point 
here is that "system" is present on this elementary level 
and that it exempll.fl.es one use ot "s'tstem" which is 
present throughout hl.S work. "System refers to an 
l.dentity with differences, a nexus o£ universals, which 
bring together its v~ious 1natances into some sort of 
connection. 
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one of in:ferellCe end can be described as 11quasi-syllogistic."1 
Let us take the perception of a thing expressed in the state-
ment, "This is the red book." 
Thls 1s R 
R 1s B 
Thls is B 
"R" in the first premise refers to the sensation of the 
determinate quali t;y red. It is ~ shade or red. 
"R" ln the second premlSe refers to a type, a meaning, or 
which "this 1s red" is one exemplification. This is the 
use of a universal. It involves going beyond the given 
but it is a part of present perception itself; it does 
not represent a mere past cond.lt ion of present perception. 
The use of the universal 1s coextensive with the percep-
tion of things. But the universal always comes in a 
context, it always has a "range • " "B 11 in the s econd 
premise 1s a part of this range. 
"B" ~ the eonclus1on is the result of the association which 
the use of "R u 1n the second premise, the type, calls up. 
The type of which this shade is one embodiment has been 
associated with other features of the book 1n the past 
and now when th1s shade 1s presented other features tend 
to arise. 
Objects are mediately known through types, or universals. 
This process may or may not be explicitly stated or known but 
2 
all three terms are involved in perceptual inference. 
Let us brlng out some of these points. We have seen that 
the universal serves as an identity through which perceptual 
1. Ct. ibid., Vol. I, P• 89. 
2. Im.pl'ICI't within thl.s illustration is, of course, the 
position that the entailment in the syllogism is not 
a matter of propositional form but has its real ground 
in the meaning of the terms. The establ:t.shment or 
connection is based upon the meanings of the terms 
1.nvolved and not just the "form'' or the syllogism. 
For Blansb.ard's arg'UJJ8nts against the Views or formalism 
and symbolic logic in regard to implication see ibid., 
Chapter XXIX. OUr illustration may be misleadlng-nire. 
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inference taKes place. It is a condition of perceptual infer-
ence, the insight into the connection between the sensuous 
given as the f1rst prem1se and the f1nal judgment of connection. 
1 In this sense, perception 1s a quasi-syllogistic process. 
But this is a little misleading, for the cond1tion of 
inference is not a bare identity with other universals 
externally attached. The universal has a "range." It is a 
system of universals, a nexus of universals. The "conclusions" 
of perceptual inference must fall within this system. The 
connection must be in some sense intrins1c to the system in 
order to be gro1.Ulded. You can only infer from a "thistt to a 
"what" by po1nt1ng to a system of interdependent parts, a 
whole of relations or properties so held together that you can 
infer from some of them the nature of others. The condition 
of perceptual inference, then, is a more or less expl1cit 
system of content which may or may not be developed into pre-
else relations between its parts. Aga1n, we can repeat this 
passage: "To thinK involves the relat1ng of the object thought 
of to something else within a system."2 
To clarify this use of the term "system, 11 let us use our 
above example of "this 1s a red booK." The second premise in 
1. Blanshard ma1ntains that the process follows the principle 
of the syllogism -- what satisf1es the condition of a rule 
falls under the rule. Cf. ib1d., Vol. I~ p. 90. We take 
th1s to refer to the appl1cat1ve pr1nc1ple. What 1s true 
of each and every member of a class is true of any given 
member of that class. If the sensed content satisfies the 
cond1tion of the universal, i.e. 1s an exemplif1cation of it, 
then, g1ven this type of universal and its associate 
universals, the conclusion follows in some way. 
2. Ib1d., Vol. I, p. 6b. 
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this example represents a system of assoc~ated universals 
and the lnferenee takes place within the system. The grounds 
of the inference 1s not just a un~versal; nor, as we have 
seen, can it be a partiCular. The grounds or the inference 
~s a context of universals, a un1versal which has a set of 
relations without m~ch it would not be what it is, and which 
allows us to go on to infer, grasp a connect~n, with other 
unl.versals which are bound up_!!! !2!.! degree with it. The 
universal asserted 1n a proposition comes in a context. A 
later passage might clarify this. 
Just as tne asserted content is organic with 
the mind as a whole, so it is organic with a logical 
system whose influence permeates it through and 
through. This system may not be explicit, and it 
may vary ~ scope and integration. But it is always 
there. Every attempt to cut concepts or judgments 
loose from it, however practically convenient or 
even necessary, 1s in strictness illegitimate. And 
s1nce what 1s asserted takes its very nature from 
the system, to d1sciss the truth ~n abstract1on from 
the system 1s idle • 
Another way of saying this, perhaps, is that the minor 
term 1n our syllogl.sm 1s internally related to the middle term 
and so 1s the major term. and both m1nor and major ter.ms are 
not seen as what they are unless they are so related. Inference 
is tne passage of one point to another within this system and 
tbe po~ts are inextricably bound up within this system. The 
universal also takes l.ts character from its points or 
spec1f1cations.2 
1. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 313. 
2. Again we shall have to put off full dl.scussion of these 
points until we come to a discussion of the concrete 
universal and internal relations. 
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Perceptual inference, then., moves within a system, a 
nexus or universa.ls. This has .far-reaching consequences 
which Blanshard carries out ln. the rest of his work. One of 
these is that the kind o:r lnterence, the kl.nd of connections 
grasped on any level of thought will depend upon the kind o:r 
system you are dealing with. 
The universal used and the context in which it comes 
to some extent determine the k1nd of connection or inference 
made. In Book III, Blanshard defines inference as follows: 
"To infer, 1n its ver1 essence, is to extend a system already 
partly present 1n the mind, in such manner as the system 
requl.res."1 It is the system with whiCh we are dealing that 
requires the kind of connection to complete itself -- we bring 
this system to explicitness, but the kind of structure required 
2 is .fiXed by the system. An:1 syatem accepted, any essence 
which 1a beyond a this and operates as a cri ter1a of relevance, 
will show some compulsion to accept the connections within its 
parts. This connection need not be a necessary connection, 
although no process i.e tully inference except the 1nsight into 
necessity.3 Indeed, the process of inference may be associative 
l. 
2. 
Ibid., Vol. II, P• 79. , 
~also Blanshard's later definition of 1mpl1cat1on. 
"We take the relatl.v1st view. We hold that one cannot 
define implication in ter.ms of p end q, because more is 
always involved. If one is Sta.id to l.mply the other, it 
is because both belong to a w~er system and to grasp the 
1mplicat1on between them is to grasp them as members of 
that system. Implication is systematic interdependence. 
It is a relation between parts ot a whole imposed on them 
by the nature of the whole itself. Since there are manJ 
kinds o.f whole, there are many varieties of ~plication. 
Since wholes, again, have man1 degrees of unity, there are 
many degrees of necessity w1 th Which one proposition may 
imply another." Ibid., Vol. II, p. 430. 
Ct. ibid., Vol. r,-p. 88. 
-
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as we saw 1n our example. 'l'here is no hard and fast line 
between the kinds or connections grasped w.1th1n systems. 
But while it 1S important to d1St.1ngu..1sh implica-
tions from connections that are associative, it is 
important also to see that the line between them is 
not a hard and fast one. Necessity may be at work within 
processes that seem merely associative; indeed, as1we shall see later, no process is barely associative. 
On this level of 1nference, however, there is insight 
into connection and there 18 the presence of implicit system 
1n perceptual inference. We take the given datwn as part of 
a larger structural whole or system and complete the inference 
1n terms of the 1nB1ght 1nto the connectl.ons wl.thin th1s system. 
We have seen that 1n the perception of things 
what is given in sense is taken as part of a larger 
whole. We have argued that suCh percept1on .involves 
the implicit judgement that other parts of this 
· whole exist; and we have described the process that 
leads to thls judgement as 1mplioit 1nferenee.2 
But on th.1s level the groands are 1mplicit, the system 
used to ground the inference 1s not s1ngled out for full and 
specific attention, as when we recognize a friend -- this 
recognition is effortless and the grounds upon which this 
recognition rests are not explicit.3 
This, of course, refers us back to our discussion of 
judgment, the element of error, and the clalm of judgment to 
reveal the character of the real. The inference which leads 
to judgment is not an insight into the connection between bare 
abstractl.ons. Judgment has reference 1n perception to further 
1. · Ibid., Vol. I, P• 97. 
2. IOIQ., Vol. r; p. 165. 
3. ~ibid., Vol. I, PP• 97, 105. 
-
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conditions which 1s the total ground of the inference. The 
implicit or further conditions and the expl1cit condit1ons 
(that which the Judgment has explicit reference to -- the 
logical subject ot tm propos1t1on) together .form a system, 
an l.ntegral whole. It is within this total system that 
1nterence holds. Every judgment is unconditioned because it 
asserts ot the subject that it belongs to reality. It is 
also conditional in the sense that 1f all the conditions were 
given, it all the "wha ts" were given, the assertion might not 
be true. When fragmentary insights are accepted they are done 
so w+th the implicit recognition that they might be different 
if all the conditions were told. The judgment is subject to 
conditions "outside" the explicit content of the assertion 
(but not necessarilJ other than content 1n kind). Hence, in 
every judgment we have, in sy.m.bolic form: "reality" is such 
that S is P. The "as such" can be 1mpl1c1t or explic1t but 
it is always a "system," a "context," WhiCh grounds perceptual 
1nterenoe. 
In summary, then, inference within a system is Blanshard's 
aolutl.on to the problem of the 1mnediate-:mediate continuum. 
The relation between what is given in sense and what is judged 
is a passage, "a movement that may be described as ~plicit 
inference, in which neither what is sensed nor what is taken 
for granted is singled out tor express attention • • • no sharp 
line can be drawn between tbem. "1 We never succeed in reaching 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 120. 
-
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a datum unaffected by nsaning. universals are there from the 
beg1nn1ng and are co-extensive with the data. Sense data are 
not sharply distinguishable trom nor uninfluenced by their 
1 
context of nean1ng by which they come clothed. 
For Blanshard thlS does not mean that we can resolve the 
world or material th1ngs 1n to thoughts. 2 But it does mean 
that the line between the g1ven and thought, sensation and 
inference, theory and fact, is not a hard and fast one. What 
is given comes in a context of relations of which the datum 
is a tragme nt • 
We have also seen the central position which the universal 
takes in this process from the immediate to medl.ate experience. 
It serves as an identity, through which perceptual inference 
takes place. But it is not a bare identity; it comes in a 
context -- the grounds tor 1n:ference is a nexus of universals. 
You can only inter from a "this" to a "what 11 within a system 
or interdependent parts. This system may be more or less 
1. We have already seen this as a negatl.on or the empiricist 
traditl.on or taking unanalyzable s~ples and bu1ldl.ng up 
knowledge l.n this way. But this vl.ewpol.nt also represents 
a denial ot the Kantian approach to experience and to the 
resulting view that knowledge is l~l.ted to a world that 
ml.nd makes tor 1tulf. For Blanshsrd, the Kant ian view-
point would result from an incorrect analysl.s of immedl.ate 
experience from which orderly relations are abstracted and 
the remainder is supposed to be what l.s actually gl.ven. 
Blanshal"d's v1ew 1n the end may come close to Kant, but 
he would be quite aga1nst this aspect or Kant. The sensory 
and the unl.versal arl.S e together in l.Dined1a te experl.ence. 
2. Blanshard adds the important qual1f1cat1ons that "this 
1s not to say that the world may not be resolvable into 
exEer1ence; nor is it even to deny that the objects of 
aensat1on are exclusively universals." Ibid., Vol. I, 
P• 118. ----
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explicit but it is a condition of perceptual l.nference, it 
"carries" the conclusion. 
Inference or the relatl.on between the given end the taken 
depend upon system, a context of universals, in which the data 
are an integral part and upon which the operation of the in-
terence depends. The choice ot system may be to some extent 
relative to the data wht ch. is to be explained but, given this 
data and system, the kind of connections which follow are 
necessarily certain klnds because ot the character of the 
l 
system. 
Loo!t1ng a little ahead here, we can see that the 
universal 1s going to function as the principle of synthesis 
by which we order data. It has a functional status. 
The genus-idea represents a plan or rule on which the 
species are built. The universal, or genus-idea, as a system 
will represent the kind of structure or relations with which 
the data are capable of being ordered. The universal is not 
something which is put into the data and is alien to it or 
unaffected by it but is interdepement with the data. Every 
judgment, being quasi-syllogistic, will express the unity of 
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so.me part in a system, or of some differences within a system, an 
1. Th1s is Blanshard's use o£ the term rtground." The ground 
of inference 1s a whole, a context of universals, in which 
the things to be grounded must be included. Bradley says 
the ground is both intrinsic in the thing and implied in 
the thing. Cf. F· H. Bradley, The Principles of Loeit, 
Vol. II, p. 633. This use of tfii"""term 11system~is no 
only Blanahard' s answer to the central problem of the 
relation between the given and the taken but will also 
have far reaching ramlfications. That is, as we shall see, 
tbe relation of differences in identity, or parts within a 
system. Every kind of system is an identity and its parts 
are always differences within it. The concrete universal 
is already ~plieitly present even on the perceptual level. 
See below P• o8ff'. 
identity. Thus every judgment is a. process ot synthesis in 
that it takes its data along with an operation which combines 
them into a whole which exhibits connection among them. But 
the nature ot the ident1ty, or universal, because it is not 
always just a bare identity, giTeS rlBe to different modes Of 
connection between their parts or species and thus brings 
about different k1nds ot judgments and lnf'erence. This is 
perhaps another way or s ay1ng that there ere many principles 
ot order, many rules ot synthesis, w1th whl.Ch we establish 
eennect1ons anong data. But we JIIUSt not tor get tba t the kind 
ot universal or rule dealt with to some extent deter~es the 
k1nd of connections wh1eh will be possible 1n the data. 
Blanshard wants us to take this aspect seriously.1 
The fUnctional status of system can thus be seen as a 
criteriOnor relevance with whi~ we order our experience. 
The order with which we connect our data is determined by our 
criterion of relevance, it links together the various cases 
and presentations 1n which the th1ng is given to us. Every 
inference, then, is a class:tficat:ton of data and every judgment 
1. Its importance may not be evident here but will be when 
we come to h:ts dl.scus s1on of the concrete universal. It 
you accept certa1n kinds ot universals, e.g. the "abstract 
universal," or if you accept certain x1nds of systems, 
e.g. a causal system, then, bt the very nature of the 
case, you will not get tully 1ntell:tgible" connections 
among the data. 1'he importance ot choosing the right 
"system" with wh:tch to order experience is all important 
tor metaphysics. 
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1 is an instance of a kind ot universal or system pointed to. 
What kind of system is referred to 1n grouping together the 
qualities of things? 
iil.. The StructUl'e of Things 
We cannot, then, separate the sensuous given and what is 
judged in perception.2 Nor can we separate the kinds of 
apprehension which belong to tne mind from their objects. 
"The only possible way to study the organizatiOn of thought 
is to study the organization it finds or introduces amoung its 
objects."3 
What are the relations which we find or introduce between 
the presented qualities themaelves? Why do we tend to take 
certain qualities as belonging to one thing? And what provides 
the inner bond by which certain qualities are grouped together?4 
1. This way of looking at tbe tunction of system as a medium 
through which we order data will have far reaching ramifica-
tions in another way also tor Blanshard. If the system of 
ideas is seen to have a functional status, is seen to have 
its use 1n the order and correlations which it establishes 
among the data of experience, then the deliverances of 
experiBnce, i.e. the k~s of judgments and inference• 
found to be present 1n experience, can come up for internal 
criticism according to how well they do so order experience 
and whether they point to one ideal order. But this facet 
of the function or system is a part of our later analysis. 
See coherence below p. ~7tf. 
2. Implied in this is, of course, a denial of phenomenological 
method which tries to describe experience without the 
destructive effect of analysis, the separation of data 
and judgment. Ct. ibid., Vol. I, P• 110. 
3. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 8~ 
4. m:aiishard is not "otrl.cietl.ly" as.K1ng logical or epistemo-
logical questions at this point. He is not asking for 
logl.eal or metaphysical grounds for the order which 
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qu~lities have or are given. He is askl.ng how, psychologically, 
do we actually cane to order them so? What is the genesis 
ot this order? 
If we grant that things are selectively constituted 1n regard 
to ~al::Lties, on what principles are they so grouped and ordered? 
What forms or organ1zat1on belong to perception specially? 
Before we go on to cite these prinCiples or organization 
ot qualities, we should perhaps clarify the question Blanshard 
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is MSX1ng here. He is asking a question regard::Lng the organiza-
t::Lon or part::Lcular qualities 1n percept::Lon of th~gs, why this 
grouping of these particular qualities, why that grouping of those 
particular qualitiest On what pr1nciples are these things 
capable of being ordered, capable of being seen as systems whose 
parts are connected by the most dlverse relat::Lonst Here the 
question has to do with the relat::Lons between particular quali-
ties of a given thing. These relations exclude categorical 
relations •1 
There are many different kinds of qual1ties (weight, size, 
color, shape) which are said to constitute a thing. On what 
principles are such grouping carried out? 
The first factor Blanshard mentions which is involved in 
the grouping of certa::Ln qualities is the factor of 11 joint 
prominence." Some qualities stand out together from an un-
appealing background, as when the shape, size and color of a 
mountain peak stand out against the sky. These qualities may 
1. Ct. ibid., Vol. I, P• 159. He says of categorical 
rela"t'llns: "Such relations hold less between the particular 
qualities of a given thing than between types of quality or 
attribute; motion as suCh muat be spatial; any size 1mplies 
shape. For the reiions why particular colours, tastes, etc., 
flock together as they do, we must tur.n to considerations 
or a different kind, whiCh have nothiDf to do with necessity 
and very little to do with each other. ~., Vol. I, 
PP• 123-124. 
in turn depend upon the strength of sensations, the interest we 
have 1n them, and the contrast which they give to each other. 
They m~y be seen as "one object" because of the constant associa-
tion with one another in this context.l The second factor which 
Blanshard mentions is "Joint movement." Qualities Which move 
together gain prominence. "Their common motion sets them off 
against the duller unchanging background, and they become united 
in the thought of one th1ng."2 But whether motion is observed 
or not, joint Change is also a factor which makes for the 
prominence of some qualities. When qualities change together 
then they are taken to be changes in the qualities of one th1ng.3 
But by tar the most 1mportant factor which makes tor the 
grouping ar qualities is the factor of "Joint utility!' "we 
group together 1.n one thing qualities ,;.hich serve one purpose. "4 
OUr own interests and practical ends provide us with principles 
ot selection with which to group qualities. On this level, 
Blanshard follows WilliSlll James, the meaning of essence is 
teleological.s 
1. Ct. ibid., Vol. I, PP• 124ft. 
2. Ibid-:;-vol. I, p. 129. 
3. ~ibid., Vol. I, P• 129. 
4. Ibid-:;-vol. I, p. 130. 
5. ~ibid., Vol. I, p. 130. Blanshard does not want to go 
the Wllo'Ie way in this, however. He adds the important 
qualification: "Some qualities have a priority in nature 
which they owe to no man's preference; they are more 
essential to the thing because, logically or causally, 
they determine a larger range of the other qualities than 
these qualities themselves •••• It ••• we cling to some 
characters as more indispensable than others 1n the constitu-
tion of a given thing, this is dictated at least partly by 
nature and not solely by our own interests." Ibid., Vol. I, 
PP• 130•131. ----
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Blanshard sees the importance of interest and practical 
ends in regard to our grouping of qualities which come success-
ively. How are successive perceptual events grouped into a 
thing conceived as enduring? Besides the factor or resemblance 
and continuity of perceptual events, Blanshard sees no one way 
to interpret the groupinss or successive qualities into one 
thing. nBut the fact is that our groupings of the successive 
• • • proceed according to shifting interests, and on no con-
1 
sistent principle." Our groupings along this line depend upon 
the qualities in which we are interested. No one answer is the 
right one. Blanshard is in substantial agreement on th:Ls level 
with Hume 1 s view of the "identity" ot successive events. 
Blanshard uses th:Ls pragmatic definit:Lon of essence in 
regard to another problem about the grouping of qualities. 
This is the problem. of incompatible qualities within the same 
object. This problem is particularly acute when we try to· 
explain the v:Lsible size of an object. How can we attribute 
the variation 1n the visible size of an object to a single th:Lng1 
But, again, Blanshard is not concerned to show how these 
appearances are "reall,-" related to the object but in what way 
we actually come to attribute these qualities to our object. 
Blanshard holds that th~s groupl.ng is done on the principle of 
convenience. The selection of the "real" qualities is done on 
the basis of conven1ence. What is the "real" color of the dress 
after it 1s seen to be of many different colors by different 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 139. 
-
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people? The color is determ~ed by the establishment of 
standard cond~tions which are set up somewhat arbitrarily.l 
The rules by which we order the different qualitative 
data of our experience are various. The order we give to the 
qualities is a matter of interest and utility. 
Those solid every day things which seem constructed 
in a fashion so firm and ~evitable are really thrown 
together 1n a most hit-or-miss way, and if thought for 
a time comes to rest amoung them, this is only because 
it has ceased to press its own interest and has sur-
rendered to the comp~ting cla~s of conven~ence and 
practical necessity. 
But there 1s another element 1n this chapter which must 
be pointed out for lt is to rece1ve increas1ng emphasis in the 
hands of Blanshard from here on in. The grouplng of qualities 
follows another principle which has not been mentioned. 
There are groupings of sensory elements which 
are due to nelther of the types of agency regarded 
as exhaustive, but to such a response of the organ-
ism as a whole to its sttmuli as a whole as leads to 
the ordering of sensory elements in certain preferred 
patterns.3 
The mind has a d~spos~tion to group its qualities accord~ng 
to forms of its own, in certain orders from the very beginning, 
and to some extent the other types of groupings are dependent 
upon this fact. 4 
1. cr. ibid., Vol. I, ·p. l4o. 
2. Ibid-:-;--v'ol. I, p. 120. 
3. IDIQ., Vol. I, P• 133. 
4. ~ in the selection by joint utility, the mind is not 
wholly pass1ve until meanings are developed. We are able 
to select certain groups of qualities for our purposes 
because they are to some ex~ent grouped already. We are 
able to flnd a jolnt use for them because they are grouped 
already. Blanshard calls them 11 cond:J.tions 11 for the 
demarcation of a thing. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, P• 134. 
-
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The m1.nd shows an original bias toward certai.n kinds of 
Gestalten. The mind groups thlngs 1.n accordance with the 
"law of pr~gnanz," i.e. the qualities will organize themselves 
aocordi.ng to stmplicity, regularity, and symmetry.1 
Its l.mportance for us here is tba t Blanshard takes this 
suggestion by the Gestalt psychologist seriously. 11 Is is pos-
sible that from the very beg1nn1.ng, and even in the organization 
of sense qualities into things, there is a pressure toward i.ntel-
ligible orderT"2 
We have seen that whenever judgment comes into play, 
whenever universals are used, inference takes place through a 
system, a context of universals which serves as an identity 
which "grounds" the perceptual inference. 
We have seen in this s action that, in our grouping of the 
qualities of things, l.n the order by which we order qualities 
into things, the universal, now taken as functioning as a plan 
or rule, serves as a pr lnciple by which we do so order qualities. 
The 1mportance of the principle of joint utllity and the 
dominance on this level of our practical interests were pointed 
to. The result for Blanshard is that our construction of 
"th~s" is done in a rather hit or miss way, the connection 
of qualitl.es in a thing is rather "loose." But however "loose" 
judgment on this level does proceed via universals and functions 
against a background of some order, system. 
1. Ct. ibid., Vol. I, P• 134 for a description of these 
elements 1n the law of pr~gnanz. 
2. ~., Vol. I, P• 136. 
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We get 1n thl.s seQtlon also a hlnt that Judgment is also 
dlreeted toward such a structure. ~e mlnd has a certain 
native bias toward forms of lts own. Many 11systems," many 
kl.nds of lntegratlon, may be possl.ble accordl.llg to our varlous 
practlcal lnterests, but Blansbard gives us a hint here that 
thought has an interest of its own. Our next section on 
perceptual meanlng wlll be concerned to brl.ng this out; it 
wlll also be concerned to show more of the functional status 
that universals dP have ln experlence. 
1 v. The Nature, Range and Structure of Perceptual Meaning 
We have seen that 1n perception things are lm.own mediately 
through types or unlversals. What is given 1n sense is taken 
as a part of a larger whole, and perception involves the im-
plicit judgment that other parts of this whole exl.St; this was 
a condition ot "~pll.c1t inference." We were then mainly 
concerned with the relation between the given and that which 
is supplementar7 to it but beyond it, and how we get from one 
to the other. Blansbard is now concerned with the nature of 
the SliPplementary part ot pereeptlon, the nature of meaning as 
it 1s used on this perceptual level. 
We have towid. that the unl.versal, which always comes in a 
context and torms a "system" wlth other universals, has .tunc-
tloned as an identity through which perceptual inference takes 
place. Here, in perceptual meaning, the nexus ot universals 
1. Thl.s use ot "system" as grounding perceptual inference 
we shall return to later under the heading or "The Nature 
Of Universals." C.t'. P• 7U.t'.t'. 
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is now seen as a context ot m.ean1ngs, a system of meanings, 
which tuncti.ons as a criterion of relevance and significance 
in present perception. Psychologically, there is an t.plicit 
or expl1o1t system or mean1Dg which we bel.ng to bear 1.n per• 
ceptl.on and wh1en serves as a settl.ng or background of what is 
given. In order to explain eertau psychological phenomena on 
this level ot peroeptl.on, an active system or meaning is 
requ1red.1 
(1) :Meaning, Relevance, am D1spos1.tions 
As we have seen, both the sensuous given and that wh1.ch 
1s beyona the given are necessary for perception. The ratio 
of one to the other may vary cons 1derably and go along a scale 
whiCh at one end borders on pure sensation and at the other end 
borders on reflection. Blanshard is concerned here with the 
intermedl.ate level or perceptl.on and the status of the non-
sensible element 1n this peroeption.2 
1. We must aga1n give the prel1.1Unary warning that Blanshard 
is mainly concerned here, as he has been thus far, with a 
psychological analysis as to how meaning is used l.n per-
ception. Perceptual judgment still has a double referent --
the sensuous given and that which is taken tor granted, and 
Blanahard is still concerned with an account of how these two 
relate to each other. Some of his conclusions as to how they 
do relate will, of course, have great effect on his later 
logical and metaphys 1.eal use ot the notion or system. Rl.ght 
now, however, he 1s concerned to show that any psychological 
account or how meaning is used involves a certain v1.ew or 
what the mean1ng of.system is, its structure, inter-connec-
tion, and mode ot operation. 
2. Hence, we Mre no longer concerned Just w1.th the structure ot 
quu1tiea in the perception of th1ngs but the form 1n which 
system ot meanlngs is used when retained experiences are 
brought to focus on the object, e.g. a motor mechanic's 
hearing ot a detective engine, or the perception of a spot 
in the sky as be l.ng an airplane. 
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Blansbard given an example ot such a scale: 
I perceive a sound as a sound. I perceive it 
as a human voice. I perceive it as a voice ot a 
friend. I grasp what mr friend is saying as a re-
:m.ark about the weather. • • • None of these cases is 
the perception or a thibang• In all of them there is 
something given, but w t is interesting about them 
iS their increasing volume or reference to that which 
lies beyond the given. The relative 1mportance of 
the sensory element grows less; that of the non-
sensory element grows greater; the Pfrceptions are 
increasingly top-heavy with meaning. 
To spec 1.ty further, Blanahard is concerned w1 th the 
meaning as acquired through past experience and how it functions 
to enable the perceiver to give r~t significance to data. 
Present perception is what it is because of 1ts setting 1n a 
great fringe of retal.ned. experience, funded .knowledge. It 
some of the meanings we attach to various sensations are gotten 
through past experience, what is the status 1n experience of 
this retained meaning and how does this meaning function 1n 
present perception?2 
To explain our perception on this intermediate level we 
must suppose that our experience is 1n some sense conditioned 
by our past. OUr interpretation ot the given 1s :1n some sense 
controlled by the results or a large range of past experience, 
so fused w11m sense that it ia impossible to separate them. We 
must, 1n order to explaln this dominance of meaning, say that 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 160. 
2. !5Ii wnole analysis or a "system" of meaning as a setting 
for present perception can be supplemented by ibid.., Vol. II, 
Ch. XXIV, wherein Blanshard speaks of the function of the 
subconscious ~ invention. Ct. ibid., Vol. II, PP• 166ft. 
-
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these results are in some sense present. How do we explain 
not only the fact of th1s surv1v~l of the past, but also the 
fact of retention? 
Retention adds something different for Blanshard. 
For the pol.nt about learning by experience is 
not simply that o.oe 1 s behavior is 1ni'luenced by the 
past, but that it is influenced selectively by the 
past, that results tending to turther the present 
activity tend to be retal.ned while irrelevant results 
are dropped. • • • The successes do tend to register 
theMselves, the ~stakes do not.l 
For Blanshard, retentiQQ is not just memory, but involves 
a selective use of the past. It is not just habit nor is it 
the presence of the past 1n the present. It is the deposit of 
the past. The past occurrence never survives just as a "that," 
but the "wha't1 " the universal, can survive. The universal, 
the meaning whl.ch is complement&.r7 to the sensory cue, is now 
a Eresent part of perceptual recognition, and for Blanshard 
acts as a condition of it. 
But what makes perception so marked an achieve-
ment is that the past has left not s1m.ply a trace 1n 
my body but also a deposit 1n consciousness, and has 
left this in such fusion w1 th what I am sensing that 
it is almost ~possible to distinguish them.2 
Blanshard feels that it is only possible to explain 
learning and that retained meantng is relevant to present 
perception 1n terms of purpose. I use the deposit of my past 
experience d1scr~1nately, selectively, for an end. The 
perceptual interpretat~n on this level of sensation is 
deter.mined purposively. Just as the leap of perceptual 
1. Ibl.d., Vol. I, P• 163. 
2. ~., Vol. I, P• 164. 
-
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inference, the order it eatabll.shes among data and qualities, 
was determined by a criterion of relevance and was grounded 1n 
this order, so, on this intermediate level, the system of 
meaning we use as relevant to present perception !! determined 
purposively. 
But there is another problem which is directly connected 
with this. If' we grant that the mealU.ngs which we take to be 
complementary to the sensory cue are determined purposively, 
do we not see that sCIRe meanings will be excluded from being 
thus complementary? Meaning does complement experience, but 
does it not also "filter" it? Blanshard feels that this is a 
paradox. 
To some sensations no meaning is attached because 
they are irrelevant. But what makes them irrelevant? 
Not their character as sensations; mere sensations can 
be as little relevant or irrelevant as they can be true 
or false. What makes them relevant or not 1s the 
meaning placed upon them. Now 11' the only way they 
can be excluded as irrelevant is to have meaning placed 
upon them, then they are not really excluded at all, 
since it is confessed 1n so m~y words that the mind 
is construing them actively just as it is the other 
sensations. Hence a contradiction; the mind refuses 
to deal with them because they are irrelevant, but they 
could not be seen as irrelevant unless the mind ~ 
dealing with tbem. What shall we say to this?l 
If our present idea-system has been built up mainly because 
of our interest, our criterion or relevance, what determines the 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 198-199. Thls contradiction shows 
itself 1n many forms tbroughout Blanshard' s work. It 
shows itself 1n the relation of observation to theory 
where the former must be directed by the latter and yet 
the tormer is performed 1n order that the latter be 
arrived at. Ct. ibid., Vol. II, PP• 95, 42. We shall 
see that his theory ot mind as purposive is formulated 
precisely to deal with this. H1s dlscuss1on of degrees 
ot relevance and ~ternal relations are pertinent here. 
Ct. ibid., Vol. II, PP• 295, 456ft. 
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relevance or somethlng •outside" ~e system? What dete~ines 
whether it is to be included or excluded from the system? 
Blanshard 1 s solution to this problem is to fall back on a 
theory Of dispositions. Our interpretatiOn Of what is given 
see~ to be controlled by the results of a great range or past 
experience outside the focus ot consciousness, i.e. not 
explicitly present. The structure and the many changes of the 
conscious field in perception are unaccountable for without 
"dispositions" which co-operate actively with conscious purpose. 
"Dispositions" are the fringe or retained experience which may 
not be open to introspective analysis, but perception on this 
intermediate level is unintelligible without them. Dispositions 
"are the form 1n which we carr7 the results of past experience, 
the memoriss or events that are not at the moment being recalled 
••• the power to recognize things and faces. It is because 
they exist that we are able to peroeive."1 As we shall see later, 
the term "power" here is to be taken quite literally. Disposi-
tions are quite active tor Blanshard and are to be thought or 
as "agencies."2 
OUr interpretation of what 1s given 1n sense is controlled 
to various degrees by the results or a great range or past 
experienee.3 But these dispositions need not be fully present 
to consciousness at this level nor need we necessarily be able 
to reach them through introspection. But Blanshard emphasizes 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 182. 
2. ~ibid., Vol. I, PP• 188, 191, 200. 
3. The •control" is even more evident in his analysis or the 
process of invention. Ct. ibid., Vol. II, PP• 162ft • 
.......... 
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the fact that_they are organic to, and inseparable from, 
consciousness. 
What is actually there 1n our consciousness 
may be very little, but that little is made what 
it is by being a const1tuent 1n a system of meaning 
which, thotJgh present in most part only 1n the form 
ot difPosi tl.ons, 1s ready to be made conscious at 
need. 
D1apos1t1ons are the matrix of meanings in which conscious 
thought 11Yea. D1spos1 tiona cooperate with consciousness as 1t 
they were continuous with it. Their relation to consciousness 
ls 
1f' we are to choose en analogy, that of the members 
to their team when thls team is 1n play. • • • In the 
absence of any one of tl:lem, tbe whole and every other 
part would function differently. They are, if you 
will, so many "x' s n whose pr eo 1se nature is unknown 
to us but whose presence we are bound to infer ~om 
their aetivltiss in supplementing perception and in 
actualizing themselves as pertinent ldeas 1n the course 
ot reflect1on.2 
The dlsposit ions which the past leaves us 1n the form of 
meanings are an integral part of our present focus of conscious-
ness. They form one context w:Lth present perception. Blanshard 
admits the vagueness of such a theory of d:Lspositi~ns but regards 
it as an indispens 1ble working hypothes 1s • 
• 
To explain our present perceiving we must 
suppose that what we have experl.enced l.n some sense 
or other continues, and regardl.ng this as a total 
of unknQWn conditions, we proceed to dump into the 
vacuum what present experl.ence seems causally to 
requl.re. But to suppose that we know it as it is, 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 189. 
2. ID!a., Vol. I, P• 190. 
-
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apart fran this unverif'iable inference, or can ever 
so know it, would be to delude ourselves.l 
Dispositions and those mean1ngs which ere consciously 
present then tor.m an integral whole, a context ot meanings 
which are brougnt to bear in perception. But if they do form 
a whole, what is the structure which this whole displays? 
Blanshard has many terms tor this system or meaning. He 
uses the terms "meaning-mass,"2 "mnenic mass,•3 "idea-group,n4 
"idea-system."5 In referring to the group of meanings actually 
used 1n perception, Blanshard uses the term "system." 
I mean that at a..oy one t1me, the mind confines 
itself, so far as it can, to one system or ideas, that 
it is wUl1ng to move about withln the limits or that 
system, but that it resists breaking out or the circle 
and entering a new one. By a "system or ideas" is 
meant here what logicians call a "universe or discourse" 
or what is often called a "single context." What makes 
it single may be nothing as logical as the 1mpl1ca tion 
or its parts with each other; it may be only the tact 
that they serve 1n cCIDmon a single interest. The 
examples or such systems are countless. The movements 
or the players when we are watching a football game .form 
parts or such a system. The science of botany, the lite 
ot Napoleon, the virtues of a new motor-car, eats, 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 186. Blanshard is unsure of the ont-
IOg!cal status or dispositions at this point. But whether 
they exist or not, perception operates as if they do. We 
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are reqU1red to postulate dispositions 1n order to explain 
they selective teleological control of retained experience 
in perception. The ~portance of' his theory here is that 
this is the po1nt at which Blanshard first uses explicitly 
the category ot the potential. c.r. ibid., Vol. I, P• 190. 
This category will have full applicatiOn in his theory or 
m1nd where it is conceived as a movement of self-realization 
ot what bef'ore was only potential. Ct. ibid., Vol. I, P• 526. 
2. Ib1d., Vol. I, P• 192. ----
3. lOI!., Vol. I, P• 220. 
4. lOt!., Vol. I, P• 212. 
5. l'5'1Q., Vol. I, P• 221. We bave been using the term idea-
system, or system ot ideas. 
religious experience, spring .fashions, this game or 
cbesa • • • all are examples. I.f tbe mind were a wholly 
logical instr\Dlent and grouped thl.ngs into logical 
complexes only, these groups would never have been · 
recogn1Zed. But the mind • • • and its group1ngs as 
a rule are queer compromises between the demands or 1 
reason and the demands or other competing interests. 
It should be ranembered here that the "system or ideas" 
1ncludes not only those elements Jresent 1n focal consciousness 
but also disposi tiona which form an integral pe.rt with focal 
consciousness and are ready to be made conscious at need. Thus 
on the level of reflection he says: 
The system we always work with is always less 
that the whole; at the best it is the mass of 
scientific knowledge bearing on the point in question; 
on the average it is a cloudy congeries of memories, 
suggestions and inferences, ill-organized in the 
extreme, and yet capable o.f subconscious mobilization 
and use. And tor all or us, except in rare moments, 
the interest in truth is satisfied by exercise within 
these 11mits.2 
Such a system or ideas and meaning may gain dominance3 
and make for disadvantages in our perceptual experience. It 
may cause us to fail to observe other .factors whl.ch are not 
lncluded in this dominant meaning mass, i.e. we .fail to observe 
things which are not of the kind we are presently concerned with. 
~
It may cause our perceptions to vary tram person to person. But 
it also has advantages: it .facilitates our searching for fac-
tors, it aids tne power or the senses to discr~inate, it renders 
perception more swift and ready. 4 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 194. 
2. IDrQ., Vol. II, P• 271. 
3. !Dii is a .function of other .factors mentioned 1n the next 
section: length, repetition ot experiences, and interest. 
4. Both the disadvantages and the advantages of the system o.t 
meaning in perception are dealt with in ibid., Vol. I, 
PP• 20l.f.f. For a sumaary paas~ge, c.r. iD!Q;, Vol. I, P• 214. 
-
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OUr entire system ot meanings then, both dispositional 
and conscious, can be a powerful influence in the control of 
our perception for it holds the mind to the relevant and closes 
it to the irrelevant. It can both complement our sense exper-
ience and can rule some data out as irrelevant. 
(2) Meaning, Interest, and Integration 
The system of meaning used 1n perception may or may not 
aid perception. But whether we see this meaning system as 
explicitly at work or implicitly at work, we must see it as 
active. "The facta of perception are inexplicable without it; 
indeed its tunct1ons are both ~portant and man1told."1 
But not onl7 can the meaning system be an aid or detriment to 
perception; it also to some extent determines the adequacy of 
our perceptions. The adequacy of perception depends upon the 
structure which the meaning-mass has. What is this structure? 
For Blanshard, perceptual experience is cumulative, much 
more cumulative than what is implied in our narrow band of 
focal consciousness. Each perception contributes to the system 
which our mind is gradually constructing, each perception con-
tributes something to the meaning-mass, conscious or disposi-
tional. The meaning-mass has "depth." The traits first noticed 
in an object in perception tend to pers1st and those noticed 
later are added to them. It is not a matter of mere repetition. 
"The last perception carries as strata in its own structure the 
deposits of all ••• ot the preceding experiences."2 Each 
l. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 215. 
2. !bid., Vol. I, P• 216. 
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perception is a particular event and is over at that instant 
but each does contribute to the dispositional meaning-mass 
which is constantly growing. 
The meaning-mass has also a hierarchical structure. The 
constant repetition of perceptual experience br1ngs to the 
foreground through sheer repetition the ideas of t~e, space, 
cause, number, matter, etc. These general traits become firmly 
rooted in the perceptual meaning-system, although they may not 
be explicitly present 1n perception. 
These elements are the bony framework of 
perceptual thought whose flesh and dress may change, 
but which itself is hardened into fixity. It must 
not be supposed, of course, that the presence of 
these elements in all perceptions and expectftions 
means a presence distinguished and explicit. 
Within this framework of generality, we have a stratifi-
cation of meaning, a stratification of generality. This is 
evident 1n expert perceiv~g. 
It the expert concentrates on minutiae that 
someone else would never notice, it is not because 
he is missing the most general features, but because 
he is beyond the need of noting them; the grasp ot 
them is involved 1n the observation of those special 
features he does notice.2 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 216-217. 
2. !OIQ., Vol. I, pp. 217-218. A qualification should be 
i!aid here. Blanshard is not holding that the hierarchy 
involved 1n perceptual meaning is a process necessarily 
in time, that the layers of generality are deposited 
temporally as perceptual experience takes place. Nor are 
the layers necessarily correspondent to a logical movement 
from species to genus. Rather, all these levels coexist. 
In perceptual thought, meanings do become more definite 
and concrete but this is "within" the general meanings, 
i.e. a part of the system through which perceptual inference 
takes place. This process of the specification of the 
general is the pattern Blanshard uses all through his 
analysis of the mental process. We have seen it exemplified 
in the place of the universal in initial experience and in 
perceptual inference. Identity and differences are generated 
together. 
4~ 
The depth and hierarchy of the meaning-mass is a function 
of the length and repetition of perceptual experience. It is 
also a function of interest. But length and repetition of 
perceptions are not sufficient to obtain depth. Mere repeated 
exposure would do little to improve our meaning-mass. Percep-
tion must serve an interest. "Now where an interest is strong 
and lasting • • • we shall be add1ng continually to the depth 
ot the mnemic mass."1 
The chief' factor in prOducing depth, then, is continuity 
2 of interest. But long experience and a lasting interest are 
not enough. For intelligent perceiving we need a well 
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integrated idea-system, one which lends itself flexibly to 
perceptual recognition and to the ass~ilation of past experience. 
And, tor Blanshard, by far the most important structural charac-
teristic ot our meaning-mass is its "integration." 
Our "1ntegratl.on" of meanl.ng is a function of interest 
also but Blanshard holds that this interest which makes for the 
integration of meaning is distinct from the general interest 
which produces depth. It is also distinct from the practical 
interest which played such a large part in the grouping of 
qualities into "things." More specifically, the integration of 
the meaning system is a function of our reflective interest. 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 220. 
2. ry-tnterest here Blanshard means 11 that .1C1nd of satisfaction 
in an object which impels us to keep the object before us, 
or that x1nd of satisfaction 1n an activity which impels us 
to maintain it." Ibid., Vol. I, P• 219. Interest on this 
level includes non-rational interests which spring from 
instinct or li.1C1ng. We have found that the dominance of 
aome sensations over others was to some extent a produc~ 
of instinctive interest. Ct. ibid., Vol. I, P• 69. 
See above P• 10. -
It is so tmportant to make this distinction in Blanshard's 
thought that we would do well to quote him here in full: 
The moving force 1n integrating is what we 
may call the retlective interest, that is; the 
des1re to understand. • • • The desire to under-
stand is the desire to grasp the essential relations 
of things, to perceive A as a species of B, as the 
effect of c, as the cause of D, as the owner or 
properties E and F; and the natural result or this 
desire ia that when something new presents itself, 
one not only notices it, but starts actively to 
reflect upon it, to place it in a context of things 
one already knows. For every first-rate observer, 
to observe means to ass~ilate, and not merely to 
reoognize.l 
To understand means to relate that which is to be understood 
to a system or meaning. Or, in other terms, to relate that 
which is to be understood as a difference within an identity. 
An interest 1n knowing is an interest in increasing and ordering 
our experience, it is an interest in order, in system as such.2 
Despite the fact that perception at this level is always 
concerned with selected materials3 and is limited to specific 
ques~ions and problems concerned with the observation, the 
immediate motive to integrate is the des1re to understand. 
For Blanshard, our interest in action and our interest 
1n knowing are two different things. 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 222. The s~ilar1ty of this desire to 
understand Blanshard's general definition of thinking is 
close. "To think involves the relating of the object 
thought of to something else within a system." ~., 
Vol. I, P• 65. 
2. This will become clearer as we go a~ong but it is ~portent 
at this point to realize that this interest is distinct 
from the general interest and the practical interest 
already mentioned. This is an interest in understanding 
and understanding itself always involves system. cr. ibid., 
Vol. II, P• 438. See below the "1mmanent end ot thou~ 
P• 5~ff. 
3. ct. ibid., Vol. I, p. 223 • 
.......... 
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This mature theoretical 1nterest does not, of 
course, spring full-fledged 1nto existence; it must 
de~elop for a long period under the wing of the far 
more 1ntense and 1nsistent interests of the life of 
action. But the fact that it 1s subordinate is no 
reason for denying that it is distinct. And what is 
suggested here is that this germinating theoretical 
interest, which 1s able to use the idea as a key to 
unlock a system, is a prfnciple ground of difference 
between brute and human. 
Accordingly, the integration of the object of present 
perception can take various forms corresponding to the structure 
of the idea-system itself. The structure of the idea-system 
can have various forms according to the specific region and 
specific end which is of interest. Interest determines the 
structure of the latent capital which we bring to bear in 
perception. To the botanist the structure of the idea-system 
may be hierarchy of species, genus, class, family, i.e. the 
idea-system may be ordered according to kind. The system may 
be organized causally. Or, for the mechanic, the system may 
be a functional system where the relation of parts is seen to 
be means to an end.2 
This is not to say that we have only one system of meaning 
with which to work. "Most ot us are fa1rly normal, which means 
that our thought is organized on no one pattern, that various 
ways of think~g are open to us."3 
But no matter what form the integration takes, no matter 
what connection is established between the present object and 
the idea-system, its 1ntegrat1on will be within this system, 
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1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 535. 
2. ror-a fuller discussion of kinds of system, see below p. 102ff. 
3. ~·~ Vol. I, P• 228. Ct. ~., Vol. I, p. 194. 
tor to understand is to grasp an identity with differences 
and to relate that which is to be understood within a system. 
But integrat1on itself depends upon the ability to grasp 
these identities under which other perceptions may be grouped. 
And, tor Blanshard, it is the use of these identities that 
defines 1n intelligence. "This consists 1n applying to a new 
situation a meaning-mass drawn from the past, by reason ot a 
1 
more or less hidden identity." The ability to grasp identities 
which unite present perception with perception in the past is 
here dependent. 
Let us give two ot his examples: 
It a boy applies his experience cleverly, it is 
because he is laying hold of the identities which, in 
spite of appearance, unite what he is confronting now 
with what he has confronted earlier. • • • It 1s not 
that he explicitly draws out the resemblance which 
supplies the ground of the transfer • • • it is the 
grasp of an underlying identity that makes the trans-
fer possible. And however different may be the 
interests it serves, this grasp ot identity is itself 
identical wherever intelligence 1s employed.2 
They are the men who are best able to see the 
whole in the part, and the part 1n light of the whole. 
They bring to bear on particular suggestions a larger 
weight of experience because that experience has been 
so assimilated, so knit up • • • that when a suggestion 
is offered, its remote bearings are seized as though 
instinctively. • • • This large and close-knit fabric 
is itself the product of further agencies, of a sound 
native intelligence, a considerable expe§ience, ••• 
and the habitual practice of reflection. 
This ability, Blanshard says, is a matter of "native 
logic."4 Intelligence is the power to grasp an identity, a 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4:. 
Ibid., Vol. I, P• 245. 
lSI!., Vol. I, P• 242. 
lSIQ., Vol. II, P• 280. 
!Eii is not clear by itself until we see 
definition of intelligence as the degree 
mind has achieved that rational order in 
its immanent end. Of. ibid., Vol. I, P• 
-
Blanshard's further 
toward which the 
experience which is 
4tsl. 
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1 
system, and develop its differences or parts. The ability to 
apply the idea-system to a new situation also turns upon just 
how the idea-system is integrated and tor what end (depends on 
interest). Present perception is a synthesis of a great many 
different deposits of past experience with the present one. 
And the synthesis.may take a great many different forms as we 
2 have seen. 
This grasp of identity supplies the basis for the transfer 
or one experience to another, of construing the present percep-
tion through universals brought from the past. The adequacy 
ot this grasp, for Blanshard, defines the various levels of 
perception. 
This grasp also gives the basic pattern which thought 
takes throughout Blanshard 1 s analyses. The pattern is always 
that of ordering the many through the one into some systematic 
structure. The ••many" l.n the form or our present perceptions, 
contributes to our idea-system which our mind is constantly 
building. The results or this construction may be explicitly 
present to aid or hinde~.rurther perception or they may be 
implicitly present in ~· form or diaposl.t1ons.3 
1. Ct. ibid., Vol. II, PP• 41, 149. 
2. Blanshard adds the qualification that the synthesis is not 
complete. Bls.nshard calls it "fusion." "But fusion is the 
word, rather than synthesis, for a union of this kind. The 
synthesis that marks a high level or perceptual intelligence 
is that in which the successive contributions are kept 
distinct, and yet combined in some sort or pattern." Ibid., 
Vol. I, P• 247. ----
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3. The a1milar1ties of this process to perceptual inference should 
Lfe obvious. In both cases, an identity, a universal, is 
used to order the differences. And in both cases, it is 
not a "bare" identity, but a "system," a more or less 
structural group of universals. 
But there are certain limitations to perceptual thought. 
It is tied to sense and is dependent upon what sense has to 
of£er.1 But more important for Blanshard is that perceptual 
thought cannot abstract. The animal has no proper nouns, 
and hence has no ideas of things, no class concepts. Language 
is the means and ay.mbol or the ability to grasp a universal 
as a universal, the essential from the unessential. Animals 
do not show this ability, eithe~ 1n action or language. Nor 
can perception per !! isolate factors and state their connec-
tions as a law, and hence falls short of science. In consequence 
ot this, perceptual thought cannot deal with the novel, it is 
unable to "break the situation into its parts, properly isolating 
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2 
the novel and allowing this to develope its special suggestions." 
Unable to analyze and grasp id&nt~, perceptual thought must 
work with rough analogies in order to structure experience. 
Between sensation and perception, then, no hard and fast 
lines can be drawn what is sensed is grasped, in implicit 
inference, as part of a larger system through which the move-
ment takes place. This system provides the ground through 
which the quasi-syllogistic process has its validity. But 
the grasp of this system, this 11idea," 1s implicit in the 
sense that it is not fully within the focus of consciousness. 
The idea used is still inextricably bound up with the perceived 
whole including the sensed elements. The same applies to the 
"categories" of experience. They are not explicitly in the 
1. cr. ibid., Vol. I, p. 251. 
2. Ibid:;-vo1. I, P• 254. 
focus of attention but are 1ndiscr1minated features of the 
given taken as things. They do function in giving order to 
our experience but the order given is still to a large extent 
arbitrary, dictated to by our practical interests. But, again, 
they are not ideas which are explicitly before our attention, 
e.g. space. 
We think space before we think or it, and we 
think of it in a matrix of irrelevancy long before 
we think of it as pure •••• T~e and space are 
onl7 examples taken arbitrarUy. What has been 
said about them could be sa~d of all manner of 
qualities and relations present in perception, but 
grasped only implicitly.! 
This same analysis has held on the intermediate level or 
perception where we were concerned with the meaning-systems 
which form a setting or background of what is given. What is 
given is seen as organic to our funded knowledge and meanings. 
This retained meaning, a distillation from past experience 
whether it be conscious or 1n the form of dispositions, has 
an active part to play in present perception. 
We have seen that the function of meaning or ideas have 
played an increasing part in giving order to our experiences 
whether it be in the for.m of the sensible complement of the 
given, or as an undiscr1m1nated feature of the given, as in 
the organization of qualities into "things," or the setting 
or background of the given, as in perception on the inter-
mediate level. We have seen something else also. The function 
of the idea on the levels of perception we have treated thus far 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 525. 
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has largely been determined by practical needs. Our 
experience has been ordered along practical lines. But our 
selection of ideas (our criterion of relevance) has not been 
•ntirely arbitrary. It has been increasingly determined by 
characteristics of mind and thought which were present through-
out, in the form prlgnanz, 1n the structure of things, and our 
interest in understanding, which were ma,jor . factors 1n the 
integration of meaning on the intermediate level. This 
characteristic is beco~g clearer as we attain the level of 
free ideas but it is present throughout. 
The impulse to know ia an impulse to widen and 
to order the field or experience, to give it that 
special completeness and coherence which will satisfy 
theoretic desire. To attain a thorough knowledge of 
anything is at least to gather all its factors into a 
single whole in which their relations are clearly 
grasped. Now, perceiving is one of the forms in which 
the impulse to know expresses itself. Hence it shows 
the same nisus of the mind toward completeness and 
order which this impulse shows everywhere • • • the 
struggle for expansion and order, the law of economy, 
the mind's complex capacities, and the probability 
that each of these is realized in degree •••• 
All the facta make 7 the structure or perception 
ecome_7 more inte~l1gible. From the very beginning, 
en attention lights upon the nucleus of qualities, 
the mind seeks to invest it with a context and 
develope it into a whole •••• What would complete 
the fragmentary given into the whole that is sought 
tor must remain in the region of unrealized or half-
realized potentialities •••• Thus all the 
characteristically perceptual ideas fall into their 
places 1f viewed as factors 1n an attempt by the 
mind, made under lim1t1ng conditions, to
1
atfirm 
itself 1n a whole or explicit knowledge. 
So far we have seen the function of the idea as it is 
described on the perceptual level. This analysis corresponds, 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 526-528. 
-
57 
roughly, to Book I in the Nature of Thought, and is to a 
large e~tent autonomous fram Blanshard's later analysis of 
the function of the idea. We have "read into" this section 
element$ of Blanshard•s later more logical analysis of the 
function of the idea in order to get a comprehensive view of 
the way in which "system" is used throughout his analysis. 
Blanshard • s full view of the nature ot, idea is "frankly 
metaphysical" S::o that ultimately psychology is unable to deal 
with ot-er problems which involve the use o:r the idea.1 
1. cr. ibid., Vol. I, ~· 455 •. For example, how we arrive at 
our notions of the externality" of the object and of our 
not~on of substance ia psychologically explicable but the 
adequacy of these notions for metaphysics is not gone into 
in Book I. Blanshard fully realizes the distinction between 
a psychological account or the genesis of an idea and its 
metaphysical status or just1:f'1cat1on. Cf. ~., Vol. I, 
P• 149. 
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3. The Nature ot Ideas and Universals 
i. The Nature of Free Ideas 
Just as we have seen that the distinction between sensa-
tion and perception is not a hard and fast one, so the dis-
tinction between perception and conception is not. Blanshard 
de.fines a free idea in distinction from the idea as it is used 
on the lower levels o.f percep~1on in terms of its greater 
explicitness. It is closer to the focus of consciousness than 
the tied ideas on the lower levels of perception. The idea is 
now brought to the .focus ot attention. It is also capable ot 
being abstracted .from its context in sensation. 
To the greater explicitness o.f the .free idea is added the 
idea's greater definiteness. The idea is less vague and more 
capable of definition than "tied" ideas, e.g. the animal, 
having been .frightened by some obJect 1n the past, may, upon 
coming to the same scene, think only of a vague object which 
previously caused his fright. A human, being capable of more 
definiteness, may describe it as "this" rather than nthat" 
and may go on to describe its various attributes.1 One 
important element in the rise o.f the .free idea is its greater 
independence .from sense. 
The child, like the antm~l, is at .first dependent 
upon sensory cues. If he thinks about food, it is 
because he is hungry •••• With mental advance, his 
dependence on sensory cues grows less and less, and a 
very slight resemblance between what is given and what 
went before will summon the past event into memory. 
• • • There are others again, such as philosophers at 
1. cr. ibid., vol. I, P• 532. 
-
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their professional task, who have no need or percep-
tion except to provide the ult~ate raw material; 
their train or ideas is so largely independent or 
sense that it seems to move 1n a different world 
from the region around them.l 
Blanshard names three important ''agencies" which make 
for the fixing of free ideas which we would do well to mention 
here. The first of these refers back to the function of the 
interest 1n understanding we found on the intermediate level 
of perception. Our theoretical interest l.n system may greatly 
a1d the rise of independent ideas. The f1rst of these agencies 
gl.ves what might be called the "tl.nal· cause" of the 
.reten tl.on and develobent of free ideas. This is 
the interest in know g. Now the l.nterest in knowing 
is an interest in increasing and ordering our exper-
ience. It is thus suggested that the interest whl.ch 
first seizes and holds the first free idea does so, 
not for the sake ot the idea l.tself, but for the sake 
ot the part it may play in 1nference.2 
He says on the following pages something which clarifies this: 
And it l.s clear that the interest 1n 1Cnow1ng 
does grow into the sort of interest t~t developes 
an idea 1nto a system tor the sa.lee of this system 
itself~ that is, tor the sake of the insight supplied 
1n it. 
This theoretical interest in system is an important distinction 
especially 1n relation to the pragmatic view ot ideas. Our 
dominant interest in an idea may be practical, may be to effect 
our practical needs and desires to some sort ot resolution. 
But in many cases, in order that our practical interests are 
to be effected, we must see the idea as a factor in inference, 
as a part or a wider system in whiQh we attempt to effect these 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 533. 
2. IDIQ., Vol. I, P• 533. 
3. Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 534-535. 
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practical purposes. Thls theoretical interest is distinct 
from the practical although lt may be subordinate. But 1n 
both instances the idea 1s seen as a means to a further end. 
The idea functlons as a means to the resolutlon of our practical 
needs; the idea also functions as a means to obtaln a theoreti-
cal end.--the satisfaction obtained from the insight which 
system br1ngs.1 But the practical success of an idea also 
has a large part to pla,Y in fixing it as independent from 
sensory cues. The ideas are .fiXed by thelr relevance to a 
practical end. 
These two .factors point up an emphasls which Blanshard 
has already made in connectlo~ with his discussion of dis-
positions. The material for rree ideas is supplied by past 
experlence but thelr lmpo.rtance, their selection, is seen to 
be a fUnction of their connection with an end. The teleological 
nature of the idea is also evldent here: 
OUr selection of ideas or reactions is governed 
not merely by association, or by the wearing of 
nervous channels, but also by their relevance to an 
end, in short that no process of learnlng can be 
accounted for if the control of purpose is left out. 
Thus a free idea that has actually helped us to the 
end, theoretical or practical, that it was called 
into being to secure, has ta~en one2step on the way of making itself a pe~anent tool~. 
The third agency which helps to fix free ideas is that of 
language, i.e. the use of names as signs which slgnify something 
not present.3 The use of words adds vividness and fixity to 
cr. our discusslon of the tmmanent end of thought, see 
below, p. ~.pf't ~ 
Ibid., Vol. I, P• 53o. 
~interest 1n Blanshard's vlew of language is not a direct 
1nterest but he does say many things concern1ng the use of 
names which help us to see the use and development of ideas. 
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ideas and it also gives them greater distinctness. In 
distingUishl.ng an idea by the use of a name we are not merely 
distinguishing it from someth~g else but we are 1dent1ty~ 
and classifying that to which 1t refers. "Distinction, 
identification, and class1t1cation all occur together; they 
are indeed the same process looked at from different points 
of view. nl 
This proceaa sounds something like the process we described 
in perceptual 1nterence, where, as soon as we make distinctions, 
we use universals and relate distinct but different elements 
within a system of universals. Indeed, it is for Blanshard, 
but with a difference. In the use of names we are grasping a 
double identity 1n difference •. Let us try to explain this: 
In the perception of "red," a distinction is made and along 
with it a classification of red within the identity Qr genus 
"color" -- red is the difference within this kind; to dis-
tinguish red from other colors is to distinguish it as a species 
of a k1nd.. 
It you distinguish red from yellow, or any other 
colour, you do so within the genus colour, which 
reveals itself in each, though in different ways. 
And unless you did have in ~nd this genus or identity, 
you could not maKe the distinction, for the only 
difference between colours lies in their different 
ways of being colour, as anyone may readily see by 
trying to find their d1£ference elsewhere.2 
But to name or fix an 'idea 1s also to identify it as 
possibly occurring again and again, that is to say, "red" 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 542. 
2. !SIQ., Vol. I, P• 543. This is essentially the process we 
have seen going on in perceptual inference in which to 
distinguish is to use a universal as an identity. Perceptual 
inference taxes place within the "range" of this universal. 
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!! ~species is capable ot occurring 1n another context itself, 
capable of having instances. 
Such an identity is always a type that may 1n 
theory have various instances, and it is usually, 
liKe red, a genus with not only instances, but 
species. Reds are many, but all are kinds or forms 
of red. Hence red is itself an identity with dif-
ferences falling under it, and ~1thout being grasped 
as such an identity it could never have received a 
name.l 
All distinction is a process of classification and this 
applies from the very beginning of experience where universals 
are used. This is another way of saying that all distinction 
is a process of ordering according to some rule or identity. 
But, again, this is not Just to identity but to classify or 
distinguish within a system, to relate the element as part of 
a larger context. In short, it is a process of relating 
differences within an identity. 
The thing distinguished by beLng named is 
grasped as identical with what is above it, or 
more general, through being one form of a genus; 
it is grasped as identical with what is below it, 
or less general, through being itself a genus 
which may take alternate torms.2 
Anything which has promoted this process of distinguishing 
and identifying promotes the rise or the free idea and the 
general idea. 
It is here that Blanshard mentions the term "comparison" 
and perhaps it should have been used all along 1n his analysis 
of distinguishing and the use of names. For Blanshard says that 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 543. Blanshard's distinction between 
instances and species shall be referred to in our discussion 
of the nature of universals. See below p. 68ff. 
2. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 544 • 
........... 
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naming in itself does not involve the use of a general idea. 
One must have an end, must be interested 1n the results to be 
obtained from distinguish1ng before un1versals are used, that 
is, where differences are noted through an identity. Comparison 
"is a process of bringing to light differences against a back-
ground of identity or of identity against a background of 
differences."1 Both processes must be seen in the light of 
the other. Thus the power to make distinctions is not enough 
in itself. As we have seen 1n the integration of meaning on 
the perceptual level, intelligence means the ability to unify 
the d1stinctions 1n light of an end. 
It means not only the power to see differences, 
but also the power to subordinate these, and thus .to 
unify them through their places 1n a hierarchy. 
Toward such a hierarchy thought moves 1nevitably. 
And its mode of building is always the same. Whether 
working implicitly or explicitly ••• if it is using 
an idea it 1a always doing the same thing. It is 
bringing to light the unities that run through exper-
ienced differences, ordering the many through the one. 
And • • • 1n ~he general idea, this method has reached 
explicitness. 
Before we begin a much delayed discussion of Blanshard 1 s 
view Of un1 versals, let us get this teleological aape·et of 
the idea set out before us. 
ii. The Nature of the Idea 
Blanshard feels that his theory Qf the idea accords with 
his psychological analysis ot the function of ideas in percep-
tion. Blanshard's functional view of the idea in perception 
has already been analyzed and its purposive character in 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 572. 
2. lD!Q., Vol. I, P• 575. 
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percept1on has been po4nted up. We have seen that the order 
given to experience at the perceptual level follows utilitarian 
lines. Perception and the order we give to sense elements 
involved is to some extent arbitrary and dependent upon and 
varies with meaning-mass we take as relevant and with our 
purpose in so taking it as relevant. But perception is not 
merely arbitrary, as we have also seen. Thinking has a theoret-
ical interest of its own. What satisfies us is to some extent 
deter~ned from within and. this factor plays a part 1n the way 
in which perception takes place and the way 1n which our 
meaning-mass is integrated. The history of perception evinces 
this theoretical element which 1s present throughout. The 
kinds of ideas used on the various levels are capable of being 
seen as a development from our tmpl1cit grasp of them to an 
explicit grasp. This movement is not determined by our practical 
interests solely, although our practical interests may have much 
to do with our grasp. The increasing function of ideas is in 
proportion to the function of this theoretic interest -- ideas 
are seen now in relation to the growth of their internal 
structure toward system. Intelligence was defined in terms 
of the ability to grasp the idea, the ability to grasp an 
underlying identity which would make for the transference of 
one experience to another. The idea and its adequacy, in so tar 
as it is used as an identity to order our experience, is seen in 
its relation to an end. This end, as shown in our interest in 
system, is the "final cause" ot the "self-development" ot 
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1deas.1 Thus, ultimately, a descriptive analysis of percep-
tion and thought is inadequate.2 
For a clarification or this ''sel:f'-development" of the 
idea and the nature or the idea, let us go back to the nature 
or judgment. Every idea has two aspects: its existence as a 
"that;" and its content as a "what." Every idea is a psychical 
event and is something which goes on 1n me here and now. The 
content as asserted, the "what" which has reference to a "that," 
is also mental and belongs to me and, as we have seen on the 
perceptual level, it is an event 1n the context or sensation. 
At least from a perceptual analysis, we cannot say that the 
psychical event and its context are independent series 
universals are there fro.m the beginnings of experience and are 
inextricably bound up with sensation in perception. This 
content is more or less the field or cons~iousness, is more or 
less implicit or explicit, and is subject to change and constant 
expansion in its reference to a "that."3 
But 1n judgment the idea, the content, is also an asser-
tion about the character or reality, and this is not the reality 
ot which the idea 1s a representation but a reality which falls 
1. cr. below, P• 81. 
2. This is only one side or the matter. One of Blanshard's 
main points in his work is that psychology and philosophy 
must supplement each other. Perception and thinking are 
both a causal process and a logica~ one; the psychologists 
must consider its logical aspects and the logician must 
consider its causal and contextual aspects. '~e have 
laboured this antithesis between thinking as an ideal self-
development dominated by its own peculiar a~, and thinking 
as a causal series ot mental events, because 1t is the fact 
ot this antithesis upon which eve:flything turns." Ibid., 
Vol. I, P• 464. Ct. Vol. I, the preface, and PP• ~278. 
3. We shall later use the term "transcendent end." See below 
P• 87f. 
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beyond this changing consciousness. This is the teleological 
aspect of the idea in the sense that it develops as a content 
1n the very process of attempting to define its "that." It 
1s a content 1nformed by an impulse to become its object. 
The real obJect that thought means is never 
exhausted by the fragmentary content which is all 
that appears to us; our reach exceeds our grasp. 
We do atf1rm of reality the content presented to us, 
but 1f we examine the meanlng of reality implicit in 
all thought, we shall see that in that real world the 
fragments that are now presented to us cannot as such 
have any place. They belong indeed to reality;Du;r-
not as a mirror or it, not identical with it, but as 
a content which exhibits 1ts character only in dfi!ree. 
They belong to reality, not as they stand, but o y 
when so transformed-that they can take their place 
coherently 1n an intelligible whole.l 
The idea in this latter sense "intends" the object, is 
the object ~posse. It can intend such a structure because 
it already has it. implicit 1n its worKing. 
It is as truly the nature or thought to develop 
itself in accordance with such immanent laws, which 
are really its immanent laws, as of the seed to expand 
itself into-r.ne tree. And these laws are not mere 
rules of regular justapoaition; they are the web of 
connections 1n which intelligibility consists; not 
laws or causal sequence but of logical or other neces-
sity •••• For thought is a teleological process 1n 
which a chief determining factor is~ not a step in the 
series at all, but an end or value.~ 
Let us now set out his view 1n summary rorm of the nature 
of the idea in relation to the object. The rest of this section 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 454. This distinction within the idea 
~omparable to Royce's distinction between the internal 
and external meaning of an idea. The internal meaning of 
an idea expresses an 1ntention, a purpose. The external 
meaning has reference to an object. Blanshard gives 
Royce credit 1n this regard. ct. ~., Vol. I, P• 518. 
2. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 458. We shall describe this immanent 
en:<:runder the heading of "Thought and Reality.'' See 
below p. 85. 
67 
will be concerned to explain this view and to show how the 
idea is bound up with his total view or the nature or 
universals. In Blanshard's words: 
The theory that will here by advocated, then, 
is in the briefest compass this: Thought in its 
essence is an attempt to attain, in the sense or 
achieving identity with, a special end or its own. 
The relation between idea and object must be conceived 
teleologically, as the relation or that which is 
partially realized to the same thing more fully 
realized. When we are saying that an idea is of 
an object, we are saying that the idea is a pur:Pose 
which the object alone would fulfil, that it is a 
potentiality which this object alone would actualize, 
a content informed by an impulse to become this 
object. Its nature is hence not fully intelligible 
except in the light of what it seeks to become. 
• • • The idea is thus both identical with its 
object and different from it. It is identical 
in the sense in whicn anything that truly develops 
is identical with what it becomes. It is different 
in the sense in which any purpose partially realized 
is different from the same purpose realized wholly.l 
iii. The Nature of Universals 
As we have seen, Blanshard thinks of the universal 
as a class, a kind or type, a set· or characters which may 
go beyond its instances and be exemplified elsewhere. 
Thus in the use or a common noun we are already 
grasping a universal, that is, a character that may 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 473. This viewpoint seems rather bold 
our-or the context from which it was reached. Blanshard's 
theory of the nature of the idea has grown out or a care-
ful internal criticism of various other views of the 
nature of an idea given in Chapters VII through XII. 
at. also ibid., Vol. I, PP• 493ft. He accepts some 
aspects or-r.hese views but finally rejects all or them 
in regard to what he feels is the central question in 
epistemology: the relation of the idea to the object. 
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be exhausted in this instance, but has, or may 
have, other embod~ents.l 
We have seen its appearance only in implicit form on the 
level of perceptual inference -- universals are there from the 
beginning as soon as we distinguish something !! something. 
Hence, the universal is not a product of the aggregate of 
particular ~pressions. 
The advance of thought is not alone a synthesis 
of particulars nor alone an analysis of universals; 
it is both together, operating upon an experience in 
which both elements are present but undistinguished. 
'All that is 1n consciousness seems to present both 
difference and identity,• and neither could have come 
to light before the other.2 
This "identity and difference" has been our pattern all 
through Blanshard's analysis wherever we identify what we took 
as different or distinguish what we took as one. Indeed we 
saw that the universal was the condition of any perception 
whatever and involved both analysis and synthesis, distinc-
tion and identification, as two sides of one operation. All 
the types of ideas varied accordingly, as to how they functioned 
in connecting differences and unifying them, how they ordered 
the many through the one. 
(1) Universals 
What, then, is a universal? At the outset, Blanshard 
breaks this question up into three qu~stions: (1) What is in 
one's mind when one thinks a class concept? (2) Is it a 
universal separable from the particular (universalia ante r~), --~~~~~ ---- ---
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 568. 
2. !D!a., Vol. I, P• 570 • 
.......... 
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resident in particulars {in re), or just particulars them-
--
selves (post £!!)1 and (3) It there is any such thing as a 
universal, how should we characterize it? 
The first question has been answered to a large extent 
in his discussion and exposition of the theory of the idea. 
Ideas, and this includes the general idea, are potentially 
their objects, they are their objects ~ posse, and their main 
function is to carry thought beyond itself. They are in essence 
self-transcendant and p~posive. But the idea as meaning is 
never identical with its referent. It is self-transcendant. 
It is also a mental content more or less in the context of 
sensation. 
The answer to the second question has been implicitly given 
in the foregoing analysis also •. Universals, which are the 
"objects" of the idea, are present from the very beginning of 
experience although they are only pres~nt implicitly. To per-
ceive anything is to perceive it as this or that. We have found 
that it serves as an identity through which perceptual inference 
takes place. 
They are found in ••• every judgement: for 
the thought of 8 and P ~in the quasi-syllogistic 
inference_! is the thought of something that main-
tains identity in spite of being diversely charac-
terized. Every inference: for if the subject that 
enters our premises is not the same that accepts our 
conclusion, the inference is broken-backed. 1The 
unity, reality and identity of the universal in the 
particulars is presupposed in every sentence that we 
utt·er. tl 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 581. The quote within the quote refers 
to Cook Wilson's Statement and Inference. 
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We have seen here also that meaning and sensation are not 
separable and that meaning at any one time represents our 
interpretation and comprehension of the referent. 
But by far the most ~portant question here to deal with 
is the third: How shall we characterize the universal? What 
is the character we think of when we use a general idea? 
Is it an element that remains precisely the 
same through all its instances, an element that,. 
like a Ford part, can be removed from one context 
and used in another without the slightest modifi-
cation? Or is it something with a connection more 
intimate and pervasive, like that of one bodily 
organ with others? It is this final question that 
divides the defenders of the abstract and the con-
crete universal, the formal fro.m the philosophical 
logicians; and we shall f~d it at onpe the most 
difficult and imp9rtant of the three.~ . 
There is no doubt that the other two questions cannot be 
kept separate from this one. This holds especially true in 
the second question which deals with a theory of the idea. 
If it is true, as we have argued, that the idea 
is its object partially realized, the nature of the 
general idea can be seen Only through what it 
apprehends.2 
But Blanshard is asking an even more specific question 
than just the question as to how we should characterize the 
universal. He is concerned, and has been throughout, with 
the question of now we are to think of the relation between 
1. Ibid.,.Vol. I, P• 576. 
2. 1'51'Q., Vol. I, p. 581. By "•pprehend" here we ta..l{e it 
~hard is alluding to the object of the general idea, 
that is, that to which it refers, its transcendent end 
and not that which it intends, its ~anent end of system. 
We shall see that in his doctrine of the concrete universal 
the interpretation and the comprehension of the referent of 
the idea cannot be separated from the intention of the idea. 
Comprehension of universals is done ~ lisht ~ the immanent 
end of thought. 
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the universal and what falls under it. How are we to think or 
the relation between the identity which is used throughout the 
experiential process, as a principle for the integration or 
experience, and its differences. 
The universal in its function as an identity is not 
separable from its ditferentiationa.l The universal is not 
a product of abstraction by the addition of attributes which 
are "external" or accidental to it. The universal is more or 
less internally related to its d1fferentiation.2 
Nor can the universal be grasped in isolation from its 
differentiations.3 In fact, the grasp of the universal carries 
a grasp of its species with it. 
The point is that a genuine universal carries a 
grasp for the species with it. Where such a grasp is 
really present, the bringing to light of the species 
is not a random running over of attributes with which 
the nuclear ones have been associated. • • • It is 
rather the making explicit and detailed of what was 
germinally present already, the evolution of the 
1. As we have seen in his psychological analysis, the 
principles of order cannot be separated from that which 
they order, nor can that which is ordered be separated 
from the ordering process. This was evident in perceptual 
inference, in the very process of escaping from immediate 
experience. The universal "infects" its differentiations 
through and through. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, P• 601. 
2. This will have much more meaning when we discuss "!rind 
of systems" (see below, p.,l02). We shall see that for 
Blanshard there is no meaningful principle of order which 
is external to the elements arranged. A purely random 
arrangement is not possible as shown in his analysis of 
a "heap." The notion of aggregation does not apply 
here. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, p. 585. This is perhaps another 
way of saying that in the definition of the differentia-
tions more than "compatibility" with the universal is 
needed; coherence is required •. 
3. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, P• 593. This is an implicit rejection 
of un1versalia ante rem at this point. 
----------- ---- ---
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undeveloped, not the enumeration of associates. 
Nothing short of this will explaln the control 
over instances that generic thinking gives.l 
Nor does anything else explaln, Blanshard would add, 
the various perceptual levels we have discussed thus far 
except the differing grasps of thls unlversal. If you take 
your criterion of relevance serlously, you will see that the 
criterion you accept is a universal and to a large extent lt 
determines its instances and the structures these instances 
will have. The species is in this sense a development of the 
genus and is integral to the structure to which it belongs. 
The dlfferentiations come from within the genus. 
Blanshard has many criticisms of those who conceive of 
the universal as an abstract f~om particulars,, as a generic 
quality which is the same throughout all its lnstances, but 
perhaps his most important one in this context is that this 
conception of the universal does not allow for any degree of 
control of its instances on the part of the universal. Its 
view, as a theory of science, does not allow the fact that we 
must see the universal as functiona~ in its lnstances and not 
as a point around which arbitrary associations may be made. 
It has little cognitive significance for it does not define 
what its species will be. Thus universals on the level of 
science have still the integrative function to perform. 
Cognition is possible only if we can simplify complex ezperience 
and reduce it to "law, " to some .H:ind of 11 order. 11 This "order" 
1. ~., Vol. I, P• 588. 
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is not just loose classification but a system of universal 
"laws." This is what 11science" aims toward. Blanshard would 
say that even classification of phenomena presupposes a 
principle of selection which is done ~ ~ purpose of 
establishing "laws," interconnection.1 
The differentiations then are an integral part of the 
universal and they come from within the genus. They are 
developments from it. We can see that Blanshard sees the final 
answer to the question of the relation between the universal and 
its instances in much the same way as he saw the question of the 
relation of the idea and object. How can the universal be an 
identity, be one, while at the same time inclusive of plurality, 
its differentiations. Again, teleology comes to the rescue. 
Was not thought, in its very essence, an 
attempt on the part of the mind to realize, to be, 
its object? And itself, so far as merely ideal, 
the same as that object realized partially • • • 
thought must be the same with its object; well, 
it is. It must be different from its object; it 
also is. ~at it this equally formidable antinomy 
of the universal and its embodiments were soluble 
.in the same way?2 
Blanshard does solve it in exactly this way. The relation 
of the universal to its embod~ents is a relation of the poten-
tial to the actual; a relation of the partially realized to 
1. Bosanquet makes an interesting remark in regard to Plato's 
Forms in this respect. "The identification, for example, 
of Plato's Forms with 'the objective correlates of class 
concepts' would render it absolutely impossible to conceive 
them as a whole of interdependent members, such as is 
~plied in the Form of the Good, and in the conception of 
a universe of reality." Bernard Bosanquet, The Principle 
of Individuality and Value, (London: Macmillan & co., Ltd., 
IV12), P• 36. ---
2. ~., Vol. I, P• 608. 
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something more fully realized. The universal here conceived 
is an "undeveloped schema," not a hard nucleus, and, again, 
it is seen as having a functional status for ordering our 
experience. But the universal is germinal and develops; it 
achieves distinctness only as it is developed into its species. 
It is in ~he process of becoming fully actual as it is developed 
into its differentiations.1 
The universal is not an extract from its species. 
It is the undeveloped schema of its species, which is 
neither their lowest common denominator nor their 
explicitly set out sum, but that which contains them 
within itself as its alternative possibilities.2 
But to say that the universal is an "undeveloped schema" 
would seem to assert that it was ideal. This is precisely 
what it is for Blanshard.3 Just as mind is a process which is 
becoming that which it has implicitly, so the idea is its 
object on the way to realization and the universal is more or 
less present in the idea. 
In all Knowledge universals are being realized. 
And to grow in knowledge is to exchange a more generic 
grasp for a more specific. It is a movement in which 
the indefinite defines itself, the potential realizes 4 itself, the relatively formless gains body and outline. 
Let us look further into this process by looxing at the 
kinds of universals Blanshard delineates. 
cr. ibid., Vol. I, p. 603. 
Ibid:;-vol. I, P• 590. 
!nii must be clarified later in our discussion of the 
"ideal and the real." (See below p. 8Sff). For Blanshard, 
a strict separation between these two is not possible. 
Ibid., Vol. I, ~· 614. Thus against nominalism, universals 
are-not merely names" but "laws" which determine the 
character of species or instances. Against realism also, 
universals exist in particulars as their essential 
character (law). 
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(2) Generic, Qualitative, and Specific Universals 
Blanshard makes a distinction among kinds of universals 
which is based upon this relation or the potential to the 
actual. These are distinctions of "degree" only.1 The generic 
universal, e.g. "man,• is a partially realized universal in 
which its differences are individuals. The attributes of the 
individuals within the universal are inexhaustible. In this 
sense, Blanshard calls the universal "indeterminate," it is 
a tho~ht of a potentiality which may be developed without 
limit. My mental content is constantly expanding in the use 
of this universal. "The reason for this indeterminacy in my 
mental content is that the universal is itself indeterminate; 
indeed, the two indeterminacies are the same."2 
The generic universal, if we grasped it to the full in 
all its determinations, would be our object. But since it is 
indeterminate, its reference is far beyond that which at the 
moment is explicitly realized. It is 11 ideal 11 in this sense. 
We hold that the fully real is never indeter-
minate and never potential. These adjectives belong 
to thought. It is the very essence of thought to 
seek fulfilment in a reality that is fully determinate. 
Thought never fails, though neither-does it ever 
wholly succeed, in compassing its end.3 
This is to say that, in the use of generic universals, thought 
never attains full determinateness but it is developing toward 
this. 
1. Blanshard's logic is throughout a logic not of hard and 
fast distinctions but of distinctions in "degrees." This 
is not only true of universals; it is also true of the 
analytic-synthetic·distinction, ideal-real, psychology-
logic, etc. All these distinctions are relative to a 
completed system of knowledge whose conditions are known 
trom the demands of reason. 
2. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 621. 
3. !OIQ., Vol. I, P• 621. 
-
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The other side of the story which the passage, "thought 
never wholly fails," is in reference to is that in using a 
generic universal, our reference is vague but it does develop 
and points to its completion; it would, if developed, be its 
species. The character of the fully determinate object is 1n 
the structure of the universal at this stage as its immanent 
end.1 
"Man" is potentially "white," ttblack, rr "red," "yellow," 
"rational," "non-rational," etc. Thus the content is extremely 
indefinite and we have to go on to specify what we mean. When 
we come to the qualitative universal, e.g. whiteness, the 
differences of this unive~sal are characters or qualities. 
But this universal d1ffers from the generic only in degree. 
An idea is called general if, at a given 
level of development, its immediate end is 
relatively remote; it is abstract if, at the 
same level, the end is relatively near. When 
we think of a genus whose members are 1nd1viduals, 
we are aiming at something that exceeds the 
present compass of our thought by a distance 
virtually infinite. In thinking of whiteness we 
choose a very much nearer mark.2 
Blanshard goes on in this passage to say that when our thought 
of whiteness falls short of full determinateness it differs 
from the thought of a generic universal in that 
the amount of the object that it leaves out, if 
we may so speak, is very much smaller. OUr 
thought of whiteness is obviously more adequate 
than our thought of man.3 
1. Ct. below P• 92t. Also ct.~., Vol. I, PP• 454, 458. 
2. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 622. 
3. !Eia., Vol. I, P• 622. 
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This conta1ns Blanshard 1 s distinction between abstract and 
general as one of degree. The qualitative universal is less 
ideal than the generic universal. As you specify the object 
as "white man," you have specified the generic universal, 
made the content of the idea more determinate. In th.is sense, 
learning is a dlfferentiation from within the general idea; it 
thus develops itself into qualitative universals. 
But the qualitative universal "whiteness" has embodiments 
also. That is, it is capable of being repeated in various 
contexts. When we reach a definite shade of whiteness, isn't 
this capable of repetition in various contexts and isn't this 
to be considered a universal?l 
Our use of the same "this" or the same "that" is a 
specific universal. It is specific in that it does not refer 
beyond itself to further determ1nateness.2 
what is the test when we are dealing with a 
generic universal ••• and when with a specific 
universal ••• ? The test is speci£icity or 
definiteness of content. When we try to find in 
that which is common to all men or colours some-
thing completely definite, we are baffled, and 
are compelled in our search for it to go on to 
their specific embod~ents. When we arrive at 
this Jellow or at three we seem to have reached as 
speci !c a content as experience can yield.3 
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1. Blanshard's definition of the universal has been that 
which is identical with itself in various'contexts. The 
universal is that which is capable of being used 1n various 
contexts. He says in a footnote: "Complete self-identity 
in various contexts implies complete independence of some 
contexts, or at least some elements in them ••• in the 
end such independence is nowhere to be found." Ibid.;--
VOI. I, p. 624n. We shall return to these in our-conclusions. 
2. This will be sub~ect to qualification later when we speak 
o:r "particulars. See below. p. 79ff. 
3. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 624. 
-
This whole process from the general to the abstract to 
the specific is one in which the content is becoming more 
determinate. It also seems to be a process in which the ideal 
becomes closer and closer to the real for the real is full 
determinateness,· actuality. The end of thought is system and 
the question is whether any of these universals and the 
individuals they include are capable of fUlfilling such a 
demand. Blanshard' s answer is, "No." Individuals can be 
resolved away into specific universals. But on reaching the 
specific universal do we have the "real?" 
(3) Particulars 
We have seen that "individuals" will not stand and that 
they are not hard, exclusive units. They resolve away into 
specific universals. We find also that there is nothing in 
so-called particulars except what turns out to be universals. 
They resolve away into that which can be at least ideally 
repeatable and are not self-identical. "There are no par-
ticulars. For what gives particularity to any character or 
. 1 
complex is itself always a universal." We specify or define 
an object by bringing its attributes and relations more and 
more to mind. These are always in the form of universals. 
The "essence" of a particular, i.e. its determinate nature, 
is not a "particular" but turns out to be universal. As long 
as we truce notice of "essences," the "what" of a "that," we 
do not really encounter particulars. 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 631. 
-
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The universal and the particular are distinguishable but 
not separable.1 This is to say that there is thought of a 
particular. The particular "white" can be thought of as a 
focus of radiating relation, a multiplicity of aspects. Here 
--
This is all that "particu-the universal is taken in situ. 
larity" means. But when we follow these lines of relations we 
find we have nothing but a nexus of universals for what confers 
2 particularity upon this specific nexus is itself a universal. 
There are no identities in the form of specific universals. 
The "uniqueness" which a "this" has derives its uniqueness 
from an interpenetration of !!! its relations to the totality 
of all actual and possible relations. Its individuality depends 
upon the relationally determinate structure of reality which is 
at once a complete and integrated system and the immanent end 
of thought. 
We shall achieve a guaranteed uniqueness only 
when we shall have exceeded the bounds of all pms-
sible repetition, and exhausted the relations of 
the thing to everything else in the universe. This 
is the only uniqueness that the object possesses.3 
Thus thought cannot rest in particulars for they are properly 
specific universals in ~ and its 1mmanent end will not rest 
"while anything is outside the web or necessl.ty."4 
1. This sounds like the Kantian distinction between the 
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concept and the percept but Blanshard, with Hegel, is going 
beyond Kant here. The concrete universal contains and gathers 
up both the concept or Plato's philosophy and the "raw stuff" 
or experience. There is no thing in itself; it is the 
concrete universal which is given in experience and which 
actually exists and is real. 
2. cr. ibid., Vol. I, P• 635. 
3. Ibid~ol. I, P• 503. 
4. !OIQ., Vol. I, P• 654. 
To fully specify an object one must pursue its attributes 
and relations until it is fully determinate. This process is 
done through the universals and is finished when thought achieves 
its immanent end. It is at this point that thought would also 
achieve its transcendent end.1 So long as one is concerned with 
a partial system of relations, one is not dealing with par-
ticulars but a system of universals taken in situ and this 
--
system, taken as a complex of universals, is repeatable. 
In summary of this section, we can see that the function 
ot the idea has become increasingly important as our theoreti-
cal interest was more and more revealed in the conative nature 
ot thought and mind. Our interest in system was 1n fact seen 
as the "final cause" of the development of the idea away from 
its context in sensation. But "system," in the form of the 
implicit range of-universals used in perceptual inference, was 
present from the beginning. It had an increasingly more active 
function to perform on the various levels of perception. 
We have seen also that Blanshard's view of the idea in 
this section is "frankly metaphysical." The idea is seen to 
be purposive. In its very act of reference to the object, its 
purpose was to be that object; in this very act of reference to 
something other, the idea also revealed an intention, an im-
pulse, to a certain kind of structure. In its attempt to be 
the object the idea has revealed its own immanent pattern. In 
its various references to an "object," it had revealed its own 
1. cr. ibid., vo1~· I, P• 505. 
81 
"self-development." 
In our discussion of Blanshard 1 s view of universals, we 
were concerned with asking the relationship between the 
universal and its differentiations, and we again saw that 
the answer was to be found in teleology. We found that the 
idea's referent, its transcendent end, was amenable to the 
kind of structure which it was trying to obtain as its im-
manent end. Granted that experience may be integrated upon 
many principles and may be capable of many kinds of order, 
is there anything in the character of the "real" which would 
not be amenable to thought 1 s immanent end? 
In Blanshard's analysis of the universal, we found a 
qualified •no." The universal is not separable from its 
differentiations and we never arrive at a bare particular. 
But this does not mean that thought is capable of the 
structuring of total reality. 
universals evinced the same developmental process which 
was present in the idea. The universal which is the object 
of the idea manifested various stages of specification, but, 
in the end, there were no hard particulars. Particulars are 
a nexus of universals. What we mean by an "object" in the end 
is nothing but an integrated unity of universals established 
through a principle which is itself a universal. Our concept 
of "objectivity" has its basis 1n the characteristic of the 
unity which is established in experience through an ordering 
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principle and hence onee again comes up to a criterion of 
full unity or system in its full meaning. The "objective" 
means not something other than thought but the exhibition 
of the structure which our reason demands in the form of 
completed system. 
System is the end of thought and the criterion of its 
advance. 
There is now no particularity 1n things that 
is alien to thought and unass~ilable by it, nothing 
which resists inclusion in that intelligible system 
of universals at which thOught aims •••• Its end 
is a system of universals, not an aggregate of par-
ticulars. In short, it is required by the nature 
of thought, and not interdicted by the nature of 
things, that thought should go on to bridge the 
interval between itself and its object, and, by 
compassing both "what" and "that" within one whole, 
should override their differenoes.l 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 632. Thus, Plato's problem of the 
universal and the particular is denied. In a sense, 
this represents a return to Parmenides' identification 
of Being and the Intelligible. This is, of course, 
not to say that Blanshard does not still have the 
problem of the relation between being and becoming. 
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4. THE NATURE OF TCYrAL SYSTEM 
i. The Ideal and the Real 
In discussing specific universals we have tound that 
there is no essential di£ference between particulars and 
universals. Specific universals in the end reduce to 
universals in situ. 
--
There is nothing alien to thought which 
can be considered as brute tact and which resists inclusion 
in that intelligible system of universals at which thought 
aims. Thought's immanent end is this system of universals. 
In the very attempt to define our object we are embodying the 
ideal of thought. All specifications of the "object" are 
universals and fall within the content, within the "whats 11 
of judgment. 
Thus, the line to be drawn between what belongs to me 
and what belongs to the "object" is in the end drawn within 
the content or consciousness •1 What is "given" is not full 
fact for it always comes within a context of universals which 
itself is not s~ple. In attempting to define the object, you 
must go beyond the presented to its connections which lie in 
the context. The "tact" as true is the entire system of 
relations in which the presented is one fragment. For Blanshard, 
the only inference we can draw between the subject-object, 
ideal-real, relation is not that our knowledge is confined to 
appearances from which it can never escape but that it is a 
knowledge of reality to some extent obscured and confused by 
1. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, P• 450. 
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limits which it is constantly seeking to overcome. 
But it !! a knowledge of reality; thought must also in 
some sense be identical with its object. It is identical, 
tor Blanshard, in the sense in which the acorn is identical 
with the oak. In the attempt of thought to get to its object, 
thought is not attempting to do something which is alien to it. 
In attempting to define its object, thought is dealing with 
this character of system which is thought's immanent end, an 
end which is set by thought's own nature. Thought is, on the 
reflective level, dominated by the whole or system which is 
l 
emerging through it. This is the nisus of mind, and is its 
very essence. System is the pattern or organization we strive 
tor in attempting to understand, and thinking is always seeking 
this pattern in its attempt to get to the "other." 
But how can we be sure that the structure which is 
thought's aim also characterizes the "other?" What assurance 
do we have. that this ideal is applicable to the "other?" 
(1) Thought and Reality 
As we have seen, Blanshard's analysis of the specific 
universal was an attempt to show that there is nothing alien 
in kind from thought. He would point out also that it is 
-
necessary to hold this on epistemological grounds. Whatever 
"reality" is, ideal knowledge must define it. We canrtot taKe 
some object which is "outside" or beyond thought and set this 
up as a criterion of reality. The only criterion of what is 
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"real" is that which is satisfactory to mind and thought. 
Let us point up his reasons for saying the ideal defines 
the real. 2 We have seen that taxing the idea as a purpcs e 
accords with the nature of mind.3 Does this theory accord 
with the nature of thought and .Knowledge? Blanshard, in answer, 
goes one step further: knowing is such an activity that it 
necessitates such a theory of the idea. The developmental 
relation which holds between the ideal and the real satisfies 
certain epistemological requirements. 
The reference to an object always entails a difference 
between the idea and the object. An idea is always of an 
object in this sense, and hence there is an element of self-
transcendence, of ideality, in this reference. Thought and 
the real are different. But the specification of the object, 
its very definition and distinction, reveals a progression in 
which the idea is seen to develop toward a certain structure. 
The idea intends this structure of system as its ~anent end 
and evinces this structure Ln the very process of referring to 
the object as something other. Ideal and real are in some 
sense identical. 
l. This relates, of course, to his criticisms of the corres-
pondence theory of truth or of any theory which taKes the 
ideal as merely "representative" of the real. Hl.s position 
aga~ comes out of a dialectical consideration of various 
views of the nature of the idea wad truth. 
The importance of this view for metaphysics is pointed up 
by Bradley: "I have assumed that the object of metaphysics 
is to find a general view which will satisfy the intellect, 
and I have assumed that whatever succeeds in doing this is 
real and true •••• This is a doctrine which, so far as I 
see, can neither be proved nor questioned." F. H. Bradley, 
Appearance ~Reality, PP• 491-492. 
See above, p. · 5lff. 
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In our long struggle with the relation of 
thought to reality we saw that 1t' thought and 
things are conceived as related only externally, 
then knowledge is luck; there is no necessity 
whatever that what satisfies intelligence should 
coincide with what really is •••• But if we get 
rid of the misleading analogies through which this 
relation has been conceived, of copy to original, 
stimulus and organism, lantern and screen, and go 
to thought itself with the quest on what reference 
to an object means, we get a different and more 
hopeful answer. To think of a thing is to get that 
thing itself in some degree within the mind •••• 
in short, if we accept its own report, thought is 
related to reality as the partial to the perfect 
fulfilment of a purpose. The more adequate its 
grasp the more nearly does it approximate, the more 
fully does it realize in itself, the nature and 
relations of its object.l 
What does reference to the object mean? We saw in his 
analysis of judgment that the "that" and the "what" cannot be 
separated; they both come to us together and are bound up in 
a wider system of meanings. Epistemologically, we require 
that they somehow be separate, that the idea not be identical 
with and swallow up the object.2 We require that the idea 
refer to something other than itself. Let us take this 
transcendent reference: 
-The transcendent end of knowing is to see things as they 
are, and, in this sense, the idea has reference to an ulterior 
1. Ibid., Vol. II, PP• 2ol-2o2. Blanshard is now concerned 
With the nature of the idea 1n its epistemological setting. 
Just as a theory of the idea has grown out of his psycho-
logical analysis of the movement of perception, so, through 
a dialectical treatment of different theories of the idea, 
a theory of the idea grows out of epistemological analysis. 
Rather complete and accurate analyses are given to various 
theories of the idea in relation to the possibility of 
knowing at the beginning of Book II in the Nature or Truth. 
cr. also his treatment and defense of coherence as-rhe 
criterion and nature of truth, ibid., Chs. XXV, XXVI. 
2. For the reasons, see Blanshard 1s-0:riticism of realism, 
ibid., Vol. I, Ch. XI, PP• 394ft. 
-
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order. 
It is impossible to find an instance of thinking 
or knowing that does not go beyond its own machinery so 
far as to intend and claim the disclosure of an ulterior 
order to which it is 1n some sense adjusting itself. 
If this is realism, then all of us are realists.l 
But the "object" is an end unatta1ned and is hence different 
from the thinking process. In reference to the object we are 
going beyond the idea as psychic event. Thought is a mediate 
process and entails, by the very nature of the case, self-
transcendence.2 
Epistemologically, we also require that the ideas and 
object be 1n some sense identical in order to make knowledge pos-
3 Sible. Well, they are. Thought reveals an 1mmenent end also. 
Just as thinking always has reference to en object which 
is beyond it so it also seeks a special kind of satisfaction 
of its own, a satisfaction which will bring the theoretic 
impulse to rest. This is the element of the idea which is 
purposive and ~volves an impulse which has more and more come 
to the foreground in our analysis of perception. 
If knowing a1ms at unbaring what is beyond itself, 
it also a~ at a special kind of satisfaction. Its 
end (we do not like these terms, but they are useful) 
is at once immanent and transcendent. The transcendent 
end of knowing is the direct revelation in experience 
of what is also beyond it •••• The immanent end is to 
achieve a state of insight that will bring the theoretic 
impulse to rest. The desire to know is a desire for what 
will satisfy this impulse, and we accept as knowledge 
only what does so. The immanent goal of this ~pulse 
sets the direction in Which knowledge developes and de-
cides when the process shall be accounted complete.4 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 488. 
2. ~ibid., Vol. I, P• 552. 
3. See ~~ P• 84ff. 
4. Ib1d., Vol. I, P• 489. 
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Just as we have seen this element coming to explicitness 
in the psychological analysis so we see this element here in 
knowledge. In fact, the immanent end is present from the begin-
ning but reveals itself only gradually and becomes clearer in 
these later phases. 
Thinking, then, is an ideal self-development, or to put 
it in perhaps a clearer form, thinking is the development of 
the ideal content of mind under the control of an end or pat-
tern it is seeking. The attainment of this end brings theoretic 
satisfaction. The satisfaction attained is possible because 
the Lmmanent end is supplied by the mind's own nature, i.e. 
the organization or pattern which thought uses in ordering and 
assimilating its facts on this level is supplied by its own 
nature. Knowing 
is a process in which one side of our nature is 
progressively realized. And it is obviously con-
trolled by an ~anent end, an end which is as 
truly fixed by our nature as the sort of food and 
drink that will satisfy us. The end grows clearer 
as the impulse works itself out; but because the 
interest grows by what it feeds on, the end is 
forever receding, and knowledge that would satisfy 
wholly, like perfect goodness and perfect beauty, 
is· at rainbow's end. Why does an argument convince, 
or a system 1mpose itself on us? Because it satisfies 
the demand of our nature at this level of developement. 
But it is equally clear that what satisfies this nature 
at one stage may fail to do so at the next, and that 
the immanent ideal is revising, rifining, reordering, 
expanding itself without oeas1ng. 
The functioning of this Lmm&nent end is the essence of thinking 
1. ~., Vol. I, P• 490. 
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and reveals the conative nature of mind.1 
It is that development of a conception 
according to the laws of its own nature, that 
struggle or an idea to achieve completeness as 
a system, which is the very activity of thinking, 
and marks it off from everything else •••• It 
is the degree of advancement of an individual mind 
toward that rational order ~n experi~nce which is 
the implicit end of thought as such. 
The nisus of thought, then, is a nisus toward intelligible 
order. 3 This structure is not learned, 4 but is the ideal of 
thought. In this sense, it is ~ priori. No judgment or infer-
ence is made which does not reveal to some extent the structure 
which thought 1s trying to realize. What ! priori means for 
Blanshard is "revealing the character of thought through 
revealing what satisfies thought. 11 In so far as the ideal of 
knowledge 1s exemplified in the structure of cognition, this 
structure will exhibit ! priori characteristics, viz. necessity. 
1. Blanshard would not have us identify the theoretic impulse 
with willing although they might be a part of one conatus 
and are often quite intimately connected ~n experience. 
Practical action and intellectual activity are often found 
together, but again their important d~ferentiating 
characteristic is that they have different ends. The 
theoretic impulse is unique. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, P• 510. 
2. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 460-461. Blansnara ~n many places 
comes close to equating thought with this process of the 
idea, this impulse. He says .1n one place: u • • • so 
thought is an impulse to system; it is system imperfectly 
realized:W Ibid., Vol. II, P• 43. Cf. also ~bid., Vol. II, 
PP• 45 1 428.---- ----
3. Blanshard often uses the term "nisus" to describe this 
impulse of thought to its own unique end. For example, 
the "nisus for necessity which forms the very nature of 
thought.n Ibid., Vol. I, p. 158. Also, perceiving 
"shows the Simi nisus of ~nd toward completeness and 
order which this impulse anows everywhere." Ibid., Vol. I, 
P• 427. For other passages, cf. ibid., Vol. l;:Pp. 119, 
129, Vol. II, PP• 283, 52'· ----
4. cr.~., Vol. I, p. 111. 
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Another way of saying this is that thought's end is 
understanding. What we ultimately mean by "understanding" 
reveals the structure of the immanent end. 
We shall hold that the movement ot reflection 
is always more or less dominated by an ideal of 
understanding, and that what understanding means 
is apprehending something in a system which renders 
it necessary. The degree to which reflection is 
really reasoning or on the other hand mere random 
association, is deterndned by the extent to which 
the immanent ideal of system has assumed control ot 
the process.l 
But whether the immanent end is in full control or not, 
understanding involves the same process: the finding ot order 
or system among facts which seem conflicting. The system may 
be simple and homogenous as in a spatial system, or it may be 
a complex system as is entailed in the understanding of his-
torical events, but understanding retains the same meaning. 
It always involves a "whole~" 
When we begin to 'include in our whole several 
systems at once, the possibilities ot complexity are 
much increased. But understanding retains the same 
meaning. A physical event or law is explained by 
putting it in a framework in which the order of t~e, 
space, and causality are combined 1nto one whole. 
Again, 
To think is to seek understanding. And to seek 
understanding is an activity ot mind that is marked 
ott from al~ other act1v1ties by a highly distinctive 
a~. This a~ ••• is to achieve systematic vision, 
so as to apprehend what is now unknown to us and to 
relate it, and relate it necessarily, to what we know 
already. We think to solve problems; and our method 
or solving problems is to build a bridge of intelligible 
relation from the continent of our knowledge to the 
island we wish to include 1n it. Sometimes this bridge 
is causal, as when we try to expla1n a disease, sometimes 
1. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 24. 
2. IOid., Vol. II, P• 29. 
-
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teleological, as when we try to fathom the move 
of an opponent over the chess board; sometimes 
geometrical, as 1n Euclid. But ~t is always 
systematic; thought in its very nature is the 
attempt to bring something unknown or imperfectly 
known into a sub-system of knowledge, and thus 
also into that larger system that forms the world 1 
of accepted beliefs. That is what explanation is. 
But there may be various types of understanding which 
gives various kinds of satisfaction tor reflection. Blanshard 
recognizes the relative nature of understanding at this point 
and defines system accord1ngly. 
Though it is always system that is a~ed at, 
the systems accepted as satisfactory are of the 
most various types. The plain man would count it 
ridiculous to confine genuine understanding to 
mathematics •••• He would even concede the name 
without question to a mechanic's mastery of the 
functions of a carburettor, a speaker's "intuitive" 
perception of how to persuade a certain audience, 
or the judgement of an art critic as to why an 
artist drew a certain line. The wholes used in 
common sense as providing understand1ng are thus 
of the widest variety. The one feature they own 
in common appears to be that they are systems with 
interdependent parts.2 
(2) Knowledge 
So then thought has a transcendent end and an immanent 
end. The former points up the needed difference between the 
idea and object in epistemology; the latter points to the 
needed identity. How are these two reconcilable and what 
~relation is required in order for knowledge to be possible? 
The two ends of knowledge must be seen as separate. We cannot 
1. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 2b2. Blanshard in the end does not 
accept this relativism in regard to the ~i~ds of systems 
which bring satisfaction. See below p. 100, 116. 
2. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 34. Attempts have been made to review 
tneie kinds of structures which provide different kinds of 
understanding. Hegel's distinction between sein, wesen 
and befriff in his logic could be considered-oDe of these 
attemp s. Cf. G. w. F. Hegel, lE! Logic £!Hegel. 
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reduce the transcendent end to the immanent end as realized 
now for we would end in solipsism;1 to reduce the immanent 
end as realized to the transcendent end would leave the fact 
of error ~nexplicable. And yet they must be seen as identical 
in some sense if thought is to have any standard which is 
applicable. We must believe that thought d~scloaes reality 
in the degree to which it achieves its own ideal, or immanent 
end. The transcendent end and the immanent end cannot be 
independent variables. If they are so taken then knowledge 
is either a miracle or a fraud. 2 
The answer to the impasse that, in knowledge, the idea 
must be the same as ~ts object and yet not the same is again 
in terms of teleology. 
What we can say is this, that any attempt on 
the part of thought to realize its immanent end, 
however feeble it may be, is also a partial realiza-
tion of its transcendent end or object. Thought ••• 
is a half-way house on the road to reality. Ideas 
are potential objects, entities whose nature and 
being lie in a germinal embodiment of that which 
they would become •••• If thOUght can be seen as 
a stage on the wj~ to its~ranscende~ena or obJect, 
as that end~Se Jn the course Of becom!n~ac£Uil 1 
'!lie-pira'Cl'Ox of know!ed,-1s 1ri principle so ved. The 
Iaia can then-be both he-same as its object and 
different; the same-Decause it is the object rn-posse; 
different because that object~ WEich is its end, is 
as yet incompletely realized.v 
Thus the ideal and the real remain distinct but also are 
definitely related. This relation shows the same identity 
and difference which we have seen all along in the growth of 
1. cr. ibid., Vol. I, P• 493. 
2. Cf. IOIO., Vol. I, P• 491. 
3. Ibid:;-vo1. I, P• 494. Cf. ~., Vol. II, P• 428. 
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the mind. The category of the potential and actual shows how 
this identity and difference is possible. The identity as 
immanent end is present throughout its differences but is 
subject to being more or less implicit or explicitly brought 
out. 
We can see now how the description of experience in 
terms of phases and development is possible. According to 
how, with what degree of adequacy, thought attains its immanent 
end, it will more adequately define its object. The impulse of 
the development is the immanent end itself. 
Ultimately thought moves because the system of 
ideas which at any moment is the mind on its intel-
lectual side is incomplete-and fragmentary, and 
because that completed system which is immanent and 
operative within it ~pels to exPlicit fulfilment.l 
External factors, psychological or physical, confine us to 
fragmentary systems or universals in situ but we can still see 
--
that to fully define our object would entail making it fully 
determinate, relating it to the wider system in which it has 
its context.2 This is the process in which we see the immanent 
ideal at work, its refusal to t~e these relatively loose 
systems as tully real; its impulse to make its object fully 
"intelligible." 
The coincidence of the transcendent and immanent end is 
of extreme importance for Blanshard epistemologically for if 
thought's ideal did not reveal the character of the real then 
1. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 45. 
2. ~extent of this process again depends upon whether we 
are talking about generic universals as the center of the 
system or specific universals. 
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there would be no alternative but scepticism in regard to the 
possibility of knowing. 
If the pursuit of thought's own ideal were 
merely an elaborate self-indulgence that brought 
us no nearer to reality, or 1f the apprehension of 
reality did not lie 1n the line of thought's i~ter-
est ••• the hope of ~nowledge would be vain. 
Blanshard backs this argument for the ultimate identity 
of the two ends of thought with.other considerations which we 
should briefly mention here. The advance of knowledge has 
corroborated the fact that the ~anent and transcendent ends 
coincide ultimately, that the closer we get to our immanent end 
in the form of a completed system, the more adequate is our view 
of the real. In fact, this is not only the assumption of 
science bl t the assumption of any act of thinking whatsoever. 
For science; 
It has been the steadfast assumption of science 
whenever it came to an unsolved problem that there was 
a .key to be found, that if things happened thus rather 
then otherwise they did so for a cause or reason, and 
that if this were not forthcoming it was never because 
it was lacking, but always because of a passing blind-
ness in ourselves.2 
For every act of thinking : 
To think is to raise a question; to raise a 
question is to seek an explanation; to seek an ex-
planation is to assume that one may be had; so to 
assume is to take for granted that nature in that 
region is intelligible. Certainly the story of 
advancing knowledge unwinds itself as if self-
realization in thought meant also a coming nearer 
to reality.3 
1. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 262. 
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2. !D!a., Vol. II, P• 263. 
3. !Dia., Vol. II, p. 263. Blanshard feels also that history 
bears this out. The various phases, various Weltanschauungen, 
of history "show a constant nisus toward an ordering of the 
world which, as coherently comprehensive, may be taken also 
as true." Ibid., Vol. II, p. 283. 
The coincidence of these two ends is the basis of 
rationality itself. 
Is there any positive reason for believing that 
the nature of things is lntelligible? We have seen 
that the wo.rld could be accounted intelligible only 
if it were a system, all inclusive and perfectly in-
tegrated, and that such integration would be achieved 
only if the parts were internally related •••• We 
have agreed that first appearances impose all but 
overwhelming veto upon belief in such interdependence; 
and if it were not for the pressure of the implicit 
ideal of thought, maKing itself lnsistently felt in 
the scientific search for connection behind apparent 
irrelevance, and surging up continually in the long 
line of speculative thinkers who have held to the unity 
of things, the belief would probably have been discarded 
long ago as fanaticism or perversity. This verdict ray 
be the right one. We have said repeatedly that proo 
of the rationality of things was not logically possible, 
since it would assume validity for a supposedly inde-
pendent world1of the very canons whose applicability was at issue • 
An analysis of the different phases of the idea reveals 
this end also. It is not just system we ask for in the inte-
gration of experience but it is total system, a system ideally 
perfect. 
And if thought cannot assume that to its questions 
there are intelligible answers, it will die from lack 
of motive •••• Again, just as we must assume that the 
qualities of one thing are intelligibly connected, so 
we must assume that the things themselves are linked 
intelligibly in a system that includes them. Thus 
thought .cannot rest in the thing. It finds i tsel:f' 
carried out along each of these planes and then seduced 
by the suggestion that the planes must be further 
related to each other •••• But neither can thought 
rest with these; it must introduce a system among them, 
and then, if possible, a wider system. And once launched 
on this process Of expansion, where are we to halt? ••• 
It seems clear that, left to itself, the theoretic im-
pulse cannot rest while anything in the universe is out-
side the web of necessity. Thought is the movement o:f' 
1. ~., Vol. II, P• 475. 
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experience toward a special type of completeness; 
it is the pursuit of intellectual integrity; and 
so long as the field of experience remains a litter 
of di.sjecta membra, such integrity is still to be 
achleved.l 
(3) System and Coherence 
That the immanent end and the transcendent end are in 
some sense identical is shown 1a our use of coherence as the 
criterion of truth also. This is not to say that, for Blanshard, 
coherence is the same as truth but it is to say that we assume 
in any act of thinking whatsoever that as we approach truth as 
embodied 1n the notion of a full concrete system, we can use 
coherence as a criteria of the degree to which we have embodied 
system. Coherence as a criterion of truth is based upon the 
assumption that the embodiment of the ideal of system as the 
immanent end 1S also a closer approximation of the character of 
reality, that self-realization in thought is also a coming closer 
to reality. 
That these processes are really one is the 
metaphysical base on which our belief in coherence 
is founded. If one admits that the pursuit of a 
coherent system has actually carried us to what 
everyone would agree to call knowledge, why not take 
this ideal as a guide that will conduct us further? 
What better k~ ean one ask to the structure of the 
real? • • • this ideal 7 is that reality is a system, 
completely or ered and tU!ly intelligible, with which 
thought in its advance is more and more identifying 
itself •••• Truth is the approximation of thought 
to reality •••• It 1a measure is the distance 
thought has travelled, under the guidance of its 
inner compass, toward that intelligible system which 
unites its ultimate object with its ultimate end. 
Hence at any given time the degree of truth in our 
experience as a whole is the degree of system it has 
achieved. The degree of truth of a particular 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 653-654. 
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proposition is to be judged in the first instance 
by its coherence with experience as a whole, 
ultimately by its coherence with that further 
whole, all-comprehensive and fully articulate, in 
which thought can come to rest .1· 
The degree of coherence as it is used as a criterion or 
any one set of propositions is based upon the final immanent 
end of full system in the form of systematic necess1ty. Our 
test of any proposition is its coherence with the system of 
knowledge atta1ned at this t~e but the system of knowledge 
at this time can also be seen as being subject to the test of 
full systematic necess1ty. 
The test of any conclusion is whether or not it 
coheres with such system as we have; but that system 
itself must be revised, and revised perpetually, under 
the correction of the immanent end that is working 
through it. What do we mean by cOherence? ••• 
Perfect coherence would mean the necessitation of 
each part by each and all of the others.2 
System as the immanent end of thought is the ultimate 
criterion or truth, the goal of thought and the nature of 
truth.3 
We can see also how easily Blanshard's doctrine of degrees 
of truth will fit in here. Just as the immanent end allowed us 
to show various phases of the "object" in experience so it 
1. Ibid., Vol. II, PP• 263-264. 
2. !DIO., Vol. II, PP• 428-429. 
3. ~ibid., Vol. II, PP• 438, 26f, 427. We have seen the 
relation of thought to reality is what we mean by "truth." 
If the ideal defines the real, if, in getting the ideal 
in a more adequate form it means also a more adequate 
specification of the object, then system as the test of 
truth is also the nature of truth. See Blanshard's 
definition of verification as the appeal to the internal 
characteristics of knowledge as a whole, to thought's 
ultimate ideal. Of. ibid., Vol. II, PP• 213f. 
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allows us to hold to degrees of truth. A given proposition 
is truth in the degree that it could stand unal tared l.n a 
complete system of knowledge, could stand without qualification 
if the immanent end were ach1eved.1 The system we use in every 
day life is our changing system of knowledge but the ultimate 
criterion 1s unchanging. "What we have sal.d is that while truth 
as measured by the ultimate standard 1s unchangl.ng, our knowl-
edge of truth does change."2 Our present system must be 
revised constantly 1n light of the immanent end which is 
thought's ideal to realize. 
But this m9ans also that ~ present system of knowledge 
is fragmentary, and has no independent reality apart from the 
ideal system which is the crit-erion of what is "real." Without 
this criterion, we must rely on the criterion of presented fact 
which is everywhere not to be found. 3 
We cannot, in the end, appeal to "fact 11 ·for "facts" 
themselves are relative to a system. Nor can we appeal to 
the self-evidence of a proposition. Self-evidence itself 
rests upon coherence.4 The same holds true of the law of 
contradiction for the acceptance of this law is based upon the 
resulting incoherence of its rejection. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
s. 
The contention here is ••• not that if 
we deny the law of contradiction thought will move 
on to an absurd conclusion, but that under sugh a 
condition it will not and cannot move at all. 
Cf. F. H. Bradley, Apiearance and Realit~, PP• 3o2-363. 
Brand Blanshard, The ature of~oug§t, ol. II, p. 272. 
cr. ibid., Vol. I~p. 448. --
cr. ID!d., Vol. II, PP• 246f. 
Ibid-:-;-vo1. II, P• 255. Cf. the "this or nothing" argument 
~ernard Bosanquet, Implication and Linear Inference, 
(London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 19~, PP• 91, 245. 
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A system of knowledge 1s true 1n so far as it embodies 
.the ultimate end of thought and coherence is our criterion at 
any place along the way to this embodiment. Truth, then, in 
l 
the end, is a function of system. There are no isolated 
propositions which can be true. 
We are saying that truth is a function of 
neither when taken independently, but of the 
system of which both are members. So far as 
they cohere with each other and with the rest 
of the system, both are taken as true; and for 
either or both, extrusion from the system means 
falsity.2 
"System" is a condition of truth and truth as "coherence" 
is an approximation of system as ideal. 
Coherence means more than consistency. It 
means not only that the various constituents 
entering into the system are compatible with each 
other,_ but also that they necessitate each other. 
The system assumed is a system ideally perfect, 
for nothing less than this would satisfy intel-
ligence beyond rectification. In such a system 
there would be no loose ends. Difference anywhere 
would be reflected in difference everywhere.3 
Such a system is the ultimate appeal of thought, for in such 
a system there could be no.rational ground of doubt attaching 
to the ref.erences it contained, for any such ground must itself 
be a thought arising within the system of thought which has 
been held to exclude it. Admit in fact that belief or doubt 
arise within the circle of operations of thought 1n or with 
experience, admit that the appeal is always to further thought, 
and the conclusion is that a completely articulated system, 
including all operations of thought with ·experience, can and 
1. Blanshard says that coherence is symptomatic of perfect 
truth. Cf. ibid., Vol. II, P• 291. 
2. Ibid., Vol. ~p. 288. 
3. !Did., Vol. II, P• 292. 
-
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need appeal only to itself. 
In this section we were ma1nly concerned with the relation 
between the idea and the real 1n its epistemological setting 
and whether the 1deal o.f system was applicable to the real. 
We found that, for Blanshard, whatever the real is ideal knowl-
edge must def1ne it. 
There is a difference between idea and object but there 
is also an identity between these two. This identity is in the 
form of the pattern of system which is the norm of intelligi-
bility implicit 1n the drive of intellect toward comprehen-
s1veness. The m1nd reveals a nisus toward intelligible order, 
an order which involves systematic necessity and which brings 
intellectual satisfaction. 
The real is what is fully satisfactory to mind. System 
is the criterion of the presence in knowledge of the real. 
System is not a mere rule of organization of experience but 
is definitive of the real, of the "object" in knowledge. 
That the immanent and transcendent ends of knowledge 
coincide is .the assumption of science and any act of thinking 
whatsoever. System, or systematic interdependence, is the 
condition of rationality itself and lies as the basis of 
reasoning. 
Coherence as the test of truth was also based upon the 
coincidence of these ends. The degrees of coherence and truth 
are graded according to their approx~ation to system. System 
is regulative for knowledge but its regulative function pre-
supposes its being constitutive of reality. 
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That it is constitutive is the "metaphysical base" 
upon which the use of coherence as a criterion of truth is 
founded. System is not merely an ideal of ours but is con-
stituent of reality. 
What more can we say Of this system which would make the 
object fully intelligible? Can we say any more about the 
total system? What are the essential characteristics of 
"system?" 
ii. Kinds of Systems 
Is there some relation between part and part 
within a whole that appears wi.th unaffected same-
ness in systems as extremely different as the mul-
tiplication table, a sonnet, a starfish, and the 
science of modern physics?l 
Blanshard holds that there is not. Those who believe that 
there is such a key as to how the parts are related within the 
systems are still holding to the abstract universal, still 
holding to the belief that there is a universal which is iden-
tical throughout its instances. By "system" we do not mean any 
one kind of relation between parts in a whole; we do not mean 
any one kind of implication. 
There is no single abstract relation that relates 
in precisely the same fashion the parts 1n a machine, 
the proposi tiona ot Euclid and the notes in a song. 
The necessity of Euclid belongs inextricably to a kind 
of space; the necessity ot music belongs inextricably 
to a world of sound. • • • The idea of necessity does 
ot course have meaning, and one is certainly not saying 
nothing in describing it as the interdependence of 
parts 1n a whole. But we can now perhaps see why the 
description says so little •••• Necessity ••• takes 
its character from its context, that is, from the wholes 
1. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 436. 
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1t appears 1n, and these wholes are extremely various. 
To exhaust the mean1ng of necessity we should have to 
exhaust the var1eties of whole wh1ch 1mpose upon their 
parts any sort of interdependence.! 
What Blanshard means by "interdependence" and "necessl.ty" 
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is perhaps best g1ven in h1s examples of d1fferent kinds of 
systema. Fram these examples we ean get an idea of the essential 
differences between kinds of systems. "At the bottom would be a. 
junk-heap, where we could know every item but one and still be 
without any clue as to what that rema1n1ng item was."2 But even 
in the junk-heap there is not mere aggregation. The parts are 
not totally aec1dental to the "heap." There is some intrinsic 
eonnect1on between the parts ot a heap.3 
On Blanshard's view this is to say that we never get bare 
dl.fference with no identity. Even the process of enumeration 
1nvolves some identity, soma common element, by which we give . 
enumeration point and signif1cance.4 
Even the junk-heap, then, exhibits the relation of dif-
ference 1n an identity. But the 11 l.ndifference" of whole to 
parts is at a maximum., The part takes little of its significance 
and meaning from its context -- the parts are relatively exter-
nally related. 
Above the junk-heap would be a stone pile. "Here you 
could at least infer that what you would f1nd next would be a 
stone.n5 This example affords us with an illustration of the 
1. Ib1d., Vol. II, PP• 437-438. 
2 • !'6IC!., Vol. II, p. 2o5. 
3. ~ibid., Vol. II, P• 4o3. 
4. Of. !Did., Vol. II, P• 472. 
5. Ib1d:;-fol. II, P• 2o5. 
increasing importance of the unlversal in its function of 
giving greater definiteness to its instancy.1 But even here 
the relation between the parts in this kind of system is 
relatively "external" although less so than the junk-heap. 
A machine would be the next highest, "since from the 
remaining parts one could deduce not only the general character 
of a missing part, but also its special form and function."2 
The parts here are bound up with their context. The parts of 
a machine support each other and contribute to a common end. 
Understanding the machine would mean here grasping the function 
of its parts within the whole. "The parts take their function, 
and therefore their relevant nature, from their place in the 
engine as a whole. tt3 
The parts are also more determinant in the sense in which 
the parts must occupy certain definite places in regard to each 
other. You cannot "add" the parts to get the whole. They must 
be constructed in a definite way so as to fulfill certain con-
dltions ~posed on them by the whole. As opposed to the heap, 
the whole must 11 show" itself in different elements which maJce 
it up and each part must contribute in a distinctive way to 
the nature of the whole. 
The body as an organism is the next hlghest, and higher 
than a machine for 
you could remove the engine from a motor-car while 
leaving the other parts intact and replace it with 
any one of thousands of other englnes, but the 
1. Cf. above p. 69ff. 
2. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 2tio. 
3. lEIQ., Vol. II, P• 435. 
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thought of such an interchange amoung human heads 
or hearts shows at once that the interdefendence in 
a machine is far below that or the body. 
Any attempt to take the concept ot "heart" in isolation 
from its matrix or connections and relations is impossible. 
The concept of heart is more relative to a system or relations. 
It takes an essential part ot its nature from its relation to 
the system. The organism exhibits a more selective composition 
ot parts than a machine. 
But even higher interdependence is to be found in a 
mathematical or geometric system. Though a human hand 
would.hardly~be a hand-when detached from the body, 
still it would be something def1nite enough; and we 
can conceive of systems in which this something 
would be gone. Abstract a number from the number 
series and it would be a mere unrecognizable x. 
• • • ~In Euclidian Geometry_? 1t any proposition 
were lack1ng, it could be supplied by the rest; if 
any were altered, the repercussions would be ~elt 
through the length and breadth or the system. 
Yet tor Blanshard even geometry falls short of ideal 
system tor 
its postulates are unproved; they are independent 
ot each other, 1n the sense that none of them 
could be derived from any other or even from all 
the other'S together •••• A completely satisfactory 
system would have none or these defects. No 
proposition would be arbitrary, every proposition 
would be entailed by the others jointly and even 
singly, no proposition would stand outside the 
system. The integration would be so complete that 
no part could be seen tor what it was without seeing 
its relation to the whole, and the whole itself could 
be understood only through the contribution of every 
part.3 
1. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 2b5. 
2. ~., Vol. II, P• 2o5. 
3. ~., Vol. II, P• 266. 
-
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In such a system there would be complete enta1lment, 
every proposition would entall all the·others. The meaning 
of a proposition in the system could never be understood 
' 
without apprehension of the system 1n its entirety. 
These series ot examples of klnds of systems have brought 
out two d1stinct features of systems: they evince different 
kinds of interdependence; and they show different degrees of 
unity. 
The term "interdependence" is in a very real sense the 
heart of Blanshard's not1on of system. "Interdependence" 
itself is bound up with the nature of relations.1 This series 
of systems reveals a continuum in which the parts are seen as 
being relatively e~ternal to each other at one end of the scale, 
relatively internally related, more"interdependent," at the 
other end. 
The second feature of these systems is their "unity," 
the kind of connection they exhibit 1n relation to the whole. 
The connectlon of parts 1s also a function of the degree of the 
unity of the system, the whole itself. This connection is a 
function of the system revealed in the terms as related. 
Terms and context are also interdependent as well as term and 
term withln the context. This is the sense in which the terms 
are seen to be more "determlnant;" they take their character 
increasingly from the system to which they belong. 2 
1. Of. the following seotlon, P• "108. 
2. Thus we saw the generic universal as not "defini~" its 
dlfferentia 1n a very determinant mli.riiier. As an essence," 
a principle of organization, the generic universal is 
somewhat arbitrary and does not adequately "def1ne" its 
instances. 
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These two features of systems, their interdependence of 
parts and the part-whole relation, cannot be separated. 
But Blanshard does not stop here in describing this 
series of systems. They do form a "series" and can be ordered 
according to how they approx~ate the ideal system which is 
the Lmmanent end of thought. These systems vary only in the 
l degree to which they have the pattern of full system. 
These series of systems which form a continuum relate 
back to Blanshard 1 s view of degrees of truth. If a proposition 
eompletely disrupts the present system of knowledge, then, 
for all practical purposes, it is to be considered false. 
The truth or falsity of a proposition is a function of the 
degree of interdependence of the system in which the proposi-
tion ta.I:Ces place. A proposition is "more true" in the degree 
to which it is capable of being integrated into the system, to 
the degree to which it can be seen as "interdependent" upon 
every other part of the system. Its falsity would involve the 
alteration of the system in varying degrees. 
This reflects back upon the systems as objects of knowl-
edge also. They all require different kinds of judgment to 
express the connection between their parts. The kinds of 
judgments e2Press differing kinds of insight in accordance 
with the unity of the system dealt with. Empirical and ! priori 
judgments are expressions of insights and also differ only in 
degree. Judgments are more necessary according to the degree 
1. Cf. ~., Vol. II, P• 462. 
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to which they embody the pattern of full system, according 
to the degree to which they reveal the pressure of thought's 
immanent end. 
These systems constitute a progression in the sense that 
each of them portrays a reference to the ideal of knowledge. 
The defect by which the forms contradict the ideal is seen as 
a defect in their grasp of reality, in their presentation of 
full systematic connect~on. Their standard is the ideal. 
The measure is the degree of approximation 
achieved by an actual system to that other and 
ideal sy$tam which it is tending to become. • • • 
It is this sort of analogy, if any, that will con-
vey what is meant by degrees of necessity. Such 
degrees are exhibited whenever one passes from 
systems where the parts are relatively external 
to each other to those. where there is completer 
interdependence, from a machine to a plant, for 
example, or a plant to a mind •••• They taKe 
their character increasingly from the whole to 
which they belong.l 
iii. The Concrete Universal as Total System 
We can take these two features of interdependence and 
unity to characterize the total system which is the immanent 
end of thought and which also characterizes the real. The 
feature of interdependence is bound up with Blanshard's 
doctrine of ~tarnal relations; the feature of unity is bound 
up with his view of necess~ty and implication. 
(1) Internal Relations 
For Blanshard, the system which is thought's ideal is 
perfectly integbated, every part or term of the system is 
1. ~., Vol. II, PP• 446-447. 
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internally related to every other part. If any one term or 
relation were different, this dlfference would entail a dif-
terence in every other term and relation.1 
by internal relations: 
Blanshard means 
(1) that every term, i.e. every possible object 
of thought, is what it is 1n virtue of relations 
to what is other than itself; (2) that its nature 
is affected thus not by some of its relations 
only, but in differing degrees by all of them, no 
matter how external they may seem; (3) that in 
consequence of {2) and of the further obvious fact 
that everything is related ln some way to every-· 
thing else, no knowledge will reveal completely 
the nature of any term until it has ~xhausted that 
term's relations to everything else. 
Some of Blanshard's arguments for internal relations are -
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implicit in our foregoing analysis. His doctrine has been with 
us all along. We found relations present in immediate. exper-
ience itself whenever distinction 1s made within that experience. 
The process of distinction even on this rudimentary level in-
volved identity and difference and a thing's relation of dif-
ference, even its relation to its negation, is a part of the 
thing itself. "Everything is related to everything else by 
the relation of difference at least."3 Blanshard's view of 
negation and relation is similar to that of Hegel as he himself 
cla1ms.4 For both, the relation involved 1n the negativity of 
1. In regard to the expressl.on "entail a difference," Blanshard 
says in a footnote: "It may be said that 'ma.Ke a difference 
to' is used ambiguously to mean both 'logically determine' 
an.a 'c-ausally determine.' From our point of view this does 
not matter, since causal determination always contains an 
element of logical necessity." Ibid., Vol. II, p. 48ln. 
For his argument for this in botll"tE:e cases of "mental" 
and "physical" events, cf • .!!!.£•, Vol. II, pp. 495ff. 
2. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 452. 
3. ~., Vol. II, P• 476. 
4. cr;-ibid., Vol. II, P• 47o. 
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finite things is their own dialectic. Thought is the center 
of this process toward overcoming the contradiction involved 
1 in a "thing's" being related to something "other." 
We are again reminded of Blanshard's description of the 
object of thought. 
To £! for thought at all is to be distinct, 
and to be distinct is to be related to something 
else, • • • to think involves the relating of the 
object thought of to something else within a system.2 
The internal relation of one thing to another is a condition 
implicit in the being of anything whatsoever. 
We have also seen his doctr~e of internal .relation 
exemplified in his analysis of perception and conception. 
Every idea, whether functioning 1n perception or conception, 
is so integral a part of a context of meaning that it cannot 
be separated from this context. This included universals 
themselves. The idea or universal was used as an identity 
which made inference possible but this universal itself always 
came within a "range" of universals, and inference takes place 
within this range. Th;s is to say that, for Blanshard, infer-
ence is only valid, intrinsic connect1on is only made, when 
1. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, The Lo~c ot Hegel, PP• 347, 173 •. 
This points up a central d ference which both Hegel and 
Blanshard have to Bradley. Bradley's view of relation is 
less positive; thought, in its use of relations, is, 
because of the very nature of relations themselves, 
ultimately self-contradictory. The ~anent end of thought 
could never, ideally or otherwise, coincide with its trans-
cendent end for there is always something "other'' than · 
ideality even on the level of immediate experience. 
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2. 
Cf. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, Ch. III, PP• 322ff, 
Essa~s on Truth and Reality, pp:-255ff. 
~ran B!inshard, The Nature ~ Thought, Vol. I, P• 65. 
the major and minor terms of the syllogism are internally 
related to the m1ddle term. 
We found that another way of stating this is to say that 
inference is a passage from one difference to another within 
the universal. The "universal" now is concrete, it grounds its 
differences and its differences take their character from this 
total context. The identity and difference inform and determine 
each other.1 
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The Kinds of universals brought out also exemplify his 
doctrine of internal relations. The series from generic to 
specific universals show different degrees of interdependence 
(internal relations) according to the extent to which they have 
control over their instanc~s. 2 "And it is evident that just as 
the abstract universal and externa~ relations are natural allies, 
so are the concrete universal and internal relat1ons. "3 
The x1nds of universals are graded according to how they 
come up to a completely interdependent system. This gradation 
has far reaching effect in regard to Blanshard's view of method. 
It 1s not Blanshard's purpose to deny the use of any one of these 
universals; the1r uses are valid within their own spheres. The 
use of abstract universals and the m~thod of abstract analysis 
is applicable in areas where the unity and the interdependence 
of relat1ons are "loose," e.g. the "loose" unity in the grouplng 
of qualities into "things" wherein many of the qualities of a 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Cf. ibid., Vol. II, P• 471. The "abstract universal" is, 
almoSt'""'by its definition, a universal "1ndependent" from its 
context, i.e. externally related to its instances which 
themselves have little relation to each other. 
Cf. above P• 78ff. 
~., Vol. II, P• 460. 
thing are relatively irrelevant to it for the purposes at 
hand. The adequacy of method depends upon the subject matter 
at hand. "The method of abstract analysis ,.!! applicable to 
wholes in the degree to whl.ch their parts are ununified (in the 
sense of being externally related), and not applicable in the 
degree to which they are unified. ttl 
Closely connected with any discussion of relations and 
method is the question as to how we should view such notions as 
"essence," "property, '' "relevance. tt Blanshard' s analysis of 
these notions is along the same line. 
Relevance admits of degrees also. Any attempt on the part 
of the finite thinker to subscribe to a system using some 
criterion of relevance would entail his not grasping the total 
system. Any criterion of relevance would relegate some rela~ 
tiona as being "external." His criterion of relevance is 
dictated to by his interests and hence he is always work1ng 
with systems which fall short of total system. "To suppose 
that because thought, through practical necess1ty, must move 
within lim1ted fields, these fields are geographical divisions 
. 2 
in nature, is an illusion." This is another way of saying that 
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any notion of "essence," "accident," and "property" are to some 
extent arbitrarily drawn distinctions and the result of "abstrac-
t1on. "3 
1. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 4o9. Blanshard goes on to say that no 
iEOie is a mere aggregate and no whole is completely unified, 
no whole comes up to ideal system. He would want to say 
that abstract analysis 1s not applicable in the end, viz. 
in dealing with first principles. 
2. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 456. But Blanshard points up the fact 
tEit science depends upon irrelevance in the discovery of 
"law." This is perfectly valid within this sphere. Cf. 
ibid., Vol. II, P• 459. · 
3. ~ibid., Vol. II, P• 480. 
-
While analysis is necessary, Blanshard would want to say, 
let us not forget tba t we are leaving something out and not 
attaining truth in the form or a total concrete system. We do 
1 
not have complete interdependence of relations. 
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This "lesson" has a double significance for Blanshard 
because if we remember it is relations which confer particularity 
and uniqueness to the object. Relations are not merely cognitive 
condi tiona for a 11 thing" but the essential conditions of a thing 
-- to be is to be related. Relations individuate what the thing 
is, are essential to its being.2 As we have seen in the case or 
the specific universal, the process of definition is one or 
specification until we relate this thing to all others. 
This stone is unique. What makes it so is a 
set or relations~at fix its connection with every-
thing else in the universe. Om1t these relations, 
all of them, or indeed any of them, and you omit 
some part of that which makes this stone what it is. 
And with this you have admitted that it is related 
internally to everything else.3 
To specify fully is to move toward particularity and 
uniqueness. Full particularity exhibits complete relational 
interdependence. 
But just as the relation of one thing to another is a 
condition or the being or anything whatever, so its being 
related within a system is a condition or its being intelligible. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
We hold that the ultimate object of thought, 
in both senses or the word, is an all inclusive 
system in which everything is related internally 
to everything else.4 
the end possible. 
the purely 11external n 
F. H. Bradley, 
The "externallytt related is nowhere in 
With Bradley, Blanshard would say that 
is "our ignorance set up as reality." 
Afpearance and Reallt~, p. 51'7. 
C • Brand B!anshird, he Nature ~ Thought, Vol. II, p. 486. 
Ibid., Vol. II, P• 48~ 
!DIQ., Vol. II, P• 453. 
-
(2) Systematic Necessity 
The total system exhibits complete interdependence in the 
sense in which every part of the system is internally related 
to every other part. But by "interdependence" here Blanshard 
does not just mean interrelation. He means that there is 
"intrinsic" connection within the system and an intrinsic 
1 
connection involves necessary connect~on. The total system 
exhibits necessary connection and implication. 
Blanshard's doctrine of internal relat1on provides him 
with the base for this entailment of every part with every other 
part. There is complete entailment and implication in the ideal 
system. In the system which would be completely satlSfactory 
to thought no part could be seen for what it was without seeing 
its relations to the whole, nor could the whole be understood 
without understanding its parts.2 
Blanshard, in fact, gives implication and necessity a 
treatment similar to the one he gave to inference. IrJerence 
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took place within a system of universals, within a context of 
meaning. Implication and necessity also hold between proposi-
tions within a context, a system. To grasp their connection is 
to grasp them as members of the same system. Inference, implica-
tion, and necessity are relations between meanings which are 
always integral to a wider context; it is only within this con-
text that they can be discerned. Two terms imply each other 
because both belong to a wider system and to grasp 
the implications between them is to grasp them ~s 
members of that system. Implication is systematic 
1. Cf. ibid., Vol. II, P• 454. 
2. Cf. YOIO., Vol. II, P• 2o4. 
-
interdependence. It is a relation between parts 
or a whole imposed on them by the nature of the 
whole itself.l 
Statements of connection, including statements of relation, 
and statements of implication, are statements of the relation 
of parts within a whole. Again, 
Statements of implication, then, are not 
statements of connection between bare abstrac-
tions. There is always a reference to further 
conditions which, together with those that are 
explicit, form a system; and it 1s within this 
system that the implication holds.2 
The analytic-synthetic distinction, if strictly taken, 
does not hold for Blanshard. There are necessary propositions 
which are not analytic. There are intentional necessities 
within a context in which two propositions are distinct, i.e. 
not tautological, but related by something more than conjunc-
tion.3 For Blanshard, necessary connections are as truly 
presented, either implicitly or explicitly, in the given con-
text as any other connection.4 
Implication and necessity are also subject to "degrees." 
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The type of connection asserted depends upon the kind of 
system in which this connection takes place, or, to put it 
otherwise, it depends upon the kind of identity or universal 
which is used in the implicatory statement. The instances have 
1. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 430. 
2. IDIQ., Vol. II, P• 434. 
3. ~ibid., Vol. II, P• 40b. 
4. Ct. !OIQ., Vol. II, p. 502. For Blanshard's discussion 
as to-t.fie relation between causal and logical connection 
ct. ibid., Vol. II, pp. 495ff. It is perhaps unnecessary 
to go into Blanshard's discussion of this for much of his 
argument is based upon what is already familiar. 
the x~d of interdependence they have because of the character 
of the universal. This is again our identity with differences. 
And the inference will thus be a passage from 
one "difference" to another wi th1n a concrete 
universal, from one point to another within a 
little system whose points are so linked together 
that each can be 1 tself only as belong1ng to the 
system.l 
Thus implication is also a function of the system 
partially revealed 1n the terms as related. Necessity also 
gets its character from 1ts context, from the system; it is 
2 the demand of implicit system. 
But Blanshard again rejects this seeming'relativism 1n 
regard to systems in favor of an 1deal system by which we are 
able to grade the various systems. "System" has a greater 
significance than just to ground inference and implication. 
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As we saw systematic necessity is a condition of asking any 
question whatsoever -- it is a condition of rationality itself.3 
Whenever we reason correctly we pass from term to term in a 
certain way and an elaboration of this way will show that there 
is systematic connection in the subject-matter to which the 
mind must make obeisance. If the subject is empirical we 
stake the possibility of its rational treatment upon the exis•-
ence or such an order. The notion of system fulfills a logical 
requirement also. Our ability to grade systems and their 
characterizations are based upon this • 
1. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 4o7. 
2. ~shard says elsewhere that necess1ty is the demand of 
~pl1cit system. Cf. ibid., Vol. II, P• 140. 
3. Cf. above P• 97ff. -
Thus ~ar we have stressed the ~act that teleology, the 
operation o~ ends, is required to explain thought, learning, 
retention, and relevance. The relation o~ the partial system 
to the absolute system is one o~ potentiality to actuality. 
Now we have to stress Blanshard's other emphasis. The relation 
between idea and object, partial system and absolute system, 
is not merely a temporal relation. The temporal process of 
thought is a process of actualizing ideas according to their 
immanent end. But the formal structure of the real is more 
than the result of temporal development. There can be no 
1 
. potentiality without the logical priority of the actual. 
When we speaK of the relation between idea 
and object as that of unrealized to realized 
purpose, we are speaking of what may be called 
the essential or logical aspect of that relation, 
not of the temporal lapse or process through which 
we-come to know it.2 
The process of thought is an attempt to realize an inherent 
structure which is logically prior to its actualization. 
The total system, then, is logically prior to its parts. 
The demand of total system is a logical compulsion for a self-
luminous logical whole3 which brings a unique satisfaction4 
and which includes and orders all other wholes. 
A system that is in the long run to satisfy the 
immanent demand of thought must be one that is neither 
based on some bare category, alleged to be common to 
all the minor wholes of experience, nor extended by 
provincial enthusiasm from one's own bailiwick to the 
universe, but one that is a genu1ne system .of systems, 
1. Although the temporal actualization may be the vehicle 
for the fully actual. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, p. 516. 
2. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 517. ----
3. cr:-ibid., Vol. II, p. 204. 
4. C~. ibid., Vol. II, P• 438. 
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which unites the lesser wholes ~nto an ~ntell~gible 
structure without omitting what is distinctive in each • 
• • • The various wholes within which explanation and 
proof are of£ered • • • are really systems within a 
system -- and this, as we have seen, is the "invincible 
surmise" of thought -- we should expect to find in them 
embod~ents in differing degree of that whole which, 
so far as they represent efforts to understand at all, 
is the immanent end of each of them.l 
The total system is a concrete universal, the only 
independent reality, i.e. the only "particular." It is 
system as such. 
1. ~., Vol. II, PP• 441-442. 
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5. A Summary of Exper~ence and 
Order ~ Blanshard 
The not1on of order is an integral part of Blanshard's 
analysis of the various phases of experience and of his psycho-
logical account of the genesis of order within immediate 
experience. Even within immediate experience there are at least 
functionally present elements and relations which lend them-
selves to being ordered. Universals must be present if there 
ls to be Wlyth~ng wh~ch is distinct for thought. Un~versals 
were seen to be, along w~th relations, the root condition of 
our power to distinguish anything as itself. The presence of 
universals and relations is the very basis of intelligence. 
It was prec~sely the universal which tooK on functional 
importance in perception. The universal functioned as a medium 
through which we passed from immediate experience to mediate 
experience, from sensed content to the perception of a thing. 
In this sense the universal was seen as the ground or condition 
of perceptual inference and is the bas~ for O'LU" ins~ght into 
connection; it supplied the identity necessary for the inference 
from sensed content to the perception of things. 
But even on this level, Blanshard is qu~te against the 
assertion of sheer identity, of abstract universals. The 
identity necessary for perceptual inference is rather a nexus 
of universals, a system of types which exhibits some Kind of 
interconnection and which brings its various instances together 
into sane k~nd of unity or order. In every judgment we find 
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that a complex experience is called up, analyzed, and its 
parts connected together 1n a certa1n def1n1te order by the 
operation of universal ideas or mean1ngs, each of which is a 
"system" of meanings. The cond1 tion of inference on this 
level is a more or less explicit system of content. ''Whatu 
is asserted in judgment takes its character from th1s context; 
the "that" which is referred to comes in a context of which the 
datum is a fragment. The universal and its relations are at 
the center of this context. 
The functional status of the nexus of un1versa~was seen 
in his analysis of our perception of things as things. In 
this sense, the un1versal represents a plan, a rule, by which 
we order the sensed content. Every judgment is a synthesis and 
arranges the data in accordance with some properties or pro-
perty in accordance with rules which determ1ne order; it ex-
hibits some Kind of connection within a nexus of universals 
either ~plicitly assumed or explicitly stated in the perceptual 
inference. But in the organization of "things," our practical 
ends determine the universal which 1s to be central -- our 
practical ends are our criteria of relevance and our principle 
or selection regarding the grouping of qualities into "things." 
But even here, in our organization of qualities into "things," 
there were types of Gestalten which pointed to the possibility 
that the mind has types ot order which it preferred as its own. 
In Blanshard's discussion of the intermediate level of 
perception, this disposition toward its own forms, toward intel-
ligibility, was seen even more-in the character of thought. 
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Along with this, the universals were seen as even more 
active. They are now seen as a single context of meaning which 
is brought to bear in perception. The nexus of universals, the 
idea-system, not only complements experience and conditions 1t 
but it also, in its role as a criteria of relevance, filters it. 
In perception on this level, the idea-system is also there in 
the form of d1spositions, as unknown conditions which help to 
explain the selective, teleological con~rol which retained 
experience has upon present perception. The "given" is to a 
large extent controlled by the results of past experience either 
in the form of focal consciousness or in the form of these dis-
positions. Both form an integral whole with that which is given 
in sense. For Blanshard, the "given" is organic to a funded 
system of knowledge and meanings. That these funded meanings 
did exhibit a structure was pointed out in his discussion of the 
structure of perceptual meaning. Its structure and the effect 
of this structure on perception were pointed up. The kind of 
structure our idea-sys~em will have we found to be largely a 
product of our interest, our criteria of relevance. But in all 
cases we found that the integration of the idea-system which is 
required to explain learning and ass~ilation of experience is 
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a product of an interest which is d1stinct from the interest in 
practical ends. Our criteria of relevance is largely practical 
on this level, but no~ wholly so. We have a theoretical interest, 
an interes~ in understand1ng, in system itself, and it is the 
immediate motive for the integration of meaning. The idea-system 
can vary according to the practical aims of the investigator, but 
the ability to integrate these meanings ~d to transfer these 
mean~ngs to other areas depends upon this theoretic interest 
in system itself. 
Thus far in Blanshard' s account of the function of order 
in perception the notion of order is a relative one and ~t is 
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in keeping with his recognition of its actual use 1n perception 
and reflection. It is not the specific arrangement that con-
stitutes an order but the exiB tence of a rule that will conduct 
us from part to part of the arrangement as desired. The s~gnifi­
cance of order here is instrumental or practical -- 1t is the 
organon of the understand~g. 
From the very beginnings of experience, a structure of 
order is either implicitly or explicitly present, either as 
complimentary to the given or as a background to the given. 
It is the logical ground of perceptual inference. This emphasis 
upon the system of meaning as more and more active in perception 
is made the central point in his account of perception. As 
mind becomes more and more independent of the conditions of its 
genesis, it is seen to be more and more directed by such a 
structure. 
Blanshard's analysis on the conceptual level of this 
process brings out even more the active character of the idea-
system, and the fact that, in the use of "free ideas, 11 this 
process is .to be seen only in light of teleology, only in light 
of an immanent end which is the "final cause 11 of the self-
development of the idea. It is this end, the ideal of system, 
which is the final cause of the various phases of the function 
of universals -- their use is increasingly dominated by this 
end. All types of ideas vary according to how they function in 
connecting differences and unifying them, according to how they 
unify the many through the one. Cognitively, ideas are more or 
less articulate systems of knowledge and meanings, which are the 
result of our interpretation and comprehension of the referent. 
They are used to judge experience. These idea-systems are 
capable of being graded in terms of the ideal system. Ideas 
are seen in terms of their development of an internal structure 
toward complete system; their "stages" are seen in light of this 
end. 
This process of the idea describes the very process by 
which thought, in attempting to define its object, develops its 
content into some kind of intelligible pattern. Blanshard 
regards the fact of mental development, choice, and inference 
as inexplicable unless the immanent end of intelligible system 
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is recognized. As we saw, the development of the idea in its 
attempts to define its object is at one with inference and choice. 
The various phases of the idea reveal a conception of system 
toward which they are developing. System is the pattern or 
arrangement thought strives tor 1n attempting to understand 1ts 
object. Completed sy~tem is the pattern the idea intends. 
Since the nature and function of the universal was at the 
center of BlanShard 1 s analysis of the function of system, we were 
required to go into a discussion of Blanshard 1 s view of the 
universal. This brought us back to the idea's reference, its 
"object." The universal is seen as a concrete universal, as an 
undeveloped schema which achieves determinateness and speci-
ficity; it is inseparable from its instances. It is, in short, 
an undeveloped system which evinces the same developmental pro-
cess which was present 1n the idea. 
LooKing at the universal in this light, one of Blanshard's 
main points is that the universal taKen now as an implicit 
system is not separable from its terms. Against formalism, the 
principles which order the data are always connected with the 
data, the inherent content of the system. Against empiricism, 
the ordering principle is not arbitrary, not external to ita 
content. The principle of order cannot be separated from that 
which is ordered. 
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In his discussion of universals another ma1n point was 
emphasized. There is nothing 1n the object of thought (that to 
which it refers) which is alien to that structure of system which 
it intends as its ideal. Thought•s object is amenable to the 
kind of structure which thought has as its immanent end and, if 
developed to the full, the idea would ~ its object. What 
Blanshard means by "object" is, in the end, an integrated unity 
of universals, a group of universals in ~ which is established 
by a principle which is itself universal. "Objectivity" does 
not mean brute fact which is other in Kind from thought. It 
means the exhibition of the structure which our reason demands 
in the form of a completed system. The ideal and the real are 
not independent variables. 
Blanshard felt this conclusion was required because of 
epistemological reasons. System is the pattern or organization 
we strive for in atte~pting to define the nature of our object, 
but when we ask for the grounds which make this ideal applicable 
to the real we raise another question. 
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On epistemological grounds, Blanshard 1 s view is that what-
ever reality is, ideal knowledge in the form of system must 
define it. The imperfection of knowledge can be stated without 
comparing the known with the real but it eamfo:t be stated without 
comparing, at least implicitly, defective with perfect knowledge. 
System is not just a generalized description of the real, nor is 
it a mere rule of organization for discourse. System is defini-
tive of anything which could be considered real. 
In order for knowledge t~ be possible, Blanshard feels that 
we must believe that thought discloses reality in the degree to 
which it reveals its own ideal. The ultimate identity of system 
as ideal and our object of thought is not only necessary as a 
condition for the possibility of knowledge but it is pointed to 
in the nisus of mind tor intelligible order, systematic vision, 
as revealed in assumptions of science and the history of the 
world. That system characterizes the real is the very basis of 
rationality itself. Intelligibility is only possible when the 
world is considered a system which is perfectly integrated and 
all-inclusive. 
We also found that coherence as the criterion of truth was 
based upon the metaphysical assumption that the character of the 
real is ultimately identical with the ideal of system. Truth is 
the degree of this approxtmation to complete system and its 
criterion is the degree to,which we have achieved this system. 
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Without this criterion we must rely on presented fact which is 
nowhere to be found. Truth in the end is a function of system 
and system is the criterion of the presence in knowledge of the 
real. System as a criterion of truth is regulative for knowledge 
but its regulative function depends ultimately upon its being 
constitutive of reality. 
We went on to attempt to characterize what Blanshard meant 
by system. His minimum definition is that a system refers to 
the interdependence of parts in a whole. We found that his term 
"interdependence" included at least two constituent features, 
internal relations, and necessity, the former referring to the 
relationship which holds between the parts and the latter to the 
relationship which holds between the parts and the whole. 
Blanshard's doctrine of internal relations lies at the 
heart of his notion of system. Relations are not merely the 
cognitive condition of the intelligibility of a thing but also 
confer particularity upon things. A thing has its being because 
of its relational position within a wider context of relations. 
An integral part of Blanshard's doctrine also is his view 
of entailment and necessary connection. Necessity is a function 
of the whole and the kind of unity it exhibits -- it is a func-
tion of system itself. The impulse for order is in the end an 
impulse for a logical system where there is complete entailment. 
Total system is not an aggregate or a collection but exhibits 
inherent connections. System is that final principle of order 
common to all subject matters and capable of combining them 
into a rational whole. It is the concept of rationality which 
is the connecting link between an empirical account of the 
process of reasoning and the grounds or ultimate basis for the 
validity of this process in regard to reality as a whole. 
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CHAPTER II ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD 
1. Introduction 
Not only is the Changing, developmental character 
of Whitehead's thought now generally recognized, but the 
actual phases of Whitehead's development are fairly well 
1 
established. The first phase of Whitehead's development 
consists of his interests 1n and writings on mathematics 
and logic (1898-1917). The second phase is the period in 
which his interests turned toward the philosophy of the 
physical sciences (1917-1924). The third phase begins with 
his coming to Harvard 1n 1924 and the publication of Science 
and the Modern World in 1925. In this third phase, White-
head's primary interests and writings turned to metaphysics. 
The following exposition of Whitehead's position is 
confined to this third phase, since it is within this latter 
period that we find the greatest relevance of Whitehead's 
thought to our topic. More specifically, our exposition 
will derive mainly from the trilogy Science ~ ~ .;..;.M .... o_d.;.er;;.n-. 
World, Process ~Reality, and Adventures of Ideas. As 
1. Cf. Victor Lowe, "The Development of Whitehead's 
Philosophy." The_Philosoph{ of Alfred North Whitehead, 
Paul Arthur ScEi!pp (ea.), Cliicago: Northwestern 
University, 1941). A complete bibliography of Whitehead's 
writings is also to be found in the Schilpp volume. 
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Whitehead himself says of these three books: "Each book can 
be read separately; but they supplement each other's omissions 
or compressions.•1 
It is within these three works in metaphysics that 
Whitehead's view of experience and order receive their most 
systematic elucidation.2 In these works, problems of 
knowledge as well as the problems of general philosophical 
thought receive a common explanation by reference to "being" 
or better, 1n this case, by reference to "becoming," "process." 
This reference is to the ·texture of actual occasions, the 
structure of experience.3 The appeal to experience, to 
"drops of experience," is also the appeal to Whitehead's 
basic ontological principle: actual entities are the only 
reasons. Whitehead has stated 1n the opening pages of 
Process ~ Reality: 
The elucidation of ~ediate experience is 
the sole justification for any thoUght; and the 
starting point for thought is the analytic obser-
vation of components of this experience.4 
Again, 
Philosophers should confine themselves to 
the rush of immediate transition.5 
.1. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, preface. 
Both earlier and later works by Whiteneid will also be 
used where relevant to clarify or supplement a point 
in the exposition. 
2. This is true also of his doctrine of eternal objects. 
3. Alfred North Whitehead, Process ~Reality, pp. 27, 290. 
4. Ibid., p. 6. 
5. !Dia., P• 197. 
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In this phase of Whitehead's writings, experience 
has its importance in its service as an example or analogy 
upon which to found a generalized description required for 
1 
metaphysics. Experience is a unifying principle of both 
human experience and non-human experience, e.g. the objects 
of science and "nature." In this way, traditional problems 
of mind, matter, and causality are seen in a new light. The 
old problems gotten into with the "detached mind" theory and 
representationalism are seen in the new light of prehensions. 
These traditional errors result in the fact "that philosophical 
discussion is enmeshed in the fallacy of 'misplaced concrete-
ness.1"2 
The following is an attempt to bring to focus Whitehead's 
conceptions of experience and order. The exposition will 
take this outline: Part 2 is an account of Whitehead's 
doctrine of prehension and how actual entities are related. 
The functions of eternal objects in relation to prehensive 
occasions are emphasized. The function of Whitehead's 
concept of God in regard to the ordering of possibilities 
by the actual occasions is pointed to. Part 3 is an account 
of Whitehead's doctrine of concrescence and subjective aim 
and how the actual occasions do so order the eternal objects. 
Parts 2 and 3 are together an account of the process, 
1. cr. ibid., P• 172. 
2 • Ibid:-;-p. 27 • 
130 
responsive, supplemental, and completed, by which the actual 
occasion attains its individuality. Part 4 is a more closely 
analyzed account of Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects 
and the ways in which they are and are not ordered and 
related. 
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2. Prehens~on 
For \~1~ehead, an ana~ys~s of experience shou~d no~ begin 
w1~ sense-percep~ion. He 1s comp~e~ely aga~s~ ~he ~ssump~ion 
~hat sense-percep~ion is ~he mos~ ~por~ant element 1n our 
exper1ence. Sense-perception is ~ der1va~~ve phase or ~he 
concrescence of some ~CliUa~ entities. I~ tt1s the ~r1umph of 
l 
absliraction in ¥nima~ exper1ence." 
As Hume so well pOin~ed ouli, sense-perception neglec~s 
essential connecli10ns. Moreover, as Hume •lao po1nted out, 
taK1ng sense-perception as fundamental leads to the v1ew that 
the perc1p1en~ is resliricted to purely private data. The 
"content" or experience, as 1n the Cartesian 11 cog1ta~1.ons, n 
1S • purely pr1vate qua~1f1cation or ~he m~d. 
For Wh1tehead, our an~lysis of experience mus~ be corrected 
by a reformed subjectivist principle that recognizes that the 
subject experienc1ng is consliituted by the immanence of ex~erna~ 
~h1ngs ~nd that experience 1s essen~ia~ly referen~ial to some-
thing other than itself. 
1. 
2. 
If experience be not based upon an objective 
content, ther~ can be no escape from a so+1ps1st 
subjectiv1sm. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of ThouTht, (New York: 
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1~b8), p.-ruo. F1rsli published 
in 1~38: New YorK, The Macm111an Company) 
Alfred North Wh1~ehead, Process and Rea~ity, p. 200. 
See a~so ~., part II, eli. VII:--
132 
We must recur to experience itself in i~s origin and with 
a minimum of analysis 1n order to f1nd the requis~te connected-
ness between things. Only this would jus~ify our ~rus~ ~hat 
"the ultimate natures of ~hings lie together in a harmony which 
excludes mere arbitrariness."1 This requisite connectedness 
Whitehead f~ds 1n "prehens~ons," w~ch he defines as "concrete 
Facts of Relatedness."2 
Whi~ehead refers us ~oF. H. Bradley's use of the term 
"feeling" ~o express ~his primary activity at ~he base of 
experience •3 
A 11prehens ~on" is 
the general way in WhiCh the occasion of experience 
can include, as part of its own essence, any o~her 
entity •••• This term is devoid of sugges~ion 
either of consc~ousness or or representative percep-
tion. Feelings are ~e pos1~ive ~ype of prehens~ons.4 
More genera~ly, ~ "prehension" can be def~ned as an 
ac~ivi~y ~n which an occasion of experience, or an ~ctual 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 
{New York: The liew American L~brary""'? World L~terature, 
Inc., l\:148), pp. l\:l-2u. (F~s"& pub~ished in l\:12o: New 
Yorx, The Mac~llan Company) 
2. Alfred Nor~h Wh~"&ehead, Process ~ Real~~y, p. 3~. 
3. Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Adven~ures or Ideas, p. ~~~. 
BO'&h Bradley and Wh~~ehead ~gree 1n maKing experience or 
sen~ience fundamental. Whitehead s~ates i~ plainly: 
"Here 'feeling' is used ~s ~synonym for 1 ac~ual~ty.'" 
Alfred Nor~h Whitehead, Religion in the MaKing, {New York: 
Meridan BooKs, Inc., 1960), p. Io07 -rFirs~ published in 
1~26: New York, The Macmillan Company) Bo~h agree ~n 
~heir repud~ation of ~e no"&ion of "vacuous ac~u~~ity." 
Cf. Alfred Nort;h ~tehead, Process ~Reality, P• 43. 
4. Alfred Nor~h Whi~ehead, Adventures ~ Ideas, p. 235. 
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entity, selectively appropria~es from i~s own perspec~ive 
some o~her type of ent1.~y, thereby mak.mg it an object of' its 
own experience. "Appropriate" is perhaps an adequa~e term to 
generally describe prehension, for the term "appropriate" 
connotes the active relation that Whitehead wants to convey 
and it also connotes a "takl.ng account of with some end in 
view" which is a~so close to Whitehead's mean1.ng.1 
Structurally, experience evinces a subject-object pattern 
but not in the sense 1.n which we could identify this structure 
with the Knower and the Known relation familiar to us in 
traai~iona~ epistemological ana~yses. In trad~tiona~ ana~ysis, 
the subject 1s often seen as the exper1ent and he is qua~1f1ed 
by his sensations which go to lilW:Le up the "object." In White-
head's broader 1nterpreta~ion of ~hese terms, each actual 
entity is bo~h "subject" and "object." It l.s an "object" in 
so far as it enters 1.nto the becomwg o.t· another actua~ entity, 
in so far as it enjoys "objective immorta~l.ty 11 and condl.tions 
the fu~ure; each actua~ entity is a "subject" l.n so far as it 
prehends its universe from its own perspective, in so far as 
it "taKes account of" its world from its own standpol.nt. 
~ As g1.ven in the eleventh category of explanation, a 
prehension is analyzable into the interaction of a "subject" 
1. Whitehead does use the term "appropriate" in Modes of 
Tho~ht, p. ~05, and in Process ~d Reality, p. 3o3:- Some 
of t e basl.c notions which went ~maKe uplWhl.tehead's 
doctrJ.ne o.t· prehens.Lons can be found 1.n his earlier con-
cept of "events." For an account of how his ear~1.er 
conception of events developea l.nto his doctr1ne of pre-
hens.Lon, c£. Rl.chard M. Ml.~lard, The Place ~ Value ~ 
Whl.tehead's Thought, unpub~ished Ph7D. disser~ation, 
Boston Ohl.vers.Lty, 1~50. · 
2. Alfred North Whl.~ehead, Process ~ Reality, P• 0o. 
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within which the prehension is an activity, a "datum" whose 
relevance partly provokes the realization of this prehension, 
and the "subjective 11 form which is the way in which that 
1 
subject prehends that datum. 
The interplay between the experiencing subject and the 
selectively appropriated object is central for Whitehead. It 
is the "stuff constituting those individual things which make 
up the sole reality of the Universe. 112 
In explaining this subject-object relation, Whitehead uses 
the Quaker word "concern." 
The occasion as subject has a "concern" for the 
object. And the 11 concern" at once places the object 
as a component in the experience of the subject, with 
an effective tone drawn from this object and directed 
towards it. With this interpretation the subject-
object rela~ion is the fundamental structure of 
experience. 
The above passage conveys the thoroughly active and 
referential character of prehensions. Prehensions are essen-
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tially processes of realization, processes which involve past, 
present and future. They are also processes which have "direction." 
1. But the way in which the subject prehends the datum is 
ultimately dependent upon its "subjective aim. n Every 
actual occasion is thoroughly telic in nature. It is 
a process of the organization of its many data in accordance 
with some "end in view." This "end in view" and the cor-
responding appetition toward it terminate in the actual 
occasion's "satisfaction." cr. below p. l89ff. cr. also 
Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 178. A 
more complete analysis of the factors of a prehension is 
given in Alfred North \¥hitehead, Process and Realitt, 
Part III, especially p. 337ff. We shall aafine eac of 
these factors as the exposition develops. 
2. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 179. 
3. ~., P• 178. 
Whitehead's defJ.nl.tl.on o.:t· 11ll.fe" poJ.nts this out. 
L1fe is the enjoyment of emotion, derived from 
the past and a~d at 'the future. It is the enjoy-
ment of emotion which was then, which is now, ~nd 
which wJ.ll be then. This vector character J.s of the 
essence of such entertal.nment.l 
The 1mportant pOJ.nti for our purposes here is to note the 
broad experJ.ential ana emotive base with which WhJ.tehead begl.ns. 
PrehensJ.on is not 'CO be identified with cognitive apprehension 
only.2 For Whitehead, feeling is central. 
Feeling is the agent which reduces the universe 
to its perspective for fact. Apart from gradations 
of feeling, the infinitude o:t· detal.l produces an 
infJ.nitude or effect in the constitution of each 
fact. And that is all that 1s to be saJ.d, when we 
omit feeling. But we feel dJ.fferently about these 
effects and thus reduce them to perspective.3 
However, the interaction between the "subject" ttnd the 
"object" is not the only way that prehensions can be analyzed. 
Prehensions can also be characterized l.n accordance with 
whether they are "physical" or "conceptual.u Each occasion 
exhibits botn KJ.nds of prehensions to varyl.ng degrees and with 
varying functions. 
1. 
2. 
Each actuall.ty J.s essentially bl.polar, physJ.cal 
and mental, ~d the physical inherJ.tance is essentially 
accompanied by a conceptual reaction partly conformed 
to, ~d partly introductory of, a relevant novel contrast, 
but always introducing emphasis, valuation, and purpose. 
The integration of the physical and mental sl.de into a 
unity of experie~ce is a self-formation which is a process 
of concrescence. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thou~, p. 2~~. Cf. also 
Alfred North Whl.tehead, Process-andRe ity, p. 247. 
Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 
PP• 7Uff. ------
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4. 
Alfred North Whl.tehead, Modes of Thought, p. 13. Cf. also 
Alfred North Whl.tehead, ScJ.ence-and ihe Modern World, pp. ?Off. 
Alfred North Whl.tehead, Process and ~ity, P• I6o. Cf. 
~., P• 423. 
Here the process of an ~ctual occasion is described as 
partly made up of determinate feelings of its world, its 
qualifications by the settled past, and its conceptual 
appetitions l.nvolvJ.ng l.ndetermlnate possibilities. "The 
process is constituted by the influx of eternal objects into 
a novel determinateness of feeling which absorbs the actual 
world into a novel actuality. ttl Each actual occasion arises 
from its actual world and attaJ.ns to full determinateness, 
satisfaction.2 
In this connection, Whitehead calls his philosophy of 
organism an inversion of Kant's posl.tion. Whitehead agrees 
with Kant that experience is an "act of construction," but he 
disagrees with Kant's view that the objective world is con-
structed by the subject experiencing in accordance with ~ priori 
categories; for Whitehead, the experiencl.ng subject arises out 
of the world which it feels and forrr£ itself in accordance with 
3 the way it feels. 
The Critique of Pure Reason describes the process 
by wh!en subjective-data pass into the appearance of an 
objective world. The philosophy of organism see~s to 
describe how objective data pass J.nto subjective satis-
faction, and how order in the objective d4ta provJ.des 
J.ntensJ.ty 1n the subjective satisfaction. 
1. Ibid., P• 72. 
2. cr:-category of explanation (xxv), J.bid., p. 38. cr. also 
his analytic dJ.vJ.sions in~., pp. 227, 3~~. 
3. How an actual entlty becomes constitutes what the actual 
is. Cf. the "prlnclple Of process," J.bid., PP• 34-35. 
4. IbJ.d., p. 135. Cf'. also J.bld., p. ~0~ 
- -
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"Feeling," or prehension, is 'the 'term signify~ng 'the 
opera'tlon of passJ.ng f'rom the object:Lv~ty of the data 'tO 'the 
subjectivl'ty of the ~ctual occasJ.on. Thus, ~nltehead announces 
his aspiration to cons'truct "a critique of pure feeling. n 
Ordered experience 1s not primarily a product of modes of 
thought. 
The first stage of the process of feeling is the 
reception into 'the responsive conformi'ty of feel~ng 
whereby the d~tum, which is mere po'ten'tiality, becomes 
the ind~vlduilized basis for a complex unlty of 
realization. 
Let us describe 'this ordering process from the s'tandpo~t 
of one aspect of each occasion: 1ts phys~cal prehensions. 
1. Phys~cal Prehension 
Whi'tehead of'ten broaaiy characterizes 'the function of the 
phys:Lcal pole in any actual occasion as 'the "responsive" 
function. It is the phase of process wh1ch denotes the recep-
tion o.t· the completed pas't in'to the present. In our experience 
1t refers to our feeling of a vague totality of emotional 
intensi'tY• All our physical rela'tionships are made up of 
these phys1cal feelings. 
This 01rect perception, character1zed by mere 
subjective responsiveness and by lacK of or1gination 
1n the higher phases 1 exh1b1'tS 'the constitution of 
an ac'tuai entity under the gu1se of receptiv1ty. In 
the language of causa'tion, it descr1bes the eff1cient 
causation opera'tive 1n the actual world. In the 
language of epistemology, as framed by Locke, it 
1. Ibid., P• i'l:tJ. 
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descrl.bes how the ideas or par'ticu.Lar exis'ten'ts ~re 
absorbed in'to the subject1v1ty or 'the perc1p1en't and 
are 'the datum for ~'ts exper1ence of the external 
world • .L 
The outs'tand1ng characterl.stic of a physl.cal prehension 
is that i't is emo"tional. 
The pr~1tive form of physl.cal experience 1s 
emotional -- bll.nd emotion -- received as felt 
elsewhere in another occasion and conformally 
appropriated ~s ~ subject1ve pass1on. In the 
language appropriate to the hl.gher sta~es of ex-
per1ence, the pr1m~tl.ve element is sKdpathf, that 
1s, feeling the feell.ng in another an fee ing 
conforma.Lly with another~ 
Whitehead spe rurs ot' physical feeling in Adventures of 
Ideas as ~ case ot· non-sensuous perception wh1ch l.s ~llustrated 
1n our Knowledge of our 1mmedl.ate past; which forms the basis 
for our present ex~stence. "The immed~ate past; ~s surv1v~ng 
to be aga~n l~ved 'through 1n the present is 'the palmary ~s1c_l 
ins'tance of non-sensuous perception. 113 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Ibid., PP• 1?8-.L'/9. cr. ibid., pp. 380, 0o5, 38~. cr. 
IIf:red North Wh1tehead, Adventures of Ideas, P• ~0~. Cf. 
also Whitehead's aescr1p'tion of 11caiiSal effl.cacy 11 ~n 
Alfred North Wh1tehead, Process and Reall.'tA' and Alfred 
Nort;h Whitehead, S~bo.Lism, Its Iraan!~ an Effect, (New Yorx: G. P. ~'tnamfs Sons, 1959~ -rFirst published 
in 1~27: New York, The Macndllan Company} S'tr1ctly 
speax1ng, no act;ual occasion is merely respons1ve or 
receptive to its past actual world. There 1s always 
valuation on the part of the present ~ctual occasion of 
this influence from the past;; every ~c'tu~l occas1on has 
~ "conceptua.L" element. See below p. 163ff. 
Alfred Nor'th Wh1teheact, Process ~nd Reall.tt' p. ~4o. The 
phrase "received as felt elsewhere-1n anot er occasl.on" 
aga1n pol.nts out; the referential character or prehensions. 
Alfred North ~~itehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 184. Note 
that both Blanshard and Wh1tehead ~re adverse 'tO the method 
or taK1ng sense d~'ta ~s ~'tom1c ~na.Lytical uni'ts ~d 'then 
a"ttemp't1ng to ~ccount for the organ1zat1on or experience 
as a comb1nation of these bare sensa. The isolation of 
bare sensa is an abs'trac'tion. Wh1tehead's pOS1'tion is 
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that you can 1 't separa'te, except by abs'traction, emotional 
experience from the experience or sensa. Blanshard recogn1zes 
'thl.s emot;10na.l base but doesn't carry 1't any fur'ther. cr. 
( 1) Objectl.f l.c a-cion 
However, even~ glance a't Whitehead's more -cechnl.cal 
analysJ.s or these primary feelings in Part III of' Process and 
RealJ.ty J.ndJ.ca -ces tha't 'this is no-c ti simple or a.Lrec't f'orm of 
prehension.1 Wha't is of p~-cicul~r J.nteres't here is 'that, even 
on -chis pr~l.'tl.ve level of feelJ.ng, there l.s selec'tion and 
elimination in-co a perspective for fact. The physl.cal feeling 
by 'the subject of 'the "objectu is not ~ dJ.rec't presence of the 
"object" l.n the subject al-chough a f~rs't readJ.ng of WhJ.tehead' s 
sta-cemen't of 'the "prl.nciple of relatJ.v~ty" gl.ves -chis J.mpres-
s J.on. 
Accordl.ng to this princJ.ple an ~c'tu~l ent.L'tY l.S 
presen't 1n o-cher ac'tUal enti'ties. In fact J.f we airow 
for degrees of relevance, ~nd for negligible relevance, 
we mus't s~y 'tha't every ~c'tual en-city is present 1n 
every o-cher ~ctual enti'tY• The philosophy of organism 
is mainly devoted to the tasK of maK.Lng cle~ the 
no-cion of "being present in another entity. "2 
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The second sentence in the above quo'ta'tl.On makes all -che 
d.Lfference for each ~c-cual occasion enters l.n'tO another accordJ.ng 
to the way J.n which it is felt. I't is then sald to exls't as an 
"object," as J.nstrumental to the prehend.Lng occasJ.on. Thls l.S 
the function of past occaslons as efficient causes; 1n its role 
of self-forma-cion 'the prehend.Lng actual occasion is said to 
exl.S't "formally. "3 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process ~nd Reality, pp. 3blff. 
2. Ibl.d., pp. 7~-80. For an ex-cendea-and convJ.ncl.ng ~rgument 
~o Whl.tehead's posi-cion that 'there is no direct presence 
of one occasion in another, cr. Wl.lliam A. Chrls-cian, An 
In-cerpreta-cion of Vlhi-cehead's MetaphysJ.cs, (New Haven:--
Yale UnJ.vers~-cyrress, 19:::>~), Par't !. 01'. also RJ.chard M. 
Nullard, The Place of Value .Ln Whl.'tehead's Thought, 'through-
out, especJ.ally pp.-rosn, 23ln. 
3. C!'. Alfred North Whitehead, Process ~ Reality, p. ~2~. 
But this distinction between subject and object is not a 
hard and fast one. Actual occasions can and do function in 
either manner depending on the phase of process with which we 
are concerned. Let us quote in full a passage which gives 
this in essence. 
The conception of the world here adopted is that 
of a functional activity. By this I mean that every 
actual thing is something by reason of its activity; 
whereby its nature consists in its relevance to other 
things, and its individuality consists in its synthesis 
of other things so far as they are relevant to it. In 
enquiring about any one individual we must ask how 
other individuals enter "objectively" into the unity 
of its own experience. This unity of its own experience 
is that individual existing formally. We must also 
enquire how it enters into the "formal" existence of 
other things; and this entrance is that individual 
existing objectivelt' that is to say -- existing 
abstractly, exeppli ying only some elements in its 
formal content. 
The particular way in whiCh an actual occasion is realized 
2 in another Whitehead calls "objectification." 
(2} Real Potentiality 
"Objectification" functions for Whitehead as an explanation 
of how what is settled and actual in the past becomes the "real 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Slmbolism, Its Meaning and Effect, 
pp. 26-27. This distinctJ.on betwee:n:-"'formal ex'i"B-E'ence" and 
"objective existence" of course ties in with Whitehead's 
"principle of relativity." Cf. Alfred North VV"hitehead, 
Process and Reality, p. 34. Both analyses are necessary: 
"That twoaescriptions are required for an actual entity: 
(a) one which is analytical of its potentiality for 
'objectification' in the becoming of other actual entities; 
and (b) another which is analrrtical of the process which 
constitutes its own becoming.' Ibid., p. 34. We are here 
mainly concerned with the former;-Ine latter is discussed 
under "subjective aim." 
2. Cf. ~., P• 34. 
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1 potentiality" for the present. The data (initial data) formed 
by the past exist as potentials for present feelings; present 
feeling must conform to these conditions in its own manner 
(subjective form). This real potentiality is given by the 
past actual occasions in virtue of their own 11decisionstt to 
realize potentials, in virtue of their own achievement of 
possibilities. Having once achieved its ~~n possibilities, 
the past conditions and limits creativity beyond itselr. 2 
11 Decision" is central for Whitehead. 
Just as "potentialitY. for process 11 is the meaning 
of the more general term 'entity, 11 or "thing," so 
"decision" is the additional meaning imported by the 
word "actual" into the phrase "actual entity." 
"Actuality" is the decision amid "potentiality." It 
represents stubborn fact which cannot be evaded. The 
real internal constitution of an actual entity 
progress! vely constitutes a decision condi tionisg 
the creativity which transcends that actuality. 
How the past occasions have realized potentialities 
has determined what they are, their form of definiteness. 
~ they have become through their "decisions" is passed on 
to the present actual occasion. These "forms of definiteness" 
and their gradations by past actual occasions form the "initial 
data" for the present occasion. These forms of definiteness 
are, of course, the "e terna.l objects. 11 
1. cr. ibid., PP· 2os, 321. 
2. cr. IOia., PP· 68-69. 
3. Ibid., PP• 68-69. 
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Whl.tehead genera.Lly def'mes eternal objects as "Pure 
Po"Centials for tihe Specl.f'~c Determinatl.on of' Fact, ~ Forms 
of Defl.nl.teness. "1 Bu'C !'or Whl.tehead "potentiality'' can have 
two me amng s • 
The first meaning is m reference 'CO po"Centiality as 'the 
"pure, n general, t:J.n.d abstrac't poss ibl.lity for reall.zation 
without regard to conditions actually Ob'Ca~~ng. This is the 
sense in wh~ch the "eternal objec'ts" are "eternal." Thel.r 
analys~s only dl.scloses other eternal objects. 2 They are 
fully l.ndeterml.nate as 'CO their particular reall.zation. They 
ind~cate only a general capacity for determination. 3 
But it ~s only~ abstraction that 'the ~ndetermination or 
potentiality l.s "pure." E'ternal objects do not exist except 
as realized determl.nan'Cs.4 
1. Ibl.d., p. 32. Sl.nce Whitehead's eternal objects are 'the 
nearest; analogue 'CO Blanshara's un~versa.Ls we shall return 
'CO a discussion of eternal objects later. cr. P·210ff. 
For Whitehead, the function of eternal objects receives 
increas~ng ~portance as his metaphysl.cal posl.tl.on develops. 
By the tl.me he expresses h:Ls metaphys~cal position fully 
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l.n Process ~nd Real~tiy, 'the fundamental metaphysical entities 
are actual entities ~d eternal objects. cr. ibid., p. 37. 
For a d.:i.scussl.on of the !'act that the eternal ObJects in 
his later period are lineal descendants of the "objects" 
in hl.s earlier period, c.f. William A. Christian, An Inter-
pretation of Wnitehead's Metaphys~cs, ch. 10, and~l.chard 
M. lhllard-;-The Place of Value ~ Wlutehead'.s Thought, p. 57. 
2. Cf. A.Lfred North Wh~tenead, Process t:J.n.d Rea!ity, p. 34. 
3. Herein ll.es their contrast 'CO actual entl.ties. We shall 
have more to say about thl.s contrast when we d~scuss 
conceptual prehensions. It ~s ~ conceptual prehensions 
that the datum are eternal objects ~n their general capacity 
as determinants. Cf. l.bid., PP• 36of. 
4. Cf. Alfred North Wh1teneaa, Science and the Modern World, 
p. 163, where he describes this pure potentiality as a 
state of not-being. 
This is to say that eternal objects can be grasped without 
reference to their instantiation Ln actual entities, but they 
do not ex1st apart from such actual 1nstantiation.1 
The potential~ty with wh~ch we are now concerned and which 
constitutes part of the pr1mary data tor present process is not 
abstract po-centiality but a "conditioned" potentiality. In 
contrast to general potentiality, ~t is a "real potentiality." 
The eternal objects, already selected by the past, are those 
which in fact are given to the new occasion. They can be 
~pl~cated 1n the new occasion 1n many ways but are ~ fact 
only ~pllcated 1n one mode. 
This indetermination, rendered determinate 1n 
the real concrescence, 1s the meanmg of "potentiality." 
It 1s a conditioned indetermination, and is therefore 
called a ureal potentiality.n2 
In 1:h1.s connection, it l.S ~portant to remember that the 
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past, which now tor.ms the real potentiality, 1s no ionger actual, 
i.e. it is no longer existing 1n its own ~ed~acy.3 The past 
acts o1· experienc~ng, the actua.L occas~ons, have been sa-cisfied; 
they now rema~n ~n their "objective JJDID.Ortality." They now 
1. This is, of course, ~n Keeping wi-ch 'IVhltehead' s "ontologicai 
principle." Cf. Alfre~ North \Vhitehead, Process and 
Reaii ty, p. :5o. This account of' the exper~entiai process 
follows from this: it is only from the past actual ent~ties, 
inciuding God, that -che eternal objects are ~plicated in 
present occasions. As we shall see, the "t·orms" ~;;.re "given" 
and become "objects" only because ot' their J.J.llplica-cion 1n 
the past. 
2. Ib~d., p. 34. The dual character o.t· po-centiality must not 
oe-forgotten. As reaiized ~n actuai occas1ons the eternai 
objects ~re always cond~tioned but they still ao not iose 
their aspect or pure possibility. 
3. cr. ~·~ p. 38. 
exJ.Sti as .Lnslirumential f'or the 1'utiure. They no longer exJ.Sti 
as pr~vat.e subjectis but. as "objectis."~ 
For Wh~tiehead, tiO be an "object" means t;O be a polJentiality 
2 for becomJ.ng, tiO be a component; .1.n Ot;her feel~ng centers. To 
be an "object" also s~gnifies function~ng as a .rorm of def .1.nite-
ness 11given" lJO t;.Q.e future as J.n~t;ial. datia. 11G.1.venness" <:~.nd 
"pot;ent;~a.l ~t;y" for Wh~ t;ehead go t.oge'ther. 
It is evident that "givenness tl and "potentiality11 
are both meaningless apart from a multiplicity of 
potential entities. These potentialities are the 
"eternal oba ects." Apart from "potentiality" and 
"gi venness, there can be no nexus of actual things 
in process of supersession by novel actual things.3 
The reception of these forms of definiteness on the part 
of the present occasions is possible because these forms are 
already immanent in the antecedent-actualities. They have 
already been realized by the past actual occasions. They are 
said to have had "ingression" into these occasions. 
The term "ingress ion" refers to the particular 
mode in which the potentiality of an eternal object 
is realized in a particular actual entity, contributing 
to the definiteness of that actual entity.4 
1. cr. Whitehead's reference to the "pragmatic" value of the 
satisfaction existing objectively, ibid., pp. 126, 134. 
Cf. below for a discussion of 11 satisfaction,u P• 202. 
2. Cf. ibid., p. 136. 
3. Ibid:;-p. 72. 
4 • 'I'6!'(I • 1 p • 34 • 
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More specifically, in objectification eternal objects 
are said to be functioning "datively." In this case an 
eternal object functions as "an element in the definiteness 
of some objectified nexus, or of' some single actual entity, 
which is the datum of a feeling. nl 11An eternal object when 
it has ingression through its function of objectifying the 
actual world, so as to present the datum for prehensions, is 
functioning 'datively. 1 " 2 
Thus eternal objects introduce the multiplicity of the 
past. Otherwise, the present actual occasion would be over-
whelmed by this multiplicity. 
Within the above general description of real potentiality, 
it is important to note two things about the function of eternal 
objects in Whitehead's doctrine of objectification. The first 
is that we find Whitehead's eternal objects required even on 
this primary level; the second is that physical prehension is 
essentially a process of abstraction. 
1. Ibid., p. 445. 
2. !Oia., p. 249. Eternal objects can function as an element 
in the subjective form of a prehension and also as an 
element in the datum of a conceptual prehension. Cf. ibid., 
p. 445. Here we are only concerned with its "dative" -
function. We shall then consider its "subjective" function. 
A discussion of its function in conceptual prehensions 
is to be found when we discuss conceptual prehensions. 
Cf. below P• 161ft. 
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(i) The Givenness of eternal objects 
The first fact is implicit in the above description. The 
forms of definiteness are "given," they form the initial data 
for concrescence and condition that concrescence. 
No actual entity can rise beyond what the actual 
world as a datum from its standpoint -- its actual 
world -- allows it to be. Each such ent~ arises 
from a primary phase of the concrescence of objecti-
fications which are in some respects settled: the 
basis of its experience is "given. nl 
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Moreover, the relation between past actual occasions and 
present occasions is not an immediate one. Physical prehension 
is mediated by eternal objects; the past actual occasions are 
prehended !!! eternal objects whiCh are the realized determinants 
of the past actualities. 
The organic philosophy does not hold that the 
"particular existents n are prehended apart from 
universals; on the contrary, it holds that they are 
prehended by the mediation of universals. In other 
words, each actuality is prehended by means of some 
element of its own definiteness. This is th~ doctrine 
of the "objectification" of actual entities. 
As realized past determinants, the eternal objects are 
the conditioned potentialities which are there for synthesis 
by present actual occasions. The eternal objects are present 
and lend themselves to baing ordered.3 The way in which the 
1. Ibid., P• 127. 
2. "'!'61::"0., p. 230. Whitehead says elsewhere that the eternal 
objects function by "introducing the multiplicity of 
actual entities as constitutive of the actual entity 
in question." Ibid., p. 93. 
3. We are reminded-neFe or Blanshard' s point: We must so 
construe the world we first live in as to maie escape-
from it conceivable:- df'. above p-:-a-:- - -
present occasions do so select and realize these objects is 
the individual contribution of each such present occasion to 
creativity. 
(ii) Abstraction 
The second point that should be brought out here is that 
no actual entity is merely receptive of the past. Even on 
this primitive level of physical prehension, the actual occa-
sions are seen to be a process of feeling synthesis arising 
out of the whole settled world of the past. The actual 
occasions, even in physical prehension, are seen to be a 
selective process, the given initial data are felt under a 
"perspective" which is the "objective datum" of the feeling. 
Objectification is an operation of mutually 
adjusted abstraction, or elimination, whereby the 
many occasions of the actual world become one 
complex datum. This fact of elimination by reason 
of synthesis is sometimes termed the perspective 
of the actual world from the standpoint of that 
concrescence.l 
Objectification is essentially abstraction but not in 
the sense of a conscious process of lifting the form out of 
its exemplification in things; rather in a more elemental 
sense or "emphasis" which involves elimination of factors 
1. Ibid., p. 321. cr. also ibid., p. 353. one could say 
~~ for Whitehead, even~ most rudimentary activity 
evinces the Bradleyan "that" and "what" distinction. 
This is found in Whitehead's distinction between the 
"initial data" and the "objective datum" characteristic 
of every prehension. 
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from the data. 1 This elimination Whitehead calls negative 
prehension. 
A feeling is the appropriation of some elements 
in the universe to be components in the real internal 
constitution of its subject. The elements are the 
initial data; they are what th3 feeling feels. But 
they are felt under an abstraction. The process 
involves negative prehensions which effect elimination.2 
The actual occasion is prehensively related to the whole 
world of both actual occasions and eternal objects. But the 
initial data are felt under a "perspective., which is the 
objective datum of the feeling. Thus concrescence is a 
process of unification and simplification. The novelty of 
an actual occasion lies in the particular way in which it 
selects from~ real potentiality and the realm of general 
potentiality. What the actual occasion becomes depends upon 
the way in which it organizes its world. 
Every actual occasion is defined as to its 
character by how these possibilities are actualized 
for that occasion. Thus actualization is a selection 
among possibilities. More accurately, it is a selec-
tion issuing in a gradation of possibilities in 
respect to their realization in that occasion.3 
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1. viz., Whitehead is not yet discussing the level of Blanshard 1 s 
grasp of universals as universals, as distinctions. This 
level of physical ~ehension that we are concerned with 
here is closer to Blanshard's reference to .,feeling-
meaning." Cf. above p. 10. 
2. Ibid., p. 353. In a negative prehension some aspects of 
~initial data are excluded from "positive contribution 
to the subject's own real internal constitution • ., Ibid., 
p. 66. It must be added here that each actual occasion 
does not include all antecedent occasions but they do feel 
the effects of, or "significance" of, the entire world 
either negatively or positively. Negative prehension is a 
relation as much as positive prehension. What is to be 
eliminated is ultimately grounded in the teleological 
character of the actual occasions. cr. subjective aim, 
below, p. 189. 
3. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, PP• 159-16 
(3) Conformal feelings 
We have been concerned thus far with at least part of 
Whitehead's account of how what is settled in the past becomes 
the real potentiality for the present. Part of the basis of 
experience is "given" and unless there is a "given," a real 
potentiality, no actualization could take place. We have seen 
that the eternal objects assumed the role of potentialities 
for realization, they introduced the multiplicities of the 
past whereby the many actual occasions become one complex 
datum for the concrescent subject. 
Whitehead often refers to this aspect of concrescence 
as the "public" side of process. In every concrete fact, 
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"its public side is constituted by the complex datum prehended."1 
But we must realize that every concrete fact also has its 
"private" side which "is constituted by the subjective form 
through which a private quality is imposed on the public 
datum. "2 
It is equally important to realize how inseparable the 
"public" and the "private" aspects are for Whitehead. They 
are both a part of any one act of prehension. In fact, a 
prehension is more properly described as a concrete inter-
connected process of a subject feeling the datum with a 
subjective form. 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, P• 444. 
2. Ibid., p. 444. Whitehead continues on the same page: 
""T:Ele facts into which the actualities are divisible are 
their prehensions, with their public origins, their 
private forms, and their private aims." 
The "positive prehension" of an entity by an 
actual entity is the complete transaction analysable 
into the ingression, or objectification, of that 
entity as a datum for feeling, and into the feeling 
whereby this datum is absorbed into the subjective 
satisf action .1 
Concrete experience for Whitehead never evinces mere 
receptiveness. Experience of something is always of that 
something ~ yet experienced as absorbed, transformed. In 
this connection, Whitehead says 
Decartes' "cogito, ergo sum" is wrongly trans-
lated, "I think, therefore I am. n It is never bare 
thought or bare existence that we are aware of. I 
find myself as essentially a unity of emotions, 
enjoyments, hopes, fears, regrets, valuations of 
alternatives, decisions -- all of them subjective 
reactions to the environment as active in my nature. 
My unity ••• is my process of shaping this welter 
of material into a cons is tent pattern of feelings .2 
The nsubjecti ve form" of a prehension is the way in which 
the present occasion prehends its objective datum. The sub-
jective form denotes the type of responsiveness which the 
subject makes to the objective datum. It is 
1. 
2. 
the affective tone determining the effectiveness 
of that prehension in that occasion of experience. 
How the experience constitutes itself depends on 
its complex of subjective forms.3 
Ibid., P• 82. 
I!f:red North Whitehead, Modes of Thought, pp. 227-228. 
Cf. Whitehead's rejection Of tne "sensationalist principle." 
Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 239ff. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures-or Ideas, pp. 178-179. 
The subjective form of a prehension-may vary from forms of 
emotional intensity to consciousness and purpose. Cf. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 35. The 
subjective forms of an occas1on,-r:e. the way in which 
occasions unify their prehensions in their process of 
self-formation, will become increasingly important as we 
(footnote continued on following page} 
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However, on the level of physical feelings, the 
subjective form is largely determined by the objective datum 
of that feeling. This fact is expressed in Adventures of Ideas 
as the ''Conformation of Feeling." Whitehead explains this 
fully: 
The first phase in the immediacy of the new 
occasion is that of the conformation of feelings. 
The feeling as enjoyed by the past occasion is 
present in the new occasion as datum felt, with a 
sub j ec t i ve form conformal to that of the datum. 
Thus if A be the past occasion, D the datum felt 
by A with subjective form describable as A angry, 
then this feeling -- namely, A feeling D with 
subjective form of anger -- is initially felt 
by the new occasion B with the same subjective 
form of anger. The anger is continuous through-
out the successive occasions of experience. This 
continuity of subjective form is the initial 
sympathy of B for A. It is the primary ground 
for the continuity of nature.l 
Whitehead further explains this ground for the continuity 
of nature by again recalling the eternal objects. Let us see 
how this is effected. 
(i) Subjective ingression 
Whitehead makes a distinction between eternal objects 
of the "objective species" and eternal objects of the 
1. 
(footnote continued from precedin§ page) proceed for 
around it and the "subjective aim turn the principles 
of the organization of an act of experience. Strictly 
speaking, subjective forms cannot be separated from the 
subjective aim. The public origin, the private forms 
and the private aims are inextricably bound up in any 
one occasion. "Subjective aims" however are more properly 
discussed under conceptual prehensions. Of. below P• l80ff. 
We are confining our attention here to the relation of the 
objective datum to the subjective form in a simple physical 
feeling. The difficulty in so confining ourselves attests 
to Whitehead's position that you cannot separate physical 
feelings from conceptual feelings. Of. below P• 190. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures £! Ideas, P• 185. 
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"subjective species." An eternal object of the uobjecti ve 
species" can only be an ele1mnt in the definiteness of an 
actual entity or a nexus whiCh is a datum of a feeling. It 
can function in the process of objectification1 but it can 
only function in this way, viz "datively." But this species 
is a real character of that datum. Among this species are, 
for example, numerical relationships and geometrical shapes. 
"Eternal objects of the objective species are the mathematical 
platonic forms. "2 
Eternal objects of the "subjective speciestt are the 
sensa. These a.re the qualities determinant of the "how" of 
feeling. Eternal objects of the subjective species can be 
"an emotion, or an intensity, or an adversion, or an aversion, 
or a pleasure, or a pain. n3 If these "universals" of quality 
do so function as an element in the definiteness of a sub-
jective form of a feeling, they are said to have "subjective 
ingression" into the real internal constitution of the actual 
entity in question.4 
1. Cf. above, p. l40f. 
2. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Rea.litz, p. 446. 
It is this species which comprises-the general relation-
ships, general structure, whiCh Whitehead discusses under 
the theory of extension. "Extension is the most general 
scheme of real potentiality, providing the background for 
all other organic relations." Ibid., p. 105. Cf. also 
ibid., Part II, ch. II, and Par~. 
3. !Oia., P• 446. 
4. w.Ei'fiehead's view of qualities and their functions is in 
great contrast to the traditional Lockian concept of 
qualities as "secondary," as mere mental adjuncts to 
physical nature. 
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We find here that Whitehead regards qualities as 
characterizing the modes of subjective forms. 
The fundamental example of the notion "quality 
inhering is ("__sicJ particular substance" is 
afforded by subjective form inhering in feeling." 
If we abstract the form from the feeling, we are 
left with an etelnal object as the remnant of 
subjective form. 
We are afforded an example: the sensum "red." 
In their most primitive form of functioning, 
a sensum is felt physically with emotional enjoy-
ment of its sheer individual essence. For example, 
red is felt with emotional enjoyment of its sheer 
redness. In this primitive prehension we have 
aboriginal feeling in whiCh the subject feels 
itself as enjoying redness. This is Hume's 
"impressions of sensation" stripped of all spatial 
relation with other such impressions.2 
In conformal physical prehension an eternal object of the 
subjective species has subjective ingression and hence consti-
tutes part of the real internal constitution of the present 
actual occasion; it also has dative ingression, i.e. it 
1. Ibid., P• 354. Ct. also ibid., PP• 210, 356. 
2. "''6''Q., p. 479. Cf. also IOra:., 246. An example of the 
Oiitinction between eternar-objects of the subjective 
species and eternal objects ot the objective species is 
given in Adventures of Ideas: "For example, in the 
intuition of a multiPlicity of three or tour objects, 
the mere number Lmposes no subjective form. It is 
merely a condition regulating some pattern of effective 
components. In abstraction from those components, mere 
triplicity can dictate no subjective form for its 
prehension. But green can. And there lies the dif-
ference between the sensa and the abstract mathematical 
for.ms." Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, 
p. 250. cr. also Whitehead's reference to language as 
conveying not only "objective meaning, but also involves 
a conveyance ot subjective form." ~., p. 248. 
154 
characterizes the objective datum of that same occasion. 
To express this in another way, the eternal object is the 
common form of definiteness defining the subjective form of 
the past feeling which is now a datum for the present and 
also the form of definiteness for the subjective form of the 
present occasion. When this is the case, the eternal object 
is then said to be functioning "relationally. 11 
In the conformal feelings the how of feeling 
reproduces what is felt. Same conformation is 
necessary as a basis of vector transition, whereby 
the past is synthesized with the present. The one 
eternal object in its two-way function, as a 
determinant of the datum and as a determinant of 
the subjective form, is thus relational. In this 
sense the solidarity of the universe is based on 
the relational functioning of eternal objects.l 
The term "reproduces" is important in the above passage. 
Whitehead is not identifying the subjective forms of the past 
occasion with the subjective form of the present. The past 
actual occasion passes on its feeling to be re-enacted by the 
present. But it is only a partial re-enaction. The feeling 
is transformed by being felt in a new context with its own 
emphases and eliminations. The subjective form is only partly 
a result of the subjective form derived from the past; each 
occasion also has its aim which also partly determines its 
subjective form. But what reproduction or re~enaction there 
is, the identical elements in this reproduction are the 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Realitf, p. 249. 
For another summary description ~this re ational 
function, cf. ~., P• 446. 
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eternal objects. The form of definiteness characterizing 
the past occasions is re-enacted by the present occasion. 
\Vhat is repeated is the eternal object. 
{ii) Re-enaction of Form 
Confor.mal feeling, or the fact of re-enaction, is one 
of the basic mechanisms in virtue of which many other aspects 
of Whitehead's metaphysics have their explanation. A summary 
passage stating the importance of conformal feeling and hence 
physical feeling can be cited here. 
A pure pnysical prehension is how an occasion 
in its immediacy of being absorbs another occasion 
which has passed into the objective immortality of 
its not-being. It is how the past lives in the 
present. It is causation. It is memory. It is 
perception of derivation. It is emotional conforma-
tion to a given situation, an emotional continuity 
of past with present •••• Thus perishing is the 
initiation of becoming. How the past perishes is 
how the future becomes.l 
Conformal feelings explain the basic physical trans-
mission of energy. Whitehead draws the analogy between the 
quantitative intensity of energy referred to by the physicist 
and the feeling intensity of experience.2 
Re-enaction of form is explanatory of causal relation-
ships also: 
A simple physical feeling has the dual 
character of being the cause's feeling re-enacted 
for the effect as subject. But this transference 
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l. 
2. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, P• 239. 
Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Process--and Realitih PP• 177-179. 
Cf. also Alfred North Whitehead, Modes-or Thou t, P• 231. 
of feeling effects a partial identification of 
cause with effect, and not a mere representation 
or the cause. It is the cumulation of the 
universe and not a stage-play about it.l 
In this connection, we can see also that re-enaction is 
to some extent explanatory of how the present, in its objective 
immortality, passes on its character to the future. This fact 
is central to Whitehead's justifying "main principle 11 for 
induction. 
This principle is that form of process chiefly 
derives from the dominant facts involved and thence 
tends to sustain itself so as to govern realizations 
in its own future •••• It is the sense of the form 
having a dual activity in the present. It charac-
terizes the present and it thereby fashions the form 
of process .in the future.2 
Perhaps more important for our purposes here is that the 
re-enaction of form is the basic mechanism with which Whitehead 
explains the grouping of occasions into "order. 11 It explains 
how the mutual immanence of occasions is possible.3 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, P• 363. Cf. 
also ibid., P• 479. In this connection we can recall 
Blansnara:•s question about imnediate experience. nis 
there any reason to suppose that the universals that 
emerge into explicitness • • • are the same as those 
present in the initial experience?" Cf. above p. 14. 
Whitehead's doctrine of conformal feeling partially 
answers to this reason. 
2. Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought, pp. 137-138. 
3. cr. Alfred North Whitehead, Ad~tures of Ideas, ch. 13. 
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We must add an extremely important qualirication here. 
Re-enaction of form is not explanatory of why we find this 
or that particular grouPing of occasions in our presen~ 
epocn:- Re-enaction is explanatory of how order is possible, 
not the why or this order. The latter-ri more properly 
accountea-for in terms of subjective aim. cr. below P• 189ff. 
For Whitehead any order is described in terms of the 
display of a certain pattern of eternal objects which is 
"shared," "re-enacted," by succeeding occasions. "Order" 
is explained in terms or the dominance of these patterns. 
Why this or that pattern dominates has its final explanation 
with the aims or actual occasions. 
Thus nexus receive their explanation along these same 
lines. A nexus is 
a set of actual entities in the unity of the 
relatedness constituted by their prehensions 
of each other, or -- what is the same thing 
conversely expressed -- constituted by their 
objectifications in each other.l 
The same form of definiteness may characterize a set of actual 
occasions by reason of their objectifications in one another. 
It is in virtue of this fact that there are real facts of 
togetherness of occasions.2 
Order, relationship between occasions, exists to the 
extent to which certain forms dominate. "Order" is a char-
acteristic of nexus, the mutual immanence of occasions. But 
for Whitehead mere mutual immanence is a "weak 11 use of the 
term "order." 
Thus the term Nexus does not presuppose any 
special type of order, nor does it presuppose any 
order at all pervading its members other than the 
general metaphysical obligation of mutual immanence.3 
A "stronger" sense of order is denoted by Whitehead's 
use of the term "society." A nexus has "social order u when 
the component members each display a determinate common 
1. 
2. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Realit;, p. 35. 
Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Advenxures of deas, 
PP• 203ff. --
Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Realitt, pp! 29-30. 
Actually, more is involved in our perception o nexus. In 
order for a nexus to be felt as-i nexus "transmutation 11 must 
occur. cr. ibid., pp. 40, 387. "Order 11 as we speak of it, 
"order" as perceptually apparent in the grouping of 
qualities, is actually an abstraction from the general 
relatedness of actual occasions. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures £f Ideas, p. 203. 
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character £l virtue ££ their inheritance from each other. 
Their prehensions of their common predecessors impose the 
condition of reproduction. 
Such a nexus is called a "society," and the 
common form is the "defining character is tic" of the 
society •••• The common element of form is simply 
a complex eternal object exemplified in each member 
of the nexus.l 
We note that Whitehead uses the "society" to mean a 
relatedness of occasions which is more than just a collection. 
It has a unity of its own because of the relationships of its 
parts. Thus Whitehead says that 
a society is more than a set of entities to which 
the same class-name applies: that is to say, it 
involves more than a merely mathematical conception 
of "order. 11 To constitute a society, the class-
name has got to apply to each member, by reason 
of genetic derivation from other members of that 
same society .2 
It is in relation to societies also that Vlhitehead 
discusses "endurance," for it is a society which exhibits the 
character of endurance. Or, differently expressed, "endurance" 
is defined in terms of prehensive relationships and the 
re-enaction of selected characters. Whitehead defines physical 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 51. 
2. Ibid., P• 137. The structure of nature Is actually 
described by Whitehead as societies within wider societies, 
each exhibiting different types of "order." This has far-
reaching ramifications for Whitehead. "Laws of Nature" 
thus denote not externally imposed "law" but the notion of 
"immanent" law. That is to say that the reasons for the 
"laws of nature" are to be found in the nature of actual 
occasions and the ways in which they are objectified for 
each other. The "laws of nature 11 are descriptive of the 
dominant characteristics of different societies or uorders" 
of actual occasions. There is nothing "ne&essary 11 about 
the present type of order we do find in our present epoch. 
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Cf. ibid., Part II, ch. III. Cf. also Alfred North Whitehead, 
Ad ve r:reili'a s .2.f Ide as , chs • 7 11 13 • 
endurance: "Than physical endurance is the process of 
continuously inheriting a certain identity of character 
transmitted throughout a historical route of events. "1 
For Whitehead, the fundamental units of existence are the 
actual entities but involved in their activity of realization 
is the emergence of some pattern of eternal objects. For 
Whitehead it is not "substance" which is permanent but "form." 
"In the philosophy of organism it is not 'substance' which is 
permanent, but 'form.' "2 "In the organic philosophy the 
notion of repetition is fundamental. "3 
Thus far we have only been concerned with simple physical 
prehension where sensa are experienced emotionally as an 
unoriginative response to the datum. 
In such occasions the process is deficient in 
its highest phases; the process is the slave to the 
datum. There is the individualizing phase of 
conformal feeling, but the originative phases of 
supplementary and conceptual feelings are negligible.4 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern world, 
~· 111. On p. 106, ibid., Whitehead uses the terms 
retention," "endurance" or "reiteration" synonymously. 
2. Alfred North Whitehead, Process ~Reality, p. 44. 
3. Ibid., P• 208. 
4. !Oia., P• 176. 
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ii. Conceptual Prehensions 
We have thus far described only one genetic aspect in 
the formation of an actual occasion. This aspect Whitehead 
generally characterizes as its "receptive phase." The 
actual occasion, with its basic physical prehensions, arises 
from its given past actual world. But Whitehead also holds 
that each occasion arises not only from its past actual world, 
which is its "real potentiality," but also from its selection 
from "pure" potentiality. Each occasion is bipolar; it is 
constituted by both its physical inheritance and its conceptual 
reaction and origination through its conceptual prehension of 
eternal objects. 
Thus the process of becoming is bipolar, (i) by 
reason of its qualification by the determinateness of 
the actual world, and (ii) by its conceptual prehen-
sions of the indeterminateness of eternal objects. 
The process is constituted by the influx of eternal 
objects into a novel determinateness of feeling !hich 
absorbs the actual world into a novel actuality. 
Whitehead formally defines a conceptual prehension as a 
prehension whose datum is an eternal object. Here we find 
that an eternal object may function not only "datively" in a 
physical prehension and "subjectively" as a quality of sub-
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2 jective form but it also may function in a conceptual prehension .• 
1. Ibid., p. 72. Cf. also ibid., PP• 165, 366. Hence various 
types of prehensions account for the manner in which the 
eternal objects are included in that actual occasion. All 
other types of feelings arise from a process of the integra-
tion of physical and conceptual prehensions. Cf. ibid., p. 365. 
2. Conceptual prehension completes the three modes of-rEgres-
sion of eternal objects possible to actual occasions. 
cr. ~· .. PP• 445ff. 
But Whitehead draws an important distinction here. 
Conceptual ingression is a "restricted" one. 
It is a real ingression into actuality; but 
it is a restricted ingression with mere potentiality 
withholding the immediate realization of its function 
of conferring definiteness.l 
The eternal objects are not being fully realized or 
included in the composition of the actual occasion as they 
are in either dative physical ingression or subjective in-
gression. The eternal objects are felt as not physically 
realized; they are felt in their general potentiality for 
ingression. A passage from The Function of Reason may throw 
light on this. 
Bodily experience is sheer physical experience. 
Such experience is the sheer final enjoyment of 
being definitely something. It is self-definition 
as constituting one sheer fact among ••• other 
actualities and selected forms of definiteness. 
Physical experience is the matter-of-fact enjoyment 
of just those items whiCh are given to that occasion. 
• • • Mental experience • • • is the experience of 
forms of definiteness in respect to their discon-
nection from any particular physical experience, but 
with abstract evaluation of what they can contribute 
to such experience.2 -
1. Ibid., P• 445. 
2. IIrred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason, (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1958}, pp.~-32. (FlrSI published in 1929: 
Princeton, Princeton University Press) Cf. also Alfred 
North Whitehead, Process and Realitf, PP• 366f. The 
general distinction between physica and conceptual 
prehensions is important for Whitehead's epistemological 
position for it represents the be!innins of the distinction 
between feeling as an undifferent ated affective tone and 
the differentiation of these contents in perceptual 
experience. Here we are reminded of Bradley's definition 
of feeling as 11 an awareness which • • • may comprise 
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s~ply in itself an indefinite amount of difference ••• 
a many felt as one." F. H. Bradley, Esaa~s on Truth and 
Reality, p. 174. Cf. also Alfred North w=Itenead, Adventures 
(footnote continued on following page} 
For Whitehead, eternal objects are involved in both 
physical feeling and conceptual feeling. The difference in 
the manner in which they are involved or have ingression is 
that in physical experience they are felt as immanent, as, 
to use Locke's phrase, ideas 11determined 11 to particular 
existents;l in conceptual experience they are felt as a 
general capacity ~ determination, for realization. 
The same point can be stated from the side of eternal 
objects. Eternal objects do not function exclusively as 
realized determinants. They also transcend their particular 
realizations; they never lose their "accent" of potentiality. 
Immanence and transcendence are the character-
istics of an object: as a realized determinant it 
is immanent; as a capacity for deternlination it is 
transcendent; in both roles it is relevant to some-
thing not itself.2 
(1) The Origin of Conceptual Prehensions 
For Whitehead, conceptual experience originates from 
sensitive experience, it begins as the conceptual "registration" 
(footnote continued from preceding page} of Ideas, p. 234. 
However, we should recall that vVhitehead aces not confine 
conceptual prehensions to what we would ordinarily call 
perceptual experience. Every actual occasion has conceptual 
experience, no matter how faint. 
1. Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, PP• 210, 
230, 366. 
2. Ibid., pp. 366-367. As we saw in the case of objectivi-
cai!on, eternal objects are factors which make possible 
the vector character of physical prehension, the 
transmission of energy. 
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of the physical pole.1 \f.hitehead states this more formally 
in his fourth Categoreal Obligation. 
(iv} The Cate~ort of Conceptual Valuation. 
From each physicalee ing there is the deriva.tion 
of a purely conceptual feeling whose datum is the 
eternal object determinant of the definiteness of 
the actual entity, or of the nexus, physically 
felt .2 
For Whitehead, all conceptual prehensions on the part of 
actual occasions are derived fran physical prehensions. Mental 
operations are operations constituent of actual occasions which 
arise from their physical feelings. ~Vhitehead's "empiricism" 
here can be stated from the side of eternal objects. 
In itself an eternal object evades any selection 
among actualities or epochs. You cannot know what is 
red by merely thinking of redness. You can only find 
red things by adventuring amid physical experiences 
in this actual world. This doctrine is the ultimate 
grouna-of empiricism; namely, that ete§nal objects 
tell no tales as to their ingressions. 
Any consideration of eternal objects in themselves and 
in their mutual relations is an abstract consideration for 
they never exist apart from some actuality. As concrete 
they are always a realized characteristic of some actual 
entity. 
Eternal objects are thus, in their nature, 
abstract. By "abstract" I mean that what an 
eternal object is in itself -- that is to say, 
its essence -- is comprehensible without reference 
1. cr. ibid., P• 379. These "registrations" are analogous 
to Hume*s "impressions of sensations." 
2. Ibid., PP• 39-40. 
3. !Dia., P• 391. 
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to some one particular occasion of experience. 
To be abstract is to transcend particular occasions 
of actual happening. But to transcend an actual 
occasion does not mean being disconnected from it.1 
Eternal objects obtain their status by reason of the 
fact that they are "found" in physical experience. To recur 
again to Locke for illustration, Whitehead agrees with what 
he feels is Locke's position: eternal objects, i.e. the datum 
of a conceptual prehension, are preceded by ideas of particular 
things. "Thus for Locke ••• there are not first the qualities 
and then the conjectural particular things; but conversely. "2 
The eternal objects are "lifted out" and are abstractions from 
the physical experience of actual occasions. The building up 
of experience is a process of addition to original data. In 
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1. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 159. 
We shall see later that eternal OOjects have both an 
individual essence and a relational essence. Of. below p. 2llff, 
This above qualification of the "abstract" nature of 
eternal objects is perhaps enough of a qualification to 
set Whitehead off from Plato's general position. The 
eternal objects do not have the independent substantiality 
of Plato's essences or forms. 
2. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 83. 
Whitehead compares Locke's point-with the category of 
conceptual valuation on his next page in Process and Reality. 
Relevant to this, there is a passage elsewhere In-which 
Whitehead says that it is a mistake to ask how concrete 
particulars can be built up out of universals. Philosophy 
should be explanatory of abstractness, not concreteness •. 
It should seek the form in the facts. Of. ~., p. 30. 
other words, our "impressions of sensation" are already 
1 
abstractions, lifted out of more basic feeling processes. 
But it is important to realize that for Whitehead the 
feeling process, the sense of physical experience, rem~ains. 
Conceptual valuation abstracts from the datum of the physical 
prehension but the sense of its efficacy remains. Physical 
prehension of actual occasions is originative and basic. 
This is brought out in a vivid passage in Modes of Thought. 
We enter the room already equipped with an 
active aesthetic experience, and we are charmed 
with the forms and colouring of the furniture. 
The sensory experience of the room adds vividness 
and point to an activity of feeling already 
possessed.2 
1. The notion of "abstraction" is an extremely important one 
for Whitehead, as we have seen in his doctrine of objecti-
fication. The notion is central to his epistemology also. 
In this connection, Vv.hitehead calls sense perception, 
where we grasp the external world in terms of characters 
and qualities, the 11triumph of abstraction." cr. Alfred 
North Whitehead, Modes of Tho~ht, p. 100. Also, the 
distinction, made by abS!ract~n, between experience of 
fact and conception of character Whitehead considers to 
be the basis Of thought. Cf. ibid., P• 135. 
2. Ibid., P• 149. Cf. also ibid., PP• 154, 169. Not unlike 
Bradley's analysis of immea!ite experience, it is the 
diversification of feeling which gives rise to those 
distinctions in virtue of WhiCh thought operates. White-
head never forgets this. Eternal objects are the "root 
condition" for our conceptual distinctions. cr. Blanshard 
above p. 13 • Our recognition comes about through these 
"objects," but our recognition is an abstraction from the 
concrete experiential fact as felt. Bradley holds also 
that immediate experience, nowever transcended, remains 
and is active. The sense of feeling is not removed, only 
its "mereness 11 is; its "ideality" is developed. Cf. F. H. 
Bradley, Essats on Truth and Realitt, pp. 159ff. "When 
my object 1sncreased ana-the addi ion comes from that 
which was and is felt, there is, in such a case, first, 
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a positive sense of expansion and of accord." Ibid., p. 186. 
We should note here that the term conceptual "registration" 
may be misleading for conceptual valuation is, for \Vhitehead, 
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a valuation. "Valuation" is an integral part of the conceptual 
pole of each actual occasion. Whitehead sees conceptual pre-
hension as a process of an assessment of potentialities for 
realization, a "grading" of potentialities, both real and "pure." 
It is the subjective form of conceptual prehensions that 
determines what formative status the eternal objects shall 
have to the occasion. The degree of emphasis or negligible 
importance of potentialities depends upon the subjective form 
of the prehensions. 
But in the formation of this integrated datum 
there must be determination of exactly how this 
eternal object has ingress into that datum conjointly 
with the remaining eternal objects and actual entities 
derived from the other feelings. This determination 
is effected by the s~jective forms of the component 
conceptual feelings. . 
Conceptual valuation, however, in its minimum meaning, 
concerns only the conceptual reproduction of physical prehen-
sion. If there is no novel content in, the conceptual 
prehension, the data are eternal objects already illustrated 
2 in the initial stage of reception, i.e. physical prehension. 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 368. 
The "relevance u of eternal objecrs-depends upon the 
subjective form. Since the subjective form is ultimately 
based upon the subjective aim we will defer discussion of 
valuation and subjective form here. Cf. below p.l84. 
2. Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, P• 196. 
In its lowest form, mental experience is 
canalized into slavish conformity. It is merely 
the appetition towards, or from, whatever in fact 
already is. The slavish thirst in a desert is 
mere urge from intolerable dryness.l This lowest 
form of slavish conformity pervades all nature. 
It is rather a capacity for mentality, than 
mentality itself. But it is mentality. In this 
lowly form it evades no difriculties; it strikes 
out no new ways •••• It is degraded to being 
merely one of the actors in the efficient 
causation.2 
(2) Conceptual Reversion 
But the function of conceptual prehension is not in all 
cases merely the reproduction of the eternal object or sensum 
derived from the physical pole. Conceptual prehension can 
add diversity to the eternal objects already realized in the 
physical pole. In evaluating and abstracting these eternal 
objects out of their immanent status in physical feelings, 
there may result a conceptual realization of proximate 
novelties. Here we are referring to Whitehead's extremely 
important Category ~ Conceptual Reversion. 
There is secondary origination of conceptual 
feelings with data WhiCh are partially identical 
with, and partially diverse from, the eternal 
objects forming the data in the first phase of 
1. For Whitehead's more technical discussion of this 
primitive form of appetition cf. the terms "aversion," 
"a.dversion," and "physical purpose." Alfred North 
Whitehead, Process and Reality. 
2. Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason, PP• 33-34. 
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the mental pole. The diversity is a relevant 
diversity determined by the subjective aim.l 
An example of a reverted conceptual prehension is furnished 
us by Whitehead's discussion of Hume. Even thoug~ we have never 
sensed a particular shade of blue we can, given other shades of 
blue, conceptually supply the missing shade. One can grasp 
relevant potentials in the datum. "Novel 11 eternal objects are 
2 
supplied by reverted conceptual feelings. Although eternal 
objects "tell no tales" as to their ingression, they do "tell 
tales u as to their relation one to another. Either as immanent 
or as transcendent, eternal objects refer to something other 
than themselves.3 
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1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 40. 
Cf. ibid., p. 380. Note the 1Dlportance of the ttsubjecti ve 
aim" to "relevance" here. "Reversion is due to the aim 
ltcomplexity as one condition for intensity." Ibid., p. 425. 
As we shall see the aim of each occasion is at Intensity 
of experience and two of the main conditions for intensity 
are repetition, largely supplied by conformal physical 
prehensions, and complexity. Both elements are necessary 
as conditions for the final adjustment of identities and 
diversities within the concrescent synthesis. To this 
process, the aim of the occasion is central. Reversion 
"expresses the rule that what is identical, and what is 
reverted, are determined by the aim at a favorable balance." 
Ibid., P• 425. Cf. below P• 180ff. 
2. ~ibid., pp. 132f. The term "novel" here refers only to 
the rae! that reverted feelings whose datum are eternal 
objects can give rise to other conceptual feelings which 
have not been physically realized in the past of this actual 
occasion. Reversion Is the source of novelty in ~ sense 
but with limitations. In the grasp of novelties there must 
be eternal objects identical with elements 1n past physical 
feeling. The origination of conceptual feeling in reversion 
must be "germane to the data." cr. ibid., pp. 133, 381. 
As we saw in discussing physical prehension, some conforma-
tion to the past is always necessary. 
3. Cf. above p.l44n. The point here is that eternal objects, 
either as expressive o~ real potentiality or pure poten-
tiality, are the given factors which make reference beyond 
the immediate occasion possible. We are here reminded of 
Blanshard1 s saying that universals have a 11range. 11 Cf. 
above p. 25. 
Conceptual reversion, because it introduces novelty of 
content, is extremely important for Whitehead. We can see its 
importance in a su.rmnary pass age in Modes ~ Thought. 
The conceptual entertainment of unrealized 
possibility becomes a major factor in human 
mentality. In this way outrageous novelty is 
introduced, sometimes beatified, sometimes damned, 
and sometimes literally patented or protected by 
copyright. The definition of mankind is that in 
this genus of animals the central activity has 
been developed on the side of its relationship to 
novelty. • • • The characterization of this con-
ceptual feeling is the sense of what might be and 
of what might have been. It is entertainment of 
the alternative. In its highest develo~ment, this 
becomes the entertainment of the Ideal.1 
But how can an unrealized eternal object be more or less 
proximate to a realized eternal object? Conceptual reversion 
sounds like an exception to the position stated in conceptual 
valuation where all conceptual feelings are derived from 
physical prehension. 
In Process ~ Reality, Whitehead explains that conceptual 
reversion is no exception to Hume's principle of empiricism. 
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Whitehead holds that reverted conceptual feeling can be explained 
on the basis of "hybrid physical feeling" of the relevance of 
eternal objects conceptually ordered in God's Primordial 
Nature. 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought, pp. 36-37. 
Cf. also Alfred North WhlteheaQ; Process and Reality, 
p. 410, where Whitehead cites revers~on as giVing rise 
to error in perceptive feeling. 
The question, how ••• one unrealized eternal 
object can be more, or less, proximate to an eternal 
object in realized ingression ••• is left unan-
swered by this category of reversion •••• A more 
fundamental account must ascribe the reverted con-
ceptual feeling derived • • • from the hybrid 
physical feeling of the relevancies conceptually 
ordered in God's experience.l 
Let us turn now to a brief account of the function of 
God in regard to eternal objects and their relevance to actual 
occasions. 
(3) God and General Potentiality 
The concept of God performs many functions in the 
context of \Vhitehead's metaphysics. Here we are concerned 
with three of these functions: (i} He is the ground of 
general potentiality; (ii) He is a condition for norder; n 
and {iii} He is the source of the subjective aim for each 
occasion. 
(i} God as the Ground of General Potentiality and Relevance 
We have seen that Whitehead distinguishes between eternal 
objects as realized determinants and as abstract general 
1. Ibid., pp. 381-382. God, for Whitehead, is an actual 
en:Eity, hence the prehension of Him as an actua.l entity 
is a physical prehension. But He is prehended via His 
conceptual feelings, hence the prehension is "hybrid." 
"A hybrid physical feeling originates for its subject 
a conceptual feeling with the same datum as that of 
the conceptual feeling of the antecedent subject." 
~., P• 377. 
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capacities for determination. The former represent the 
conditioned potentiality which forms the real potentiality 
1 in the initial stages of concrescence. The latter are the 
general potentialities which may be grasped in conceptual 
prehension. Eternal objects have both of these characteristics: 
they are immanent in occasions as real potentialities and are 
also "transcendent, 11 they never lose their "accent" of 
potentiality. They are realized in occasions and yet they 
might have been realized in other ways. 
The general possibilities must in some sense be "avail-
able," be relevant, to the concrescent occasions. Whitehead 
accounts for their availability to occasions, accounts for 
the fact that t;hey are relevant to each process, by their 
Primordial conceptual realization by God. 
The primordial created fact is the unconditioned 
conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of 
eternal objects. This is the "primordial nature of 
God.n~ 
Or, again, 
Now an eternal object, in itself, abstracts 
from all determinate actual entities •••• It is 
merely referent to any such entities, in the 
absolutely general sense of ant •••• Thus the 
endeavour to understand eterna objects 1n complete 
abstraction from the actual world results in reducing 
them to mere undifferentiated nonentities •••• 
Accordingly the differentiated relevance of eternal 
objects to each instance of the creative process 
requires their conceptual realization in the 
primordial nature of God.3 
1. Cf. above p. 14lff. 
2. Ibid., P• 46. 
3. Ibid., P• 392. Cf. ibid., PP• 48, 134, 521. 
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That this is so is also a requirement of Whitehead's 
metaphysical categories. Here we are referring to Whitehead's 
basic "ontological principle." 
Everything must be somewhere; and here "some-
where" means "some actual entity." Accordingly the 
general potentiality of the universe must be some-
where; since it retains its proximate relevance to 
actual entities for Which it is unrealized •••• 
This "somewhere" is the non-temporal actual entity. 
Thus "proximate relevmce" means "relevance as in 
the primordial mind of God."l 
The ground of pure potentiality is God's Primordial 
Nature. God completely envisages the multiplicity of eternal 
objects. There are possibilities as yet undeter.mined and yet 
"real, 11 entertained in the Primordial nature as relevant for 
realization. Eternal objects do not exist except as realized 
determinants. The notion of "pure" or "general" potentiality 
is an abstraction. But it is a requirement of process that if 
each actual occasion is to become and :Ls able. to grasp 
proximate novelties through conceptual reversion, then there 
must be possipilities as yet physically' unrealized by those 
occasions. 
The alternative is a static monistic universe, 
without unrealized potentialities; since npoten-
tiality" is then f;l. meaningless term.2 
Thus because!God is the reservoir of unrealized poten-
tiality, He is'the condition for there be-ing novelty in the 
world. 
1 • Ibid. , p •. 73. Cf • ~., pp • 36, 134 • 
2. !'5I'Ci., P• 72 • 
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Apart fram the intervention of God, there 
could be nothing new in the world, and no order 
in the world .1 
Thus the Primordial Nature accounts for how it is 
possible for abstract eternal objects, as yet unrealized by 
occasions in process, to be relevant for process. It accounts 
for how, in Conceptual Reversion, possibilities as yet 
unrealized may be grasped. The prehension of relevant 
alternatives, "proximate" novelties, occurs because each 
actual occasion has a hybrid prehension of God. 2 It is in 
virtue of the Primordial Nature that the possibilities 
realizable for each occasion can and do exceed those set by 
its immediate past although each occasion is conditioned by 
its past in some degree. 
But Whitehead is saying more here. God is not only the 
ground for unrealized possibilities; He is the reason for 
their general relevance to each occasion. 
In what sense can unrealized abstract form 
be relevant? What is its basis of relevance? 
"Relevance" must express some real fact of together-
ness among forms. The ontological principle can be 
expressed as: All real togetherness is togetherness 
in the formal constitution of an actuality. So if 
there be a relevance o£ what in the temporal world 
is unrealized, the relevance must express a fact of 
togetherness in the formal constitution of a non-
temporal actuality •••• This is the ultimate, 
basic adjustment of the togetherness of eternal 
objects on which creative order depends •••• It 
1. Ibid., p. 377 • 
2. cr:-ibid., p. 377. 
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constitutes the meaning of relevance. Im status 
as an actual efficient fact is recognized by terming 
it the "primordial nature of God. nl 
This »togetherness among forms" is expressed in Science 
~ ~ Modern World by Whitehead 1 s noting that eternal 
objects have a "relational essence." 
An eternal object, considered as an abstract 
entity, cannot be divorced from its reference to 
other eternal objects, and from its reference to 
actuality generally •••• This principle is 
expressed by the statement that each eternal 
obj act has a "re ls.tional essence • 11 This relational 
essence determines how it is possible for the object 
to have ingression into actual occasions.2 
or, again, 
Accordingly there is a general fact of 
systematic mutual relatedness which is inherent 
in the character of possibility. The realm of 
eternal objects is properly described as a 
"realm, 11 because each eternal object has its 
status in this general systematic complex of 
mutual relatedness.3 
1. Ibid., p. 48. Note that he says "on which creative order 
depends," not "which is the creative order." God is the 
ground of general relevance only. For concrescent occa-
sions an additional ground of relevance is derived from 
the grading of past occasions and its own subjective aim. 
Cf. ibid., P• 46. The specific relevance of forms of 
defiii'Ireness to each occasion is derived from the actual 
occasions in process. Real possibility is an additional 
limitation upon general possibility. 
2. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 
p. 160. They also have en "1ndi'VIUu'aressence ." Cf. 
below p. 212ff. 
3. Ibid., p. 161. This use of the term "inherent" in this 
quotation has to be qualified considerably for it would 
seem to be in contradiction to Whitehead's view of eternal 
objects in Process and Reali~. In Process and Reality, 
eternal objects, considered themselves, are-seen as a 
11multiplicity" which is defined as "Pure Disjunctions of 
Diverse Entities." Alfred North Whitehead, Process and 
Reality, p·. 33. Cf. PP• 36, 44, 73, 348. Cf. aboveP.l43f. 
(footnote continued on following page) 
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Their "relational essence" expresses the fact that eternal 
objects considered in regard to concrescence exhibit internal 
relations. The ground of their general relatedness is their 
complete valuation by God. God does not ori~inate the eternal 
objects but His primordial nature constitutes their complete 
conceptual valuation. Apart from their realization by God, 
they could exhibit no order or pattern. God is the ground of 
the adjustment of Forms "severally appropriate for all 
realizable basic conditions. 111 
The general relationships of eternal objects 
to each other, relationships of diversity and of 
pattern, are their relationships in God's conceptual 
realization. Apart from their realization, ther~ is 
mere isolation indistinguishable from nonentity. 
God's primordial valuation does not order eternal objects 
into any one type of order. He is the ground of General 
potentiality. The eternal objects, because of His nature, 
1. 
2. 
(footnote continued from preceding page) Given this view 
and Whitehead's ontological principle which holds that all 
real togetherness is to be found in an actuality, the 
"general fact of systematic mutual relatedness which is 
inherent in the character of possibility" is not inherent 
to the character of eternal objects per se but only in 
virtue of God's conceptual realization: -wApart from such 
orderings, there would be a complete disjunction of eternal 
objects unrealized in the temporal world." Ibid., p. 64. 
Cf. also ibid., pp. 392, 522. For a discuss~of this 
seeming contradiction between Science and the Modern World 
and Process and Reality, cf. William A:-nhristian, An 
Interpretation-or Whitehead's Metaphysics, pp. 258ft: 
cr. Alfred Nortn-Wfiitehead, Process and Reality, P• 134. 
Ibid., P• 392. Cf. also ibid., PP• "Sir, 522. 
- -
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have ~ relevance to any occasion. At any one time or 
place these possibilities ~ become effectively relevant 
(real potentials) for concrescence.1 
(ii) God as a Condition for Order 
But Whitehead is appealing to a Primordial nature not 
just to account for the relationships of unrealized eternal 
objects which partly constitute their relevance, but also as 
an explanation of why there is any actual definiteness what-
soever. God brings the forms into effective relevance to the 
creative process. This is to say that pure potentiality and 
mere creativity would be ineffectual to determine any one 
type of definiteness. There must be a Primordial limitation 
upon unbounded potentiality which furnishes the general con-
ditions for some process of realization. 
1. Here we are adopting the interpretation of God's 
Primordial Na.ture as it is done, with excellent argu-
ments, in William A. Christian, An Interpretation of 
Whitehead's Metaphysics, cf. pp.~66ff, 36ltt. \*lhTte-
head's conception of actual occasions as essentially 
a process of realization, a process from potentiality 
to actuality, has its similarities to Aristotle's 
conception of substance. But unlike Aristotle, 1N.hite-
head is careful not to conceive of the "forms" as 
actual in any sense prior to the process of actualization 
itself. The conditions for actua~ity are general con-
ditions only and have their full realization only 
through actual process itself. 
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The primordial nature of God is the 
acquirement by creativity of a primordial 
character. His conceptual activity at once 
exemplifies and establishes the categoreal 
conditions •••• From this point of view, 
he is the principle or concretion -- the 
principle whereby there is initiated a 
definite outcome from a situation otherwise 
riddled with ambiguity.l 
God's Primordial nature is thus a primordial limitation 
upon unbounded possibility. His nature is not seen as a 
complete explanation as to why there is ~ or that particular 
order, or actualized pattern of definiteness, 2 but why there 
is any definiteness whatsoever. 
There is a passage in Science ~ ~ Modern World which 
throws light on Whitehead's point here. 
Thus as a further element in the metaphysical 
situation, there is required a principle of limita-
tion. Some particular how is necessary, and some 
particularization in the-what of matter of fact is 
necessary. • • • God is the Ultimate limitation, 
and His existence is the ultimate irrationality. 
For no reason can be given for just that limitation 
which it stands in His nature to impose. God is 
not concrete but He is the ground for concrete 
actuality. No reason can be given for the nature 
of God, beca~se that nature is the ground of 
rationality. . 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process snd Reality, pp. 522-523. 
Ct. also ibid., P• 64. ---
2. Why there--rsthis or that particular pattern of forms 
further requires each actual occasion as its explanation. 
3. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 
p. 179. Whitehead goes on to say-rhar-what further can 
be known about God must rest on an empirical basis; we 
must resort here to an appeal to religious experience 
itself. 
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In Process and Reality, Whitehead says something about 
history which is relevant to his point about a principle of 
limitation. We can talk about history in regard to how one 
period gave rise to another period and this period in turn 
gave rise to its successors, etc. But no ultimate reasons 
can be given why, for example, "capitalism" was illustrated 
in history at a certain period as opposed to another possible 
economic sys tern. "No reason, internal to history, can be 
assigned why that flux of forms, rather than another flux, 
should have been illustrated. ttl 
If we accept the reality of actual occasions and this 
ordered world, we can explain ~ it is that there is this 
order and its categorical conditions. That order in general 
exists cannot be explained; we cannot account for the why of 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 74. 
Or, to express this in 'lli1tehead1an terms, some limitation 
can be explained because of the antecedent occasions 
(real potentiality) but for the why of the limitation 
for the system as a whole no reasons can be given. 
Unless we are going to say that the existence and 
character of the world is logically necessary, we must 
proceed on the basis of the belief that "there is a 
metaphysical need for a principle of determination, 
but there can be no metaphysical reason for what is 
determined. If there were such a reason, there would 
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be no need for any further principle: for metaphysics would 
already have provided the determination. The general 
principle of empiricism depends upon the doctrine that 
there is a principle of concretion which is not dis-
coverable by abstract reason. 11 Alfred North 'Whitehead, 
Science and the Modern World, p. 179. We are here 
reminded-a? Whitehead's point that philosophy should 
be explanatory of abstractness, not concreteness. 
any fact whatsoever~ for rationality itself depends on 
this assumption.l 
These limitations of antecedent selection are 
(i) the special logical relationships which all 
events must conform to~ (ii) the selection of 
relationships to which events do conform and~ 
(iii) the particularity which infects the course 
of events within tho~e general relationships of 
logic and causation. 
But there is another way of limitation for concrescent 
occasions: 
Restriction is the price of value. There 
cannot be value without antecedent standards 
of value, to discriminate the acceptance or 
rejection of what is before the envisaging 
mode of activity. Thus there is an antecedent 
limitation among values.3 
It is to this kind or condition or limitation of 
concrescence that we now turn. 
(iii) God as the Source of Aim 
God's conceptual valuation of eternal objects involves 
more than just their conceptual realization as pure poten-
tialities. The subjective forms ot conceptual prehensions~ 
1. 
2. 
3. 
It is the function of reason to explain this or that 
fact but reason cannot begin its function without the 
assumption that there is something to explain. 
cr. ibid.~ p. 178. 
Ibid:;-p. 178. 
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whether activities of actual occasions or the nature of 
God, represent essentially an activity of evaluation and 
an appetition.1 The act of evaluation is essential to the 
function of the mental pole in every actual entity. 
Mental experience ••• is the experience 
of forms of definiteness in respect to their 
disconnection from any particular physical 
experience, but with abstract evaluation of what 
they can contribute to suCh experience •••• 
In its-6ssence, mentality is the urge towards 
some vacuous definiteness, to include it in 
matter-of-fact which is non-vacuous enjoyment. 
This urge is appetition. It is emotional purpose: 
it is agency.2 
In the case of God's conceptual prehensions, He not only 
has a conceptual realization of all eternal objects but has 
an urge or appetition toward their realization in regard to 
this actual world. His vision represents a grasp of all 
possibilities as possibilities in relation to what is, or 
that which has been, actualized by actual occasions. 
God's immanence in the world in respect to 
his primordial nature is an urge towards the future 
based upon an appetite in the present. Appetition 
is at once the conceptual valuation of an immediate 
physical feeling combined with the urge towards 
realization of the datum conceptually prehended • 
• • • Appetition is immediate matter of fact 
including in itself a principle of unrest, involving 
realization of what is not and may be.3 
1. Cf. Alfred North ~fuitehead, Process and Reality, 
PP• 280, 367. --
2. Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason, p. 32. 
Cf. also Alfred North 1iVhl.tehead, Process and Reality, 
PP• 47, 367ff, 380. 
3. Ibid., PP• 47-48. 
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God, conceived merely in His primordial aspect, is an 
abstraction.1 GOd's conceptual valuation involves more than 
one aspect of God's nature. God's primordial aspect only 
has reference to His envisagement of all eternal objects. 
Abstractly considered, God in this one aspect is unaffected 
by temporal events. But God is in His concrete nature 
affected by temporal events. This aspect of God's nature 
represents His "consequent nature" which involves His 
"physical" realization of the creative advance of the 
world. 
An actue.l entity in the temporal world is to be 
conceived as originated by physical experience with 
its process of completion motivated by consequent, 
conceptual experience initially derived from God. 
God is to be conceived as originated by conceptual 
experience with his process of completion motivated 
by consequent, physical-experience, initially derived 
from the temporal world.2 
Another way of saying this is that the realization of 
"what is not" involves more than God's unbounded conceptual 
realization of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects. 
There are general systematic mutual relations among eternal 
objects in virtue of His primordial nature, but these eternal 
objects are not related to particular occasions merely by 
virtue of His primordial nature. 
1. cr. ibid., PP• 521, 528. 
2. Ibid:;-p. 524. cr. ~., PP• l34f. 
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"He, in his primordial nature, is umnoved by love for 
this particular, or that particular; for in this foundational 
process of creativity there are no preconstituted particulars. "1 
For Vl.hitehead, in order for God to be fully actual and 
not "deficiently actual," it is required that God be in rela-
tion to actual process.2 In His full nature, God is determined 
in part by His prehensions of each actual occasion in its 
objective immortality, each actual occasion upon completion 
is "objectified 11 in God. He regulates the mutual relatedness 
of eternal objects in accordance with this "consequent" nature, 
thereby allowing possibilities which can be effective to that 
actual world. 
This is a metaphysical requirement from the standpoint 
of actual o cc asi ons also. God's primordial nature concerns 
only general potentiality, but if eternal objects are going 
to be in any way effectively relevant to the concrescent 
occasions, the eternal objects must become real potentialities, 
i.e. "ordered" relevant to the concrescent occasions. In 
light of the actualization of each occasion, there is a 
"restructuring" of general potentiality. It is part of God's 
function to merge these two natures, primordial and consequent, 
thereby allowing relevant possibilities, ideals and aims to be 
realiz.able in the actual world. 
1. Ibid., P• 160. 
2. cr:-ibid., P• 521. 
His purpose is always embodied in the particular 
ideals relevant to the actual state of the world •••• 
He is not the world, but the valuation of the world. 
In abstraction from the course of events, this 
value.tion is a necessary metaphysical function. 
Apart from it, there could be no definite determina-
tion of limitation required for attainment. But iri 
~actual world, He confronts what is actual in it 
with what is possible for it.l ------
This confrontation of God to the world and the world 
to God involves a third aspect of God's nature, His "super-
jective nature" which refers to God's reaction upon the world 
after the interweaving Of His primordial and consequent 
nature. Like actual occasions, God represents a synthesis 
of the ideal (primordial) and the actual (consequent), and 
His final reaction upon the world in virtue of this synthesis 
is His superjective nature. 
The "superjective" nature of God is the 
character of the pragmatic value of his specific 
satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity 
in the various temporal instances.2 
All three of these natures are smmned up in a passage 
in Process and Reality. 
The consequent nature of God is the fluent 
world become "everlasting" by its objective immor-
tality in God. Also the objective i:mmorte.lity of 
actual occasions requires the primordial permanence 
of God, whereby the creative advance ever re-estab-
lishes itself endowed with initial subjective aim 
derived from the relevance of God to the evolving world.3 
1. Alfred North ~Vhitehead, Reli~ion in the Making, pp. 152-153. 
Underlining mine. Cf. also ~bid.-;-p-:---95. 
2. Alfred North Whitehead, Process-and Reality, p. 135. 
3. Ibid., p. 527. Cf. ibid., pp. 2tm"'; 407. Note how "sub-
Jective aimtt is derived-from the relevance of God to the 
evolving world in virtue of His complete nature. It is 
actually by reason of His full na tm·e that there is the 
ubasic adjustment of the togetherness of eternal on which 
creative order depends." Cf. above p. 181. God in His 
full nature provides the relationship of potentiality to 
actuality, of the ideal to the actual. 
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Thus God is not only the ground of general potentiality 
but is also in some sense a creative "agent," structuring 
these possibilities in light of some aim. 1 In Modes of 
Thought, Whitehead expresses the function of a supreme being 
in the world. His function 
is to sustain the aim at vivid experience. It is 
the reservoir of potentiality and the coordination 
of achievement. The form of its process is releyant 
to the data from which the process is initiated.2 
GOd's aim, which is derived from the completeness of His 
primordial nature, is to sustain and coordinate achievement 
in the temporal world. This aim can be otherwise expressed 
as God's primordial appetition toward uintensity," udepth of 
satisfaction, 11 ttthe evocation of intensity. u3 
What is inexorable in God is valuation as an 
aim towards "order;" and ''order" means usociety" 
permissive of actualities with patterned intensity 
of feeling arising from adjusted contrasts. In 
this sense God is the principle of concretion; 
namely, he is that actual entity from which each 
temporal concrescence receives that initial aim 
from which its self-causation starts. That aim 
determines the initial gradations of relevance of 
eternal objects for conceptual feeling.4 
1. This is precisely how we found actual occasions defined. 
Of. above p. 133f. 
2. Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought, P• 128. As 
"reservoir of potentiality 11 He1s the ground of general 
potentiality and hence the reason for the possibility 
of unrealized form being realizable by actual occasions. 
He ¢akes novel possib~lities available as we saw above. 
cr. above p. 171ft. 
3. These three phrases are from Alfred North Whitehead, 
Process and Reality, PP• 160-161. 
4. !bid., pp:-373-374. 
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It is extremely important to note in connection with 
the above passage that God's aim is not toward order per~, 
but toward the maximum value realizable in each temporal 
actual occasion. 
The primordial appetitions which jointly 
constitute God's purpose are seeking intensity, 
and not preservation •••• His aim for f:an 
occasion 7 is depth of satisfaction as an inter-
mediate step towards the fulfilment of his own 
being. His tenderness is directed towards each 
actual occasion as it arises. 
Thus God's purpose in the creative advance 
is the evocation of intensities. The evocation 
ot societies is purely subsidiary to this absolute 
end.l 
11 0rder 11 is thus instrumental to His aim at intensity. 
11
'0rder 1 and 'novelty' are but instruments of his subjective 
aim which is the intensification of 1 formal immediacy.' 112 
From the standpoint of actual occasions, it is in virtue 
of t~ hybrid prehensions of God3 that they acquire their 
aim. They acquire a "lure" of ideal possibilities to stimu-
late their particular organization of relevant data. God 
presents a novelty and evokes a response to it. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Ibid., pp. 160-161. Whitehead says elsewhere: "Various 
occasions are thus comparable in respect to their relative 
depths of actuality. Occasions differ in importance of 
actuality. Thus the purpose of God in the attainment of 
value is in a sense a creative purpose." Alfred North 
\~itehead, Relifion in the Making, p. 100. 
Alfred North Vih teheaa,-rrocess and Realitt, p. 135. 
That is, in this hybrid prehension-a possi ilit~ has been 
"picked out, held up, and clothed with emotion. 1 Cf. ibid., 
pp • 428, 37 3 • 
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He is the lure for feeling, the eternal urge 
of desire. His particular relevance to each 
creative act as it arises from its own conditional 
standpo~nt in the world, constitutes him the 
initial 11 object of desire" es:£ablishing the initial 
phase of each subjective alm. 
God's general appetition toward ~ntens~ty, value, is 
another cond~tion for process wh~ch is expressed in the 
initial subjective aim of each occasion. Again we quote 
this passage: 
Restriction is the price of value. There 
cannot be value without antecedent standards of 
value, to discriminate the acceptance or rejec-
tion of what is before the envisaging mode of 
activity. Th~s there is an antecedent limitation 
among values. 
Thus God is in a sense the "creator" of each occasion. 
. 3 But we must note an important qualification of th~s. God 
does not completely determine the concrescence of each 
occasion, He is only "the aboriginal condition which qualifies 
its action 114 because He is the "aboriginal instance of 
creativity." Whitehead seems to mean here that, since in 
accordance with his metaphysical scheme God is an actual 
entity, He, like all other actual entities, qualifies 
creativity. But God, being aboriginal, qualifies each 
occasion in each instance by being its source of subjective 
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1. Ibid., p. 522. Cf. also ibid., p. 281. Cf. also \Vhitehead's 
references to "eros" ~n A'Ci"V'eiitures of Ideas, and 11 De~ty 11 
~n Modes of Tho~. --
2. 
3. 
4. 
Alfred North Vlh~ ehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 178. 
cr. Alfred North Wh~tehead, Process and Reality, p. 343f. 
Cf. ibid., P• 344. 
aim. Whitehead insists upon Creativity as the ultimate 
category, and, in accordance with this, he insists upon 
1 
some autonomy for each occasion. 
God and the actual world jointly constitute 
the character of creativity for the initial phase 
of the novel concrescence. The subject, thus 
constituted, is the autonomous maste~ of its own 
concrescence into subject-superject. 
It is here that we muBt return to the description of 
actual occasions and concrescence itself. 
1. Cf. ibid., p. 380. 
2. Ibl.d-:-;-p. 374. Elsewhere, Whl.tehead says: "Thus an 
originality in the temporal world is conditioned, 
thou~ not determl.ned, by an initial subjective aim 
supp ea-Dy the ground of all order and of all 
originality. 11 Ibid., p. lo4. Italics mine. 
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3. Concrescence and SUbjective Aim 
One fundamental characteristic of actuality is that it 
is a process of becoming, an act of achieving novel unity. 
There is nothing in the Universe other 
than instances of this passage and components of 
these instances •••• The word Creativity ex-
presses the notion fhat each event is a process 
issuing in novelty. 
An actual occasion is a concrescence of many prehensions in 
which the many entities function as objects. In subsequent 
phases its prehensions are integrated and re-integrated 
thereby terminating in a complete but complex unity termed 
its "satisfaction." In each case the concrescent occasion 
is a process in which real individual things come into 
being, perish, and then condition the future. 
This whole concrescent process is described in many 
ways by Whitehead. One of these descriptions is in terms 
of the familiar notions of "efficient" and 11final 11 causes. 
The "efficient causes" are the antecedent data as objectified. 
The "f'inal cause" is the subjective aim. For Whitehead, the 
"final cause" is inseparable from the "eff~cient causen for 
the effectiveness that the data have for this concrescence 
partly depends upon the actual occasion's own dec~sion as to 
what it is to be. "An actual entity feels as 1.t does in order 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 237. 
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to be the actual entity which it is. ul 
Or this whole process may be described, as we are doing 
here, in terms ot physical and conceptual prehensions and 
their final unity into the "satisfact~on" of the occasion. 
Let us aga~n quote this significant passage from Whitehead: 
1. 
2. 
Thus the process of becoming is bipolar, 
(i) by reason of its qualification by the deter-
mination of the actual world, and (ii) by its 
conceptual prehensions of the indeterminateness 
of eternal objects. The process is constituted 
by the influx of eternal objects into a novel 
determinateness of feeling which absorbs the 
actual world into a novel actuality.2 
Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, P• 339. 
ct. also ibid., pp. 228f. otlier-a6scriptions of the 
concresce~ocess as a whole would include White-
head's reference to each occasion as a synthesis of being 
and not-being (Alfred North Whitehead, Science and 
the Modern World, p. 163) and his reference to the 
"ground" and "consequent" of each occasion (Alfred 
North Whitehead, Religion in the Making, pp. 107ft). 
ct. above, pp. 65, 16. seel)ffiifehead's delineation of 
the "responsive" phase, the "supplementfil" stage, and 
"satisfaction" (Alfred North Whitehead, Process and 
Realitz, p. 323). See also his division into th_e __ 
condit~oned potentialities which are there for synthesis, 
the substantial activity, and the achieved outcome of 
the synthesis (Alfred North Wh~tehead, Science and the 
Modern World, pp. 177f). For an interesting compar~son 
between this concrescent process as a whole and Hegel's 
Sein, Wes en, and Begriff stages, cf. Richard M. Ivlillard, 
~Place of Value in Whitehead's Thought, pp. 244ft. 
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But we have obviously simplified the discussion of 
physical and conceptual prehensions 1n order to describe 
just how eternal objects are involved in both physical and 
conceptual prehensions. There is not involved just one 
physical or conceptual prehension for each occasion. Each 
actual occasion prehends the full content of the universe 
in some degree of relevance. "The whole world conspires to 
produce a new creation. It presents to the creative process 
its opportunities and its limitations. 111 Any one concrescence 
involves all antecedent occasions and all relevant eternal 
objects. Each occasion is prehensively related to the entire 
world from that standpoint. 
Given this full relatedness, the subjective aim, in 
virtue of which the occasion achieves its distinctive 
character, is central. Its aim brings to focus all of the 
relevant data into one satisfaction.2 
Moreover, for Whitehead, the aim of the occasion is not 
something external to it. Its subjective aim is essential 
to its en tire concrescent process. It is the principle of 
1. 
2. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Reli~ion in the Making, p. 109. 
Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, odes-of~ought, p. 121. 
This would follow from the 11princ ipi'e of relat iv :tty 11 
which means that it belongs to the nature of every being 
to be a potential for every becoming. Cf. Alfred North 
vVhitehead, Process and Reality, P• 30. 
Cf. ibid., PP• 232,~1. Cf. Alfred North \v.hitehead, 
Modes of Thought, PP• 207, 121. 
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selection in virtue of which this focus, this prehensive 
unification, takes place. Let us now point up how central 
the subjective aim is for Whitehead and indicate how it 
operates within the concrescent process. 
1:• Immanent teleology 
We saw that "objectification 11 is essentially a process 
of abstraction and elimination under the control of the aim 
of the occasion. Antecedent actual occasions are prehended 
under an abstraction and are not, in their "formal" nature, 
included in the actual occasion.1 The actual occasions do 
not select their initial data but what they do with their 
data by way of their selective realization into a unity 
depends fundamentally upon their subjective aim, their ideal 
of themselves to some extent derived by their hybrid prehension 
2 of God as the source of aim. 
The aim is present "from the beginning" of the con-
crescent process. It operates as an ideal at which the 
process aims. 
In its self-creation the actual entity is guided 
by its ideal of itself as individual satisfaction and 
as transcendent creator. The enjoyment of this ideal 
is the ttsub jecti ve aim," by reason of which the 
actual entity is a determinate process.3 
1. Cf. Alfred North ~fuitehead, Process ~Reality, p. 321. 
Cf. also above p. 148ff. 
2. Cf. above p. 180ff. 
3. Ibid., p. 130. Strictly speaking, the aim cannot be 
separated from the process. The occasion is at once the 
ttsubject" of its experience and the outcome of it. See 
Whitehead's reference to "subject-superject," ibid., 
PP• 43, 108, 340ff. ----
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In other words, the data has to be evaluated and this 
evaluation is central to the whole process of the actual 
occasion in bringing unity to its many complex prehensions. 
The actual occasion is conditioned by its past but the way 
in which it organizes and integrates its data, both from the 
past as in its physical prehensions and also the relevance of 
general potentiality, is due to its subjective aim. The data 
are evaluated in accordance with the subjective aim at satis-
faction. 
That the aim is present from the beginning of concres-
cence is indicated by ~fuitehead's point that it is the 
subjective aim which gives the necessary internal unity to 
the concrescence even in its incomplete stages. Throughout 
the concrescence the "subject" is "at work" interpreting its 
data so as to achieve its aim at intensity; the aim is the 
reason for the 11harmony of feeling" necessary for intensity. 1 
Whitehead feels that the "harmony of feeling" is neces-
sary in the incomplete phases of concrescence. Thus it is 
the subjective aim whiCh accounts for the first basic 
1. cr. ibid., PP· 36f, 342. 
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categoreal obligation, "The Category of Subjective Unity, 11 
and the seventh, "The Category of Subjective Harmony. 111 
For Whitehead, this selective teleological control is 
characteristic of all actual occasions no matter what the 
level with which we are concerned, conscious or non-conscious. 
For all occasions, its prehensions originate as prehensions 
of "objects, 11 but those prehensions as we saw imply "aim," 
"purpose. "2 The aim is an integral part of the prehensions. 
As Whitehead sees it, each actual occe.sion is fully teleo-
logical by virtue of its aim at satisfaction. 
Another way of emphasizing the immanent teleology of 
each occasion would be to say that the subjective aim is the 
"principle of selection" in virtue of which the actual occasion 
selects and evaluates its many data for inclusion or exclusion.3 
1. Cf. ibid., PP• 39ff~ 390. Whitehead seems to regard this 
"harmony of feeling' as due to the character of concres-
cence itself and as representing the conditions of any 
concrescence whatsoever. In keeping with this, n. Emmet 
says that the categoreal obligations come near to s. 
Alexander's meaning of "categories," i.e. for Alexander, 
his categories are the all-pervasive features of space-
time. Dorothy M. Emmet, \Vhitehead's Philosoph~ of 
Organism, (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 193 );-p. 71. 
It is perhaps accurate to say that Whitehead does look 
upon them in this way: the internal harmony is due to 
the activity of concrescence itself. The categoreal 
obligations "flow from the final nature of things." 
Alfred North ~bitehead, Process and Reality, P• 340. 
Let us briefly note here thar-tlie categoreal 
obligations for Vlhitehead would not indicate a drive 
toward intelligibility per se but a drive toward enouwn 
harmony to procure intensity-or satisfaction. "Order' 
is, again, subservient to this end. 
2. Cf. Whitehead's use of the term "appropriation" for 
"pre hens ion 11 above, p. 134. 
3. Valuation as we saw is the function of the conceptual 
pole. cr. above p.l67f. Or, more precisely, valuation is 
the subjective form of conceptual prehensions and its 
subjective forms are ultimately determined by its 
subjective aim. cr. ibid., p. 369. 
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The aim is the ideal for that concrescence and it determines 
how eternal objects (general potentiality) and past actual 
occasions (real potentiality) may be synthesized in its 
experience. It is in virtue of the subjective aim and the 
conditioned possibility given by the past that the concres-
cence determines what is compatible for inclusion or exclusion. 
The aim defines the "pattern," or mode of togetherness, of the 
eternal objects. It defines how forms may mingle relevant to 
the given situation. This is the actual occasion's "form of 
composition. nl 
1. Cf. Alfred North lVhitehead, Modes of Thought, pp. 128ff. 
See Whitehead's reference to the "graded envisagement" 
of each occasion. Alfred North ~Vhitehead, Science and 
the Modern World, pp. 174, 177. Cf. also Alfred NortE 
WEI'tehead, Modes of Thof,fr1.t, p. 2 3. To use Blanshard' s 
terms, a universarmay nction as a 11principle of 
synthesis" by which we order the data. cr. above p._: 
For both Blanshard and 1JVhitehead, in the final analysis 
the meaning of t1essencen is teleological. 
Vfuitehead says something is Adventures of Ideas 
concerning our interpretation of historical events which 
is indicative of the importance of teleology for him: 
"You can't consider wisdom or folly, progress or decadence, 
except in relation to some standard of judgment, some end 
in view. Such standards, suCh ends, when widely diffused, 
constitute the driving force of ideas in the history of 
mankind. They also guide the composition of historical 
narrative." Alfred North Whitehead, Adventl.U'es of Ideas, 
p. 12. In a similar fashion, the aim of each occas~on, 
made possible by its conceptual grasp of a possibility 
not yet realized in past occasions but relevant to this 
process by virtue of God's nature,guides the compositiOn 
of each occasion. Adventures of Ideas, especially ch. 1, 
is an interesting exposition or-just how intellectual 
concepts have had a driving force in the history of western 
thought. 
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,11. Concrescence 
"Concrescence" indicates a concrete unity, a real fusion 
Of the data, a real mingling of forms. For Vfuitehead, the 
eternal objects have real ingression into the actual occasion; 
they characterize its "real internal constitution. 11 
An occasion of experience is an activity, 
analysable into modes of functioning which 
jointly constitute its process of becoming.l 
All actuality involves the realization of 
form derived from factual data. It is both a 
composition of qualities, and it is also a form 
of composition. The form of composition dic-
tates how those forms as thus realized in the 
data enter into a finite process of composition, 
thus achieving new actuality w~th its own 
exemplifications and discards. 
For Whitehead, the actualities are not the mere linitation 
of the forms. They are processes of realized form into some 
mode of togetherness or form of composition. The actual oc-
casions depend upon their prehensi ve relations both to real 
potentiality and pure potentiality and the manner in which 
they are prehensively related makes a difference to that 
occasion. In other words, the relations and the qualities 
1. Ibid., p. 178. Cf. Alfred North VJhitehead, Process and 
Rea!ity, pp. 34, 38, 335. As we saw in the case of tne 
11 subjective ingression 11 of eternal objects, this is 
particularly true of qualities. cr. above p. 152ff. 
Note also that it is the 11modes of functioning, 11 viz. 
prehensions, which constitute its process. 
2. Alfred North \Vhitehead, Modes of Thought, p. 122. 
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unified by the occasion are internally related to that 
occasion. An actual occasion is constituted by its pre-
1 
hensive relations. 
For each relationship enters into the essence 
or the event; so that, apart from that relationship, 
the event would not be itself. This is what is 
meant by the very notion of internal relations.2 
Implicit in Vfuitehead's emphasis upon internal relations 
is his rejection of the traditional conception of a "sub-
stance" as, to use the Cartesian phrase, "that which requires 
nothing but itself in order to exist" and the attendant 
notion that its qualities and relations are external to the 
substratum. Whitehead emphatically rejects this notion of 
substance as being a static substratum which endures with 
its accidental qualities. On these presuppositions you not 
only have difficulties in explaining change but are in a real 
quandary as to how there can be real connections between real 
things. 3 
For 1¥-hitehead, relatedness is dominate over quality. 4 
Actual occasions are procedures of organization, modes of 
the real togetherness of forms. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
This statement of course must be qualified by our dis-
cussion of Vihitehead's doctrine of objectification, or 
his interpretation of the phrase, "being present in 
another entity. 11 Cf • above p • 140f. 
Alfred North ~.l!Jhitehead, Science and the Modern World, 
p. 125. Cf. ibid., PP• 174ff. ITr7 Airred North ~ffiite­
head, Modes or-Thou~ht, p. 226. 
Cf. Alfred North tVb:tehead, Process and Reality, pp. 43, 
112, 208, Adventures of Ideas, p. 22cr:- See also his 
discussion of "vacuousactualityn throughout Process and 
Reali tt. 
Cf. Al red North Whitehead, Process and Reality, PP• ix, 
295, 350. 
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For facts and species are the product of 
the mingling of genera •••• A species is a 
potential mingling of genera, and an individual 
instance involves, among other things, an actual 
mingling of many species.l 
But the phrase "among other things 11 in the above passage 
is an important qualification. \"'hitehead goes on to add 
this important qualification: 
Thus Concrescence is useful to convey the 
notion of many things acquiring complete com-
plex unity. But it fails to suggest the creative 
novelty invol ved.2 
~ii· •. Real Individuality 
Each actual occasion is something more than a "com-
position of forms." Hence it is misleading to merely describe 
it as a "mingling of genera. 11 The entire nature of an actual 
occasion cannot be accounted for by describing its relations. 
It is to be noted that every actual entity, 
including God, is something individual for its 
own sake; and thereby transcends the rest of 
actuality.3 
Each actual occasion has "significance for itself, 11 it is 
the realization of an intensity of experience. It is a 
realization of value. 
1. Alfred North Vv'hitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 236. 
2. Ibid., P• 237. --
3. Arrred North i¥hitehead, Process and Reality, p. 135. 
See Vfuitehead's reference to res-vera throughout 
Process and Reality. -------
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The element of value, of being valuable, 
of having value, of being an end in itself, of 
being something which is for its own sake, must 
not be omitted in any account of an event as the 
most concrete actual something. 11 Value 11 is the 1 word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event. 
These actual occasions are ndrops of experience 11 and, 
for Whitehead, the only entities which are concretely actual 
are those which can be described as having experience. 
"Actual entities 11 -- also termed "actual 
occasions" -- are the final real thing of which 
the world is made up •••• The final facts are, 
all alike, actual entities; and these actual 
entities are drops of experience, complex and 
interdependent.2 
The terms "experience," "feeling," connote for Whitehead 
a concrete unity in which the components have their own 
particular function and status by virtue of their being in 
this unity. This is to say that the eternal objects have a 
1. 
2. 
Alfred North 'Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 
p. 95. R. M. Millard's treatmen"t"'Of"""'W'fiitehead presents 
an extended analysis of the concept of value as it is 
found in Vlhitehead's writings. After a developmental 
analysis of Whitehead's notion of value, Millard takes 
the position that vVhitehead's metaphysics is thoroughly 
axio-centric. \Vhat is more relevant to our discussion 
here is that Millard makes the point that vVhitehead' s 
"principle of individuation" is the attainment of 
intrinsic value on the part of the occasion. cr. 
Richard M. Millard, The Place of Value in \Vhitehead's 
Thou~t, especially PP• 150ff,~87ff. --
Alfr~ North \Vhitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 27-28. 
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real diversity of status in this particular realization.l 
For Whitehead, an actual occasion is a real individual and 
not merely a collection of abstract characters. 2 The 
individual particularity of an occasion is not expressible 
in terms of abstract concepts.3 
Perhaps another way of expressing the real individuality 
of the occasion is to point up Whitehead's insistence upon the 
novelty of each occasion. The unity of each occasion, its 
full determinateness, cannot be wholly attributed to the 
conditions set by its past or even to God as the source of 
its aim.4 Part of the reason for this specific instance of 
concrescence is due to its own autonomy, its own response to 
the given situation. 
1. Cf. ibid., P• 39, The Category of Objective Diversity. 
InvoiVea here is, of course, the question as to how 
far a class theory of universals can take you in meta-
physics. This has relevance to Blanshard's discussion 
of abstract universals. Vfuitehead is here saying that 
an occasion is always a composite and never a mere 
aggregate of characters. The occasion is a "cell" or 
an "organism. tt Cf. ibid., p. 164. In this connection 
'Whitehead compares h~mself to Leibniz: ttrt is obvious 
that the basing of philosopny upon the presupposition 
of organism must be traced back to Leibniz. His monads 
are for him the ultimately real entities." Alfred North 
Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 156. Vfuitehead 
goes on to say, liowever;-that Lelbn~z, being influenced by 
the Cartesian notion of substance, failed to emphasize a 
"concrete reality of internal relations.'' Leibniz only 
establishes connections between his monads by a deus ex 
machina. ------
2. Nor is an occasion, to use Blanshard's phrase, merely a 
universal in situ. Cf. above p. 80. 
3. Cf. Alfred~o~vVhitehead, Process and Reality, P• 86. 
4. Cf. above p. 180ff. 
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God and the actual world jointly constitute 
the character of the creativity for the initial 
phase of the novel concrescence. The subject, 
thus constituted, is the autonomous master of its 
own concrescence into subject-superject •••• 
Each creative act is the universe incarnating 
itself as one, and~er~ is nothing above it by 
way of final condition. 
The actual entity, in a state of process 
during which it is not fully d~finite, determines 
its own ultimate definiteness. 
Each occasion is self-creative, is an instance of 
creativity, and its final character is not to be completely 
attributed to its relations. 
11 Creati vi ty 11 is the principle of novelty. 
An actual occasion is a novel entity diverse 
from any entity in the "many" which it unifies. 
Thus "creativity 11 introduces novelty in to the 
content of the many.3 
A real individual is more than a member of a class. It 
is a real togetherness, synthesis of characters, where the 
many become one. There are no new eternal objects,4 but there 
can be these forms in a new function, a new mode of together-
ness. 
"Concrescence'' is the name for the process 
in which the universe of many things acquires an 
individual unity in a determinate relegation of 
the "many" to its subordination in the constitu-
tion of the novel "one. 115 
1. Ibid., pp. 374-375, underlining mine. Let us add here 
tEat this is e. real "incarnation 11 and not the "appear-
ance 11 characteristic of some Absolute Idealisms. Each 
occasion is a new fact, a creative synthesis arising 
out of its relatio~o the rest of the world. 
2. Ibid., p. 390. Cf. ibid., pp. 373f. 
3. !D!a., P• 31. Cf. iOTa:, P• 143. 
4. cr:-ibid., p. 33. ----
5. Ibid:;-p. 321. 
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lv. Satisfaction and Order 
We have seen that one of God's functions is to allow 
relevant possibilities, ideals, to be realized in the actual 
world. 
The mental pole has derived its objective 
content alike by abstraction from the physical 
pole and by the immanence of the basic Eros 
which endows with agency all ideal possibilities. 
The content of the objective universe has passed 
from the function of a basis for a new1individuality to that of an instrument for purposes. 
God is the source of the initial aim of each occasion 
and is the Eros whose aim is toward "intensity," 11depth of 
satisfaction. 11 
We found also that the process of becoming for an actual 
occasion is an activity of integration or "composition" where 
the subjective aim, operating as the "immanent end, n the 
ideal for that process, guides the composition from its very 
beginning. Actual occasions are thought of as essentially 
processes of ordering relevant possibilities, both "real" 
and "general." Eternal objects have definite structure and 
relationship only in virtue of their realized ingression. 
Stated in other terms, each occasion is seen as a 
synthesis of the ideal and the real. In its receptive and 
supplementary phases, the occasion has yet to achieve a com-
plete synthesis, integration, of all its relations, it has 
1. Alfred North 1Nhi tehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 211. 
Cf. above P• 17lff. 
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yet to achieve its aim. Its aim is still an "appetition." 
11 The occasion arises as an effect facing its past and ends 
as a cause facing its future. In between there lies the 
teleology of the Universe. nl 
The internal unity is complete only upon its attainment 
of its satisfaction. "The term 'satisfaction' means the one 
complex fully determinate feeling which is the completed 
phase in the process."2 Its completion is a concrete unity 
of those conditions set for it by its past occasions (physi-
cal prehensions), those potentialities it may realize (con-
ceptual prehensions) and its own creative decision as an 
instance of creativity. 
The points to especially note here are that the aim of 
each occasion is at some definite but complex unity of its 
prehensions and that its aim is attained. Its satisfaction 
denotes the completion of the entire process of concrescence. 
The actual occasion is now a definite settled fact with con-
sequences which condition the future. Its 11 ideal" has become 
fact which must be dealt with in ti1e future. The satisfac-
tion ttcloses up the entity; and yet is the superject adding 
its character to the creativity whereby there is a becoming 
of entities superseding the ore in question. n3 
1. Ibid., P• 196. 
2. l!rred North vVhitehead, Process and Reality, p. 39. 
3. Ibid., p. 129. 
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The final phase in the process of concres-
cence ••• is one complex, fully determinate 
feeling. This final phase is termed the 11sa tis-
faction. 111 
That the satisfaction is attained can be substantiated 
by Whitehead's insistence that in the satisfaction the 
occasions have lost final causation, they are devoid of all 
indetermination. Furthermore, he adds that in the satisfac-
tion "potentiality has passed into realization. "2 
"Satisfactiontt provides the individual element 
in the composition of the actual entity -- that 
element which has led to the definition of sub-
stance as "requiring nothing but itself in order 
to exist.u But the "satisfaction" is the 11 super-
ject" rather than the "substance 11 or "subject. "3 
Of the many descriptions of satisfaction available to 
us in \~itehead's writings, the outstanding characteristic 
are 
of them all is that they/describedin terms of experience. 
The aim is at the 11 intensi ty of feeling, n4 the satisfaction 
is a "concrete unity of feeling, "5 actuality is a 11 value 
experience. "6 That experience is fundamental is not, of 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Ibid., p. 38. For other descriptions of the satisfaction 
or-in occasion, cf. ibid., pp. 53, 129f, 169f, 340, 368. 
\Vhitehead seems most-cO:nsistently to regard the satisfac-
tion as not a part of the process of concrescence but its 
completion. On this point; viz. as to whether "satisfac-
tion11 denotes a process or whether it does not, there is 
room for debate. Cf. William A. Christian, An Interpreta-
tion of Whitehead's Metaphysics, pp. 38ff. --
AifreUN'orth Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 44. 
Ibid., p. 129. 
!15Ia:., p. 41. Cf. ibid., p. 129. 
!OIU., P• 322. Cf.-ro!d., pp. 337, 131. 
IIrred North Whitehean;-Modes of ThOUght, p. 151. 
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course, surprising in light of Whitehead's definition of 
actual entities as "drops of experience, 11 his emphasis on 
feeling, and his general metaphysical and epistemological 
position. The key notion is experience in its evident 
meaning, 11 the emotional intensity entertained in life. ul 
But to be more specific in regard to Whitehead's view 
of satisfaction, we would have to specify the kind of exper-
ience to which he is generally referring. Here it seems 
that the closest analogue to what \~itehead means by 
"satisfaction" is to be found in aesthetic experience. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Thus the satisfaction is the attainment of 
the private ideal which is the final cause of the 
concrescence •••• ~It is 7 a unity of ~esthetic 
apprecis t ion immediately fe'It as private. 
An actual fact is a fact of aesthetic 
ex per ie nee • 3 
Beauty is the internal conformation of the 
various items of experience with each other, for 
the production of maximum effectiveness •••• 
The teleology of the universe is directed to the 
production of Beauty.4 
Ibid., p. 232. Cf. ibid., p. 13. 
Arrred North Whiteheaa;-Process and Realiti, p. 323. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Religion ~ the Ma ing, p. 111. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures-or-!deas, p. 264. 
Cf. ibid., ch. 17. For the importa~e of aesthetic 
experience for Whitehead, cf. John Goheen, "\Vhi tehead 1 s 
Theory of Value," and Bertram Morris, "The Art-Process 
and the Aesthetic Fact in Whitehead's Philosophy," both 
in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosoph! of Alfred 
North Whitehead, (Chicago: No~nwestern Un varsity, 
194n. Cf. also Donald W. Sherburne, A ~fuiteheadian 
Aesthetic, (New Haven: Yale University-press, 1961). 
R· M. Millard and D. Emmet are also of the opinion 
that the aesthetic categories are basic. Cf. Richard 
M. Millard, The Place of Value in Whitehead's Thought, 
P• 174. Cf. Dorothy ~Emmet, Wlliteheadts Philosophy 
of Organism, p. 141. 
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This emphasis upon aesthetic categories is also not 
surprising in light of Whitehead's conception of the occasion 
as having "subjective fozm," the importance of emotional 
qualities, the novelty of each occasion, and their active, 
valuational character. 
Whitehead's emphasis upon aesthetic experience is 
especially evident in the fact that the 11 pre-established 
harmony" mentioned in connection with the categ·oreal 
obligations are essentially aesthetic categories. They all 
point to the diversity in unity characteristic of aesthetic 
experience and objects. This is especially true of the 
category of subjective harmony and the category of reversion 
in which "aesthetic adaptation for an end is the formative 
1 
condition in the pre-established harmony." 
Perhaps the best summary statement, giving us at least 
an outline of what is involved in satisfaction, is to be 
found in Process ~ Reality. 
In synthesis there must always be a ground of 
identity and an aim at contrast. The aim at con=-
trast arises from the depth of intensity promoted 
by contrast •••• This 11 aim at contrast" is the 
expression of the ultimate creative purpose that 
each unification shall achieve some maximum depth 
of intensity of feeling, subject to the conditions 
of its concrescence.2 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Realitz, p. 389. 
2. Ibid., P• 381. Cf. ibid., pp. 1~, and conceptual 
reversion, above, P• 168f. 
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This can be clarified in terms of our mode of analysis 
here, viz. physical and conceptual prehensions. One require-
ment of satisfaction on the part of the occasion is some 
1 
conformation with the past. Some "endurance 11 in the sense 
of a repetition of pattern in the succession of events is a 
necessary condition for satisfaction. 
But repetition is not a sufficient condition. Mere 
reiteration of pattern does not make for intensity of 
experience. 
The unity of emotion, which is the unity of 
the present occasion, is a patterned texture of 
qualities, always shifting as it is passed into 
the future. The creative activity aims at 
preservation of the components and at preserva-
tion of intensity. The modifications of pattern, 
tbe dismissal into elimination, are in obedience 
to this aim. 
In so far as conceptual mentality does not 
intervene, the grand patterns pervGding the en-
vironment are passed on with the inherited modes 
of adjustment. Here we find the patterns of 
activity studied by the physicists end chemists •2 
In the higher organisms, this "ground n is fused with 
the novelty and contrast made possible by conceptual pre-
hensions and conceptual reversions. The past occasions 
are no longer prehended as a bare sensum which does not in 
itself express the manner of relatedness between eternal 
objects. The past is now grasped and unified in its con-
trasts and complexity. Through the activity of the 
1. Cf. above on conformal feelings, p. 150ff. 
2. Alfred North vVhitehead, Modes of Thought, P• 230. 
Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 
pp. 176f, 247. Cf. above- on conforma-rl'eelings, p. 150ff. 
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conceptual pole there is now included some grasp of the 
mutual relatedness of eternal objects. 
The essence of intensity is a fusion of this identity 
and contrast, unity and diversity.1 Again, the appeal is to 
aesthetic principles. 
1. The novel consequent must be graded in 
relevance so as to preserve some identity of 
character with the ground. 
2. The novel consequent must be graded in 
relevance so as to preserve some contrast with 
the ground in respect to that same identity of 
character. 
These two principles are derived from the 
doctrine that an actual fact is a fact of 
aesthetic experience. All aesthetic experience 
is feeling arising out of the realization of 
contrast under identity.2 
1. Or, as 'Whitehead formally defines the term "contrasts," 
nModes of Synthesis of Entities in one Prehension." 
Ibid., p. 33. Cf. ibid., pp. 36, 40. 
2. iO!O., p. 427. Cf.-ro!d., p. 427, and Alfred North 
Wfii'tehead, Reli~ion "'ilthe Makirt. vVhitehead gives 
us a classif'ica ion or satisfa.c ons under such terms 
as "triviality," "vagueness," "narrowness," etc. 
Cf. Alfred North 1Nhitehead, Process ~Reality, 
PP• 170ff. 
The importance of unity and diversity, identity and 
contrast, is not new to Process and Reality. It can 
be found in his early concept of--rrmiythm. 11 For example, 
in the last chapter of Principles of Natural Knowled~e, 
where Whitehead says that 11 the essence Of rhytfuri is ne 
fusion of sameness and novelty; so that the whole never 
loses the essential unity of pattern, while the parts 
exhibit the contrast arising from the novelty of their 
detail. A mere recurrence kills rhythm as surely as a 
mere confusion of differences. A crystal lacks rhythm 
from excess of pattern, while fog is unrhythmic in that 
it exhibits a patternless confusion of detail." Alfred 
North \f.hitehead, An Enquirb Concerning the Principles 
of Natural Knowle~e, (Cam ridge: At t~niversity 
Press, 1919), p. 1 6. 
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The particular satisfaction of each occasion is 
dependent upon the kind of orderliness of its prehensive 
unification given the aesthetic requirements for satis-
faction. 
Again, to recur to this passage: 
The Critique of Pure Reason describes the 
process-by which suojective data pass into the 
appearance of an objective world. The philosophy 
of organism seeks to describe how objective data 
pass into subjective satisfaction, and how order 
in the objective data provides intensity in the 
subjective satisfaction.l 
To this we now add: 
The notion of "order" is bou..'1d up with the notion 
of an actual entity as involving an attainment which 
is a specific satisfaction .2 
1. Alfred North ~bitehead, Process and Reality, p. 135. 
cr. above p. 137. ---
2. Ibid., p. 129. cr. ibid., p. 142. 
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4. Eternal Objects and Order 
We have been thus far mainly concerned with a 
description of the ways in which eternal objects have 
ingression into actual occasions. Eternal objects may 
have 11dative ingression," viz. they may function as "objects," 
or the given contents of the present occasion which bestows 
definiteness upon this occasion. Eternal objects may also 
have 11 subjecti ve ingress ion" by virtue of which, in objectifi-
cation, the present 11 inherits 11 a character from the past and 
in turn passes it on to the future. Subjective ingression 
coupled with dative ingression means for \Vhitehead that 
qualities may have a "relational" function, they may function 
1 
as recurrent types uniformly exhibited as imrnanent in process. 
In the last section we found that eternal objects may 
also function as ideals which guide the composition of the 
occasion. A novel possibility can be the datum of the initial 
conceptual aim of each creative occasion functioning as the 
2 immanent "principle of selection" regulating its concrescence. 
Vve now turn to a discussion of eternal objects themselves. 
Vfuitehead 1 s most extended and concentrated discussion of 
eternal objects is to be found in Chapter X of Science and the 
Modern World. Early in this chapter ~~itehead expresses the 
1. cr. above p. 155. 
2. Cf. above p. l89ff. 
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importance of eternal objects to his rretaphysical position. 
It is the foundation of ~the_7 metaphysical 
position which I am maintaining that the under-
standing of actuality requires a reference to 
ideality. The two realms are intrinsically 
inherent in the total metaphysical situation. 1 
In this same chapter, ~fuitehead goes on to announce 
two principles concerning our consideration of eternal objects. 
The first principle expresses the fact that an eternal object 
has an "individual essence. n 
The first principle is that each eternal 
object is an individual which, in its own peculiar 
fashion, is what it is. This particulBr indi vid-
uality is the individual essence of the object • 
• • • Thus the individual essence is merely the 
eternal object considered as a~ding its own unique 
contribution to each occasion. 
The second principle expresses the fact that an eternal 
object has also a "relational essence." 
An eternal object ••• cannot be divorced 
from its reference to other eternal objects, and 
from its reference to actuality genere.lly; though 
it is disconnected from its actual modes of in-
gression into definite actual occasions. This 
pr ire iple is expressed by the statement that each 
eternal object has a "relational essence." This 
relet io nal essence determines how it is possible 
for the object to have ingression into actual 
occasions .3 
The plan of our discussion here is an explEnation of 
these two principles. Or, to express our procedure in a 
1. Alfred North vilhitehead, Science and the Modern World, 
pp. 158-159. The text reads: "'!l;ist'ne foundation of 
metaphysical position ••• " 
2. Ibid., p. 159. 
3. !OIQ., P• 160. 
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different manner, one could say that our procedure is to 
explain in what sense eternal objects are 11 eternaltt and in 
what sense they do function as "objects." vv·e shall then go 
on to discuss their relation to actual occasions from the 
standpoint of eternal objects. 
i. Individual Essences 
We must first note that Vfuitehead calls this chapter 
on eternal objects nAbs traction. 11 For Vfui tehead, to consider 
eternal objects in themselves is to consider them as abstrac-
tions for we never find them completely separated from their 
concrete embeddedness in occasions, as reBlized in the con-
text of experience. But Whitehead adds the important qualifi-
cation that to consider eternal objects in themselves is only 
a relative abstrection. 
Eternal objects are thus, in their nature, 
abstract. By "abstract" I mean that what an eternal 
object is in itself -- that is to say, its essence 
is comprehensible without reference to some one 
particular occasion of experience. To be abstract 
is to transcend particular concrete occasions of 
actual happening. But to transcend an actual oc-
casion does not ~being disconnected from it.1 
The function of eternal objects is that they are possible 
forms of definiteness, considered in themselves they are 
1. Ibid., p. 159. Ite_lics mine. A consideration of eternal 
ObJeCts in tbems elves would thus be only a "rele_ ti ve 11 
abstraction. wbitehead reminds us elsewhere that a 
complete abstra_ction is self-contradictory. Cf. Alfred 
North Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 42, 321. 
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potentialities but what is potential is potentis.l for ~ 
actualitl• 11Potentiality 11 and "actus.lityn are two contrasting 
notions, each requiring the other; both are "intrinsically 
inherent in the total rn.etaphysical situa tion. 111 Any object 
considered as an object is a potentiality but considered as 
concrete it is a realized characteristic of an occasion. 
But ~ an object, its essence is to be a possibility. "Thus 
the metaphysical status of an eternal object is that of a 
possibility for an actuality.u2 We can meaningfully consider 
eternal objects as possibilities in the sense that we can 
discuss them apart from any particular mode of ingression but 
not apart from their general relation to actual occasions. 
Now an eternal object, in itself, abstracts 
from all deterrrdnate actual entities, including 
even God. It is merely referent to any such entities, 
in the absolutely general sense of ant •••• Thus 
the endeavour to understand eternal o jects in 
complete abstraction from the actual world results ~ 
in reducing them to mere undifferentiated nonentities.~ 
But their essence is to be potentialitie~. Their 
realiza.t ion in any one particular occasion does not thereby 
make them lose their 11 a.ccent 11 of potentiality. Despite their 
realization and implication in process, they still retain 
1. Cf. above P• 211. Cf. also Alfred North vVhitehea.d, Modes 
of Thought, p. 96, and Process and Reality, p. 63. This 
TS of course another way of stating the principle of 
relativity and of saying that a complete abstraction is 
self-contradictory. Cf. above p. 172. 
2. Alfred North V'lhitehead, Science and the Modern World, 
p. 159. ------
3. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 392. 
As we saw, one function of God is-!o be the ground of 
this potentiality. Cf. above p. 17lff. 
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their status as potentialities. This fact is stated. in 
what Whitehead. calls the principle of 11The Translucency of 
Realisation. 11 
By this I mean that any eternal object is 
just itself in whatever mode of realisation it 
is involved. There ce.n be no distortion of the 
individual essence without thereby producing a 
different eternal object. In the essence of 
each eternal object there stands an undeterminate-
ness which expresses its indifferent patience fol 
any mode of ingression into any actual occasion. 
This nindifferent patience" is the sense in which the 
eternal objects are "eternal." They are, in their essence, 
unaffected by their realization in any particular concrescent 
process. Whitehead gives us an indication of what he meHns 
by "eternal." 
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Every scheme for the analysis of nature has 
to fe.ce these two facts, chan~e and endurance. 
There is yet a third fact to e placed by it, 
eternality, I will call it •••• A colour is 
eternal. It haunts time like a spirit. It comes 
and goes. But where it comes, it is the same 
colour.2 
For Vfhitehead the eternal objects themselves are not 
indeterminate. Each eternal object is determinate. They 
are what they are. 11Thus every so-called 'universal' is 
particular in the sense of being what it is, diverse from 
1. Alfred North V'Jhi tehead, Science a.nd the Modern 1.Vorld, 
P• 172. --
2. Ibid., p. 88. Eternal objects preserve their identity 
amiQ change. As we saw, ~bitehead's doctrine of con-
formal feeling which is basic to his explanation of the 
continuity of nature and the relations between occasions 
requires the repetition of "same form. 11 Cf. above p. 150ff. 
1 
everything else. tt VVhat is indeterminate in their relations 
to actual occasions~ Process is not a description of how the 
eternal objects become specific, how they become more deter-
minate. Process is, rather, a description of how their 
relationships to occasions become more determinate from the 
st e.ndpoint of the occasions. This being realized by occasions 
does not affect their individual essences. Whitehead states 
this formally. 
This principle is the principle of the 
Isolation of Eternal Obi! cts in the realm of 
possibilitY: The etern objects are isolated, 
because their relationships as possibilities are 
expressible without reference to their respec-
tive individual essences.2 
The term "isolation" can be strictly taken in the above 
quotation. In themselves, taken as pure potentialities, they 
indicate nothing about their ingression into any one par-
ticular occasion. They are "abstracttt and do not in themselves 
determine their instances. 3 
The term "isolationtt can be taken in another sense also. 
Eternal objects in themselves, apart from God's conceptual 
valuation, are not related to one another. As we noted above, 
eternal objects, considered in themselves, form a multiplicity, 
they are pure disjunctions. 4 Apart from God's ne.ture, apart 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
Alfred North ~bitehead, Process and Realit~, p. 76. 
Alfred North ·r~bitehead,. Science and the Mo ern World, p. 165. 
Cf. Alfred North \Vhitehead, Process and Reality, p. 70. 
4. 
Other phrases used by 1Nhitehead are :--rhey are 11neutral 11 
as to their ingression; cf. ibid., p. 70. they "tell no 
tales" as to their ingressions:- Cf. ibid., p. 391. 
Cf. above p. 175n. ----
from His basic adjustment of the forms, there is no order 
1 
exhibited in or intrinsic to eternal objects per se. "Apart 
from the intervention of God, there could be nothing new in 
the world, and no order in the world. n2 
Thus pure potentiality, the eternal objects considered 
in their individual essences, does not constitute any one, 
fixed, necessary order. 
"Order" is a mere generic term: there can only 
be some definite s pacific "order, 11 not merely 11 order 11 
in the vague •••• There is not just one ideal 
"order" which all actual entities should attain and 
fail to atta.in. In each case there is an ideal 
peculiar to each particular actual entity, and 
arising from the dominant components in its phase 
of 11gi vennes s. n3 
Eternal objects "mingle 11 not in virtue of their own 
natures but in virtue of concrescent occasions themselves. 
It is the subjective aim which determines how the forms may 
mingle given the general conditions supplied by God (including 
His reaction to the world) and the conditions supplied to the 
1. Cf. above p. 178. 
2. Ibid., p. 377. Vie must remember howev·er that "God" here 
does not merely refer to His primordial nature but to 
all three "natures" taken together. Eternal objects are 
not relBted to occasions merely by virtue of His primor-
dial nature nor are they related to each other merely 
by virtue of His primordial nature. 
3. Ibid., p. 128. Cf • ibid., p. 132. 
- -
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occasion by its past occasions.1 "Actual entities are the 
2 
only reasons." "The notion of 1 order 1 is bound up with 
the notion of an actual entity as involving an att2.inment 
which is a specific satisfaction. 113 
ii. Relational Essences 
As we saw above, it is God Who provides the general 
relevance of abstract potentialities to actual occasions. 
It is God Who provides for creativity the general conditions 
for its realization. 4 Because He has appetition for all 
possibilities, eternal objects are relevant to process. 
God is the reason for the "adjustment of forms severally 
appropriate for all realizable basic conditions. 115 Because 
of God there is the general fact of systematic mutual rela.ted-
ness inherent in the character of possibility, thereby setting 
the stage for some course of events in the future. 
The general relationships of eternal objects 
to ea.ch other, relationships of diversity and of 
pattern, are their relationships in God's concep-
tual realization. Apart from this realization, 
there is mere isolation indistinguishable from 
nonentity.6 
1. Even the categoreal obligations are not obligations 
inherent in eternal objects. As we saw above, the 
categoreal obligations are characteristics of concres-
cent occasions, they "govern" the becoming of actual 
occasions --not eternal objects per se. cr. above p. 194n. 
2. Ibid., p. 37. --
3. lEIQ., p. 129. 
4. ~above p. 174. 
5. cr. above P• 177ff. 
6. Ibid., P• 392. cr. above P• 175n. 
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This can also be stated from the side of actual occasions. 
Unrealized abstract form can be relevant to actual occasions 
only if they have ~ relationship to eternal objects which 
have already been realized. Thus one condition for novelty 
in the actual occasion is that there be a ntogetherness of 
1 the forms." 
So if there be relevance of what in the 
temporal world is unrealized, the relevance must 
express a fact of togetherness in the for~al 
constitution of a non-temporal actuality. 
We have already suggested that this "fact of togetherness" 
can be meaningfully identified with Whitehead's earlier dis-
cussion of the "relational essences" of eternal objects in 
Science and the Modern World. 3 We are returning now to a 
discussion of the "relational essences" of eternal objects. 
Whitehead maintains that the primary metaphysical truth 
4 
about the realm of eternal objects is its analytic character. 
By this Whitehead means that eternal objects considered as 
relational essences are capable of analytic division into a 
number of different abstract structures of differing degrees 
of relatedness. Or, stated from the side of our concrete 
experience, Whitehead is saying that there are formal, 
relational structures, or universals of relation, exhibited 
in our experience. These formal relations which have their 
basis in our experience, can be distinguished and considered 
1. Cf. conceptual revers~on above p. 168f and our discussion 
of God and general potentiality above p. 17lff. 
2. Ibid., p. 48. cr. ibid., pp. 63ft. 
3. "0'?':-above p. 175n. -
4. Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 
P• lti4. 
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1 apart from their exemplification in our experience. 
In these relational structures, eternal objects are seen 
as exhibiting grades of complexity, or multiple relations, 
extending from the grade of s~ple or zero complexity, e.g. 
a specific shade of blue considered merely as a relatum, to 
higher and higher grades of complexity, the complexity being 
determined by the amount of relatedness of its relata or the 
number of sub-patterns of complexity within it. Whitehead 
gives us an example: 
For example, consider the set of three eternal 
objects A, B, C, of which none is complex. Let us 
write R (A, B, C) for some definite possible related-
ness of A, B, c. To take a sLnple example, A, B, C 
may be three definite colours with the spatio-temporal 
relatedness to each other of three faces of a regular 
tetrahedron, anywhere at any time. Then R (A, B, C) 
is another eternal object of the lowest complex grade. 
Analogously th~re are eternal objects of successively 
higher grades. 
1. In this regard, Whitehead gives recognition to Greek 
philosophy, especially Plato, for emphasizing these 
distinguishable formal relations. "According to this 
tradition in so far as we abstract from our experience 
the brute particularity of happening here, and now, 
amid this envirorunent, there remains a residue with 
self-identities, differences, and essential inter-
connections, which seems to have no essential reference 
to the passage of events. According to this doctrine, 
as a result of this discard of the factor of transition 
we rivet our attention on the eternal realm of forms. 11 
Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought, pp. 92-93. 
~~itehead then goes on to critiCize the Platonic tradition 
which has considered this realm as "self-sustaining, 11 
"completely real," "perfection. 11 As we have seen White-
head holds that the forms are potentialities and as such 
have no significance absolutely apart from process. v¥hen 
we do consider them completely apart from process, they 
are "isolated." 
2. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 
p. 167. ------
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But there is a greater amount of connectedness exhibited 
than this. The various grades of complexity can be also seen 
to include sirr.pler grades as their components. Thus in regard 
to Whitehead's example above, there may be a higher grade of 
relational complexity including R (A, B, C) as a component. 
The relations between the grades are transitive and are 
analogous to the whole to part relation. These grades of 
complexity Whitehead calls "abstractive hierarchies." His 
description of an abstract hierarchy is as follows: 
We can now conceive the successive stages of 
a definite progress towards some assigned mode of 
abstraction from the realm of possibility,-rllVoTVing 
a progress (in thou~ht) through successive grades of 
increasing complexi y. I will call an1t such route 
of progress "an abstractive hierarchy. 1 Any abstractive 
hierarchy, fJ.nite or infinite, is based upon some 
definite group of simple eterna1 objects. This group 
will b~ called the "base 11 of the hierarchy. Thus 
the base of an abstractive ~ierarchy is a set of 
objects of zero complexity. 
Thus we can start from any complex set of eternal 
objects (called the "vertex" of our perspective) and by 
analysis follow the decreasing relational character of its 
components down to the grade of simple objects which is its 
"base. 11 What Whl.tehead is pointing to here can perhaps be 
illustrated in our perception of a painting. Given our 
"vertex" in regard to this painting, its abstract relational 
structure is analyzable into different degrees of complexity 
1. Ibid., p. 168. Italics mine. 
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of relations, or "sets," "patterns," of sensory data. The 
m1n~um relatedness would be just the sensory data considered 
as relata. In this abstract analysis we are merely cons1dering 
the painting from the po1nt of view of the mutual relations 
of its parts, not fran the point of view of 1ts emotional and 
- 1 cognitive ~pact on us as perc1p1ents. 
For our purposes, the italics added to the above 
quotation are extremely important. Whitehead regards 
abstractive hierarchies as abstract1ons from the realm of 
poss1b1l~t ies. 
It is to be noted that 1n deal1ng with 
hierarchies we are entirely within the realm 
of poss1bility. Accordingly the eternal 
objects are devo1d of real toget~erness; they 
rema1n wl. th1n their "isolation." 
For Wh1tehead, this 1ncludes even the 11al.mple n eternal 
objects for 1n this mode of analysl.s one is cons1dering a 
quality not 1n its individual essence but as t:~. "bare relatum." 
1. Thl.s mode of analysis, "coord1nate divl.sJ.on, u recel.ves 
greater and more deta1led treatment 1n Part IV of Process 
and Reall.l!· cr. espec1ally "extens1.ve connection. 
cr7 also fred North Wh1tehead, Modes of Thought, 
PP• 92ft. 
2. Alfred North Whl.tehead, Sc1ence and the MOdern World, 
p.l70. --
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"Hence A as in R (A, B, C) is more abstract than A sim-
pliciter. nl The "relational essences 11 of eternal objects 
are describable without necessary reference to their 
individual essences. In considering the mutual related-
ness of eternal objects we are considering eternal objects 
as "bare relata" only. 
The relationships of eternal object A, 
••• merely involve other eternal objects as 
bare relata without reference to their individual 
essences •••• To understand A is to understand 
the how of a general scheme of relationship. 
This scheme of relationship does not require 
the individual uni~ueness of other relata for 
its comprehem ion. 
1. Ibid., p. 168. In this connection, a comparison between 
~ahead and Bradley is interesting. For Whitehead, 
concrete relatedness is never a universal of relation 
connecting mere relata, R (A, B, c). In a concrete 
relation, as in prehension, it makes a difference what 
the relata are. He agrees with Bradley that "feeliiig"' 
avoids the distecta membra provided by abstraction. 
cr. Alfred Nor~h Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, P• 234. 
But Bradley in his discussion of relations forgets that 
he is considering them as abstractions. "Bradley's 
discussions of relations-are confused by his failure to 
distinguish between relations and contrasts. A relation 
is a genus of contrasts. He is then distressed -- or 
would have been distressed if he had not been consoled 
by the notion of 'mereness' as in 'mere appearance' --
to find that a relation will not do the work of a con-
trast." Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 
PP• 349-350. Bradley's negative view of relations as 
self-contradictory is the result of his failure to 
realize that they are abstractions from the connected-
ness of experience •. Accordingly, Part I of A;pearance 
and Reality is called "appearancett and "reali y" has to 
become a non-relational, all-inclusive, whole. 
2. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 
P• 166. Again, sensa perceptionYiOuTcrperhaps be the 
clearest example of what Whitehead means here. Our 
perception of 11 chair 11 would be a complex eternal object 
(footnote continued on following page) 
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Hence the eternal objects are significant of their 
relations, their patterns of connection, to other eternal 
objects but not to their individual essences •. All eternal 
objects considered in their relational essences are deter-
minate of their relations to others (given a vertex or 
perspective) but are indeterminate in regard to their 
individual essence and their relations to actual occasions. 
In this sense, then, the relational essences present us with 
patterns of connection, schemes of re la ti onships, of 
unspecified entities. 
But that eternal objects are determinate to their 
relations with other eternal objects is a point Whitehead 
emphasizes. R (A, B, C) is a definite relationship although 
we need not mention the individual essence of any of the 
other eternal objects. In other terms, vVhitehead allows for 
the possibility that we can and do refer to finite relation-
ships and that nature is divisible into a multiplicity of 
(footnote continued from preceding page) analyzable into 
hierarchies of different extensive structures having as 
its "base" specific sensa. The specific sensa are 
perceived as specific determinations of one relational 
complex, this complex being the "extensive continuum. 11 
nThe extensive continuum is that general relational 
element in experience whereby the actual entities 
experienced, and that unit experience itself, are 
united in the solidarity of one common world. The 
actual entities atomize it, and thereby make real what 
was antecedently merely potential. 11 Alfred North 
l:Vhitehead, Process ~ Reality, p. 112. 
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finite structures or hierarchies. He cites the principle 
for this. 
The difficulty inherent in the concept of 
finite internal relations among eternal objects 
is thus evaded by two metaphysical principles, 
(i) that the relationships of any eternal object 
A, considered as constitutive of A, merely 
involve other eternal objects as bare relata 
without reference to their individual essences, 
and (ii} that the divisibility of the general 
relationship of A into a multiplicity of finite 
relationships of A stands therefore in the 
essence of that eternal object. 
The relational essence of an eternal object need not 
require specific reference to any other eternal objects 
except those which are included, i.e. those which have only 
the requisite relational essence. \Ve can refer to particular 
groupings of eternal objects because these groupings need not 
include all eternal objects. Sense experience is perhaps the 
best illustration of this where 
we first fix at tent ion on some sensory detail. • • • 
We endeavour to lift into consciousness meaningful 
units, such as the whole picture, the whole building, 
the living animal, the stone, the mountain, the 
tree.2 
In connection with his pointing up the possibility of 
finite abstractive hierarchies, ~fuitehead goes on to give us 
an indication of how he conceives the relational essences in 
1. Alfred North \'Vnitehead, Scie nee and the Modern World, 
p. 166. 
2. Alfred North v'Vhitehead, Modes of Thought, pp. 169-170. 
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general. Let us quote in fUll here. 
rThe 7 relational essence is determinable 
by re1erence to that ;-eternal 7 object alone, 
and does not require reference-to any other 
objects, except those Which are specifically 
involved in its individual essence when that 
essence is complex •••• The meaning of the 
words "any" and "some 11 springs fro::n this 
principle -- that is to say, the mea..'1ing of 
the "variable" in logic. The whole principle 
is that a particular determination can be made 
of the how of some definite relationship of a 
definite-6ternal object A to a definite finite 
number n of other eternal objects, without any 
determination of the other n objects, Xl, X2, 
••• Xn, except that they have, each of them, 
the requisite status to play their respective 
parts in that multiple relationship. This 
principle depends on the fact that the relational 
essence of an eternal object is not unique to 
that object. The mere relational essence of each 
eternal object determines the complete uniform 
scheme of relational essences, since each object 
stands internally in all its possible relation-
ships.l 
His analogy to the notion of variables in logic is 
interesting here for it does seem that this is the way in 
which he is tt.tinking of the "reletional essences." Given 
any eternal object, 11x 11 , with tbe relational essence ,¢{x), 
we can, by analysis, indicate what must be the case about 
its formal relations to other eternal objects although we 
cannot tell by analysis alone whet "values" are assigned. 
conversely expressed, a variable (or a propositional function) 
can be looked upon as a potentis.l forrn for realization, or 
1. Alfred North Whit ahead, Science and the Modern World, 
p~ 165. 
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universals of reletion, whic:t is 11patient 11 for realization, 
such that when tbe varis.bles are given determination (values 
assigned) they coll:[)rise a specific proposition. Until the 
values are assigned the propositional function is an 
abstraction, they themselves "tell no tales" as to their 
ingression. But these purely formal relations can be 
distingu.ished and considered apart from their exemplification 
. . 1 ~n exper~ence. 
For Whitehead, then, it would seem that the relational 
essences of eternal objects present us with a matrix from 
which any specific set of relations are re a_liz able. The 
realm of eternal objects merely presents us with potential-
ities for division and hence possible relational orders. 
Any additional determination into this or that set of relE!.-
tions involves the decisions of actual occasions. 2 
1. Pure mathematics is representative of the attempt to 
do this: 11 It is a resolute attempt to go the whole 
way in the direction of complete analysis, so as to 
separate the elements of mere nw. t t er of fact from the 
purely abstract conditions which they exemplify. 11 
Ibid., p. 26. For example, "triplicity" is a 
recurrent 11form 11 which is expressible without &ny 
one particular kind of "matter of fact" being 
mentioned. 
2. Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 103ff. 
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It is in this sense of "potentialities for division" 
that Whitehead speaks of eternal objects of the objective 
species, the "mathematical platonic forms," as functioning 
as a "medium. tt As a "medium" 
the order of nature ••• exhibits itself as a 
morphological scheme involving eternal objects 
of the objective species •••• In this theory 
the notion of the atomicity of actual entities, 
each with its concrescent privacy, has been 
entirely limited. We a~ left with a theory 
of extensive connection. 
From the side of actual occasions, they are the "agents" 
that give a specific value to the general possibilities of 
relatedness expressed as the "realm" of eternal objects. 
Although the eternal objects are generally relevant to each 
occasion they receive added relevance because of the 
decisions of each occasion.2 The eternal objects have 
received added limitation for this occasion in virtue of 
the realizations of all of the occasions which form its 
past. 
1. Ibid., PP• 447-448. 
2. ~ is the distinction between general potentiality and 
real potentiality. Cf. above P• 143f. 
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The prime example of this "added limitation" is of 
course ~ spatio-tempor al relationships. 
Accordingly the spatio-temporal relationship, 
in terms of which the actual course of events is 
to be expressed, is nothing else than a selective 
limitation within the general systenmtic reletion-
ships among eternal objects. By "limitation, 11 
as applied to the spatio-temporal continuum, I 
mean those matter-of-fact determinations -- such 
as the three dimensions of space, and the four 
dimensions of the spatio-temporal continuum --
which are inherent in the actual course of events, 
but which present themselves as- arbitrary in 
respect to a more abstract possibility.l 
In respect to abstract possibility, there might have 
been other types of order than our four dimensional order 
made possible by the abstract scheme of extensive relations. 
But since this order has been derived from process these 
extensive relations, this order, "represent the systematic 
scheme which is involved in the ree.l potentiality from which 
every actual occssion arises. "2 Past occasions are objecti-
fied for the present with their own retention of these 
extensive relationships. 
This extensive continuum is one relational 
complex in which all potential objectifications 
find their niche •••• ~It 7 is not a fact 
prior to the world; it is the first determination 
of order -- that is, of real potentiality -- ~ 
arising out of the general character of the world.'-' 
1. Alfred North Vmit ehead, Science and the IYiodern World, 
p. 161. Cf. ibid., p. 166. Cf.A'Ifred North Whitehead, 
Adventures of-rdeas, pp. 190ff, 203. 
2. Alfred Nortn'Nhitehead, Process and Re[dity, p. 441. 
3. Ibid., p. 103. Cf. ibid., P• 14~ 
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What this me 8!1S in regard to the eternal objects is 
that they, in their individuHl essences, rem&in as isoleted, 
as a sheer multiplicity. There is no one structure or order 
in eternal objects taken by themselves. Nor does it seem 
that there is any one particul~:~r order in the "realm" of 
eternal objects. God regulates their mutual relatedness in 
accordance with His consequent nature which is dependent upon 
I 
actual occasions thereby allowing possibilities to be effective 
relevant to that actual wor ld. 1 He confronts what is actual 
with what is possible for it. God is not the creative order 
but is the ground for its possibility. He allows possibili-
ties of order. 
The immanence of God gives reason for the 
belief that pure chaos is intrinsically impos-
sible. At the other end of the scale, the 
in@ensity of the world negatives the belief 
that any state of order can be so established 
that beyond it there can be no progress.2 
Any particulor order is derivativ"'B from the prehensive 
relations among actual occasions and, in abstraction from 
these, they form the 11real 11 potentiality which must be t&ken 
account of in the future. There might have been, e_nd may be, 
other orders, other added 1 imitations. No particular order 
can exclude the possibility that there might have been other 
orders. 
1. Cf. above p. 180ft. 
2. Ibid., p. 169. 
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There is no totality which is the harmony 
of all perfections. Wnatever is realized in 
any one occasion of experience necessarily 
excludes the unbounded welter of contrary pos-
sibilities. There are alwe.ys 11 others, 11 which 
might have been and are not .1 
Any order is dependent upon the sustaining of certain 
uniformities or repetition of patterns on the part of actual 
occasions.2 
But there is order as i:mLJ.enent in e.nd between occasions. 
There are mutual relations and patterns of mutual relations 
discernible within concrescent process. The order the world 
exhibits is not an imposition from without. The order is 
immanent. For example, the "laws of nature: 11 
None of these Laws of Nature gives the 
slightest evidence of necessity. They are the 
modes of procedure which within the scale of 
our observation do in fact prevail •••• 
There is no necessity in any of these ways of 
behavior. They exist as average, regulative 
conditions because the majority of actualities 
are swaying each other to modes of inter-
connections exen~lifying those laws.3 
Nor, against Kant, is "order 11 legislated by the mind, 
but is a structure exhibited in concrete experience. Our 
relational schema, our notions of space-t:ilr..e, are not then 
conditions for the possibility of experience. 1Ne have 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Alfred North VIJhitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 275. 
Italics mine. -------
Hence, the importance of "societies." Cf. ebove p. 158f. 
Alfred North Vfhitehead, Modes of Thou~t, pp. 211-212. 
Cf. also Alfred North Vfuitehead; Adveri:ures of Ideas, 
Chs. 7 and 8. ---
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experience and our conceptual schemas are abstractions 
from this experience "in terms of which every element of 
1 
our experience can be interpreted." Philosophy should 
"seek the forms in the facts. "2 
iii. Particular Facts of Relatedness 
The order or pattern derivative from concrescent 
processes in the past represents an added l~1itation upon 
general potentiality giving some additional relevance to 
some eternal objects for the present occasion. They 
constitute the present occasion's "actual world." From the 
standpoint of concrescent occasfuns, Whitehead calls this 
actual world the "objective lure" for that occasion. 3 The 
"objective lure" includes those eternal objects already 
realized and also those not realized by past occasions but 
relevant to this concrescence.4 Thus each occasion includes 
some grasp of both general potentiality and real potentiality. 
By its own "graded envisagment 115 and integration this actual 
1. Alfred North 'Nhitehead, ~recess and Reality, p. 4. 
Whitehead compares his notion of-uie extensive continuum 
with that of Kant 1 s view of space and says that it is 
like Kant 1 s "form of intuition 11 in some respects but 
11 it is derived from the actual world qua datU1ll, and 
thus is not 'pure' in Kant's sense of-rliat term. It 
is not producti-re of the ordered world, but is derivative 
from it." Ibid., p. 112. 
2. Ibid., p. 3o:--
3. cr:-ibid., pp. 131, 281, 334ff. 
4. Cf. above Conceptual Reversion, p. 168ff. 
5. cr. above p. 196. 
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occasion adds to the future its own ordering of possibilities. 
But as we have seen, what the occasion does with its data 
depends fundamentally upon its aim. It is in virtue of its 
aim, its immanent teleology, that the occasion brings to 
focus all its data into one integral satisfaction.1 This 
"bringing to focus" !! the process of concrescence itself 
and it signifies a concrete unity, not a mere imitation of 
forms. The actual occasions are constituted by its pre-
hens i ve relations. 2 But it is the aim which defines the 
pattern or mode of togetherness of eternal objects. It is 
in virtue of the aim at intensity and satisfaction that 
eternal objects have a definite structure or order. 
The notion of "order" is bound up with 
the notion of an actual entity as involving an 
attainment which is a specific satisfaction.3 
But as we have seen, Whitehead holds that the actual 
occasion is not merely a collection of abstract characters 
but represents a real mingling of forms.4 For Whitehead, 
each occasion is an instance of the togetherness of the 
individual essences of eternal objects. 
In contrast to the realm of possibility 
the inclusion of eternal objects within an actual 
occasion means that in respect to some of their 
possible relationships there-is a togetherness 
of their individual essences.5 
1. Cf. above p~ l92f. 
2. Cf. above p. 196f. 
3. Ibid., p. 129. Cf. above p. 209. 
4. cr.-above p. l98f. 
5. Alfred North Whitehead, Science ~~ ~ MOdern World, 
P• 165. 
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The actual occasions represent a real togetherness of 
the forms. Eternal objects are really immanent in concrescent 
occasions. They are "present" in the occasions as forms of 
definiteness.1 The eternal objects have real ingression into 
the occasion. Whitehead's doctrine of prehensions, which he 
defined as "concrete facts of relatedness," is an attempt to 
2 
show how this is possible. The prehensive relation involves 
eternal objects which make a difference, are internally 
related, to the prehensive unity of the occasion. 
This was particularly true in regard to the aspect of 
prehensions called "subjective form" where, as we saw, a 
quality can make a difference to the real internal constitu-
tion of the occasion. 3 In "subjective ingression,'' eternal 
objects may function as forms of definiteness qualifying the 
subjective form of the occasion. 
As we saw, it was by reason of prehension, or, more 
specifically, subjective ingression and dative ingression 
of the same eternal object, that Whitehead explains how 
1. But see our discussion of· 11being present in," or 
objectification, above, p. 140. 
2. Of. above p.l32ff. 
3. Of. above on conformal feeling, p. l50ff. 
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mutual immanence is possible.1 The relational function 
of qualities, conformal feelings, and objectification all 
contri"oute to \Vhitehead' s explanation of how there can be 
concrete facts of relatedness, prehensions and nexus. 2 
But there is another type of relatedness other than 
prehensions and nexus which we have yet to mention and which 
is particularly relevant to our discussion of relatedness 
here. This type of relatedness is what vVhitehead calls a 
"contrast, 11 which he defines as nModes of Synthesis of 
Entities in One Prehension. 113 
In a contrast, eternal objects can be together in the 
objective datum of a prehension in such a way that the 
individual essence of the eternal objects make it that 
definite relation. As a contrast it has a unity of its own 
that makes it that particular fact of relatedness as realized 
by the occasion. 
Whitehead gives us an example in Process and Reality of 
the contrast between red and blue as not repeatable as that 
contrast between any other pair of colors. That contrast as 
a datum for feeling has a unity as felt wherein the individual 
1 • Cf • above p • 152f • 
2. cr. above p.l55. cr. also nexus above p.l58. 
3. Alfred North 'Nhitehead, Process and Reality, p. 33. 
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essences of each of the colors, or relata, affect this 
1 
relation. 
Whitehead's doctrine of prehensions, nexus, and 
contrasts are ways Whitehead has of maintaining that there 
are relations vvhich are particular and real; that these 
11modes of syntheses" have a unity and particularity of their 
own. 
Universals of relations are abstractions from these 
concrete facts of relatedness. Thus Whitehead holds that 
"what are ordinarily termed 'relations' are abstractions 
2 
from contrasts." 
This point of Whitehead's about "relations" as 
derivative is clearly brought out elsewhere. 
1. 
2. 
It is generally held that relations are 
universals, so that A can have the same relation 
to B as C has to D. For example "loving, tt 
"believing, 11 "between," "greater than,'' are 
relations. There can be no objection to this 
doctrine. For it is a mere definition. Universals 
which require two or more particulars for their 
illustration need some term to indicate them, and 
Relation is the word chosen. 
But wit~ this meaning to the term, a relation 
cannot signify the actual connectedness of the 
actual individual things which constitute the 
Cf. ibid., p. 399. Thus the synthesis could not be 
fully-characterized as R (A, B). Cf. above p. 219. 
Perhaps another example could be used here. In 
music, the relation between, say, the notes "en and 
11G11 can be described in many ways (even mathematically 
as the Pytha§oreans were fond of pointing out). But 
the notes 11 C and "G 11 as contrasted, as grasped together, 
is that particular contrast with a unity as felt. The 
particular qualities of the notes make it that fact of 
relatedness. As grasped, as experienced, it represents 
a real togetherness of the individual essences of the 
notes. 
Ibid., P• 349. 
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actual course of history. For example, New York 
lies between Boston and Philadelphia. But the 
connectedness of the three towns is a real par-
ticular fact on the earth's surface involving a 
particular part of the eastern seaboard of the 
United States. It is not the universal "between." 
It is a complex actual fact which, among other 
things, exemplifies the abstract universal 
11 betweenness." 
This consideration is the basis of Bradley's 
objection that relations do not relate. Three 
towns and an abstract universal are not three 
connectld t~ins. A doctrine of connectedness is 
wanted. 
Implicit in Whitehead's doctrine of real facts of 
togetherness, of the real mingling of forms, is also his 
rejection of the class theory of universals. Again, in 
connection with his discussion of contrasts, he says that 
his doctrine of contrasts 
is the doctrine of real unities being more than 
a mere collective disjunction of component ele-
ments. This doctrine has the same ground as the 
objection to the class -theory of particular 
substances.2 
Because of the very nature of a ttclass, 11 it cannot 
give to its members any requisite diversity of status. 
nThe members of a class are diverse members in virtue of 
mere logical dis junction. "3 Class analysis is not capable 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 231. 
Cf. above p. 20ln, 222n. ---
Alfred North Vf~itehead, Fro~ and Reality, p. 349. 
Ibid., p. 348. 
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of representing the complex unities of actual occasions 
which are never a mere aggregate of characters. Occasions 
exhibit concrete syntheses of internal relations where 
eternal objects function differently in regard to each 
1 
occasion. The genus and species analysis is adequate for 
some purposes but is not adequate f~ expressing concrete 
unities, a real mingling of forms characteristic of occasions 
and nexiis. 2 
But this is not to say that we must think of the 
11universal 11 as "concrete." As we saw above, Whitehead means 
by the "translucency of realization" of eternal objects that 
they are ~determinate only in regard to their relations to 
actual occasions. Taken in themselves, eternal objects are 
3 determinate and in this sense "particular." Concrescence 
is not a description of how eternal objects become more 
determinate but a description of how their relations to 
occasions become determinate. The "mingling of genera" 
expressive of concrete unities is not from the standpoint 
1. cr. above, the category of objective diversity, p. 200n. 
Much of Whitehead's criticism against the class analysis 
is the same as Blanshard's criticism of the "abstract 
universal" where the universal and its instance are 
conceived to be externally related. Cf. above p. 78ff. 
2. Whitehead's rejection of the Aristotelian classificatorY. 
analysis is one reason he uses the term "eternal object 1 
and not ttuni versal. 11 Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, 
Science and the Modern World, PP• 170f. Cf. also 
Alfred North-wliitehead, Adventures of Ideas, PP• 157ff, 
275. --
3. Ct. above P• 212. 
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of eternal objects themselves, but only as in the formal 
constitutions of occasions. 
This is expressed in Science ~ ~ Modern World by 
Whitehead's stating that the relation which holds between 
the asymmetrical eternal objects and the occasions are 
internal as regards the actual occasions but external as 
regards the eternal objects.1 
1. Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 
pp. 160-161. Cf. above P• 214. AS wa-s aw above, 
Whitehead insists upon both the transcendence and 
immanence of eternal objects. cr. above p. 210f. 
How relationships can be external in regard to the 
eternal object and internal in regard to the actual 
occasion is difficult to see at first. It would seem 
that the relation Whitehead has in mind here is the 
one implied in the distinction between "formn and 
"function." 
That Whitehead does seem to conceive of the 
relation between eternal objects and actual occasions 
in this way would seem to be indicated. He does use 
the term ttrunctioning" for 11 ingres sion" throughout 
Process and Reality. Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, 
Process and Reali£~ PP• 38, 249, 251, 445. Whitehead, 
In this regard, ad an interesting qualification when 
talking about how novelty is introduced into the world. 
"That member of the locus has introduced a new form 
into the actual world; or at least, an old form in a 
new function. tt Ibid., p. 284. A form may have different 
functions in different occasions and still be that form. 
Moreover, a form could have different functions in the 
same occasion (e.g. subjective functions and objective 
functions in conformal feeling). 
But of course we must be careful to not impute the 
"functioning" to eternal objects themselves. They are 
the forms which are realized £l occasions. Perhaps 
Whitehead's use of the term "variable 11 corrects the 
danger of imputing activity to eternal objects. At 
this stage or study, this writer sees no contradiction 
in thinking of the relation between eternal objects and 
actual occasions as the "form-function" relation or the 
"variable-instance" relation. If not, then Whitehead 
has an interesting attempt at a solution to Plato's 
problem of "participation" in the Parmenides. 
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Sheer analysis exhibits only the relational essences 
of eternal objects; in analysis we remain in the realm of 
possibility. In an important passage where Whitehead is 
talking about philosophic method he says: 
There can be no descent from a mere genus 
to a particular fact, or to a species. For facts 
and species are the product of the mingling of 
genera. No genus in its own essence indicates 
the other genera with which it is compatible • 
• • • Thus no contemplation of the genus verte-
brate taken by itself, can suggest mammals or 
fishes, even as abstract possibilities. Neither 
the species nor the instance are to be discovered 
by the genus alone, since both include forms not 
11gi ven" by the genus. A species is a potential 
mingling of genera, and an individual instance 
involves among ofher things, an actual mingling 
of many species. 
Although Whitehead does hold that eternal objects 
cannot be grasped apart from its differentiations, he does 
not maintain that the "grasp of the universal" carries the 
grasp of the species with it. An eternal object, as in the 
realm of possibility, may indicate its abstract relational 
essence, but it indicates nothing of its relations to the 
individual essences of other eternal objects. The "mingling" 
of the forms does not happen by virtue of the "genus" itself 
but only by virtue of actual occasions of experiencing. 
The relation between eternal objects and actual 
occasions is a relation of potentiality to actuality but 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 236. 
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the actualization is done in virtue of the occasion. Eternal 
objects are not uundeveloped, 11 they are pure potentialities; 
the development, the activity, is on the part of experience. 
ttThis synthesis is a limitation of realization but not of 
1 
content.u 
The creativity is the actualization of 
potentiality, and the process of actualization 
is an occasion of experiencing.2 
No things are tttogether" except in 
experience; and no things are, in any sense 
of "are," except as components in experience 
or as immediacies of process which are 
occasions in self-creation.3 
For Whitehead, the business of philosophy is to explain 
the abstraction as arising from the more concrete. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
It is a complete mistake to ask how 
concrete particular fact can be built up 
out of universals. The answer is, 'In no 
way. 1 • • • 
Philosophy is explanatory of abstrac-
tion, and not of concreteness •••• Each 
fact is more than its forms, and each form 
'participates' throughout the world of facts. 
The definiteness of fact is due to its forms; 
but the individual fact is a creature, and 
creativity is the ultimate behind all forms, 
inexplicable by forms, and conditioned by 
its creatures.~ 
Alfred North Whitehead, Science and ~ ~~ World, 
P• 162. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, P• 181. 
Ibid., P• 237. 
AI?red North Whitehead, Process ~Reality, P• 30. 
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5. A Summary of Exper1ence and 
Order in Wh1tehead 
For Whitehead, our analys1s of exper~ence must beg~ 
with exper~ence ~n its broadest sense and not with sense-
perception per ~· The basic princ~ple is creativ~ty, the 
process of actual~zation, to be conce1ved of as "drops" of 
exper~ence, occasions of exper1enc~ng. Each occasion is a 
functional act~v~ty, a concrescent process of unif1cation and 
sl.lllplification, an activity wh~ch has as its base "feeling" 
or what Whitehead calls "physical prehens~on." The actual 
occas~ons are predom~nantly feeling centers, their essential 
d~fferences being made up of the way in which they feel and 
are related to their environment. These relations are their 
prehens~ons. Prehens~ons are the concrete facts of related-
ness; consc~ous sense perception is a derivative phase from 
these more basic felt relations. 
An integral part of Whitehead's doctr~e of prehension, 
and hence his account of how occas1ons are related, is h~s 
theory of objectification. In object1f1cation there is no 
unmediated presence of the object in the subject. The pre-
hens~ve relation is referential and 1nvolves selective elimin-
ation. Objectification functions for Wh1tehead as an 
explanation of how what is settled and actual in the past 
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becomes the "real potential~ty," the cond~t~oned potential~ty, 
for the present. Thus we s~w Wh~tehead's theory of eternal 
objects, forms of def~1teness, requ1red even on this pr1mary 
level as realized determinants of past actualities. In 
objectification, the eternal objects function datively as 
elements of the datum of a feeling. The past is prehended 
v1a the eternal objects; physlcal prehens1ons are med1ated by 
eternal objects. 
Another 1mportant prehens1ve relat1on 1s conformal feeling. 
Eternal objects not only introduce the past but also ma~e real 
connections between actual occas~ons poss~ble. Eternal objects 
may also have subject~ve ~gress1on by virtue of wh~ch, in 
objectif1cation, the present "1nher~ts 11 a character from the 
past and 1n turn passes it on to the future. Subjective 1n-
gress~on coupled with dative ingress1on means for Wh~tehead 
that eternal objects wh~ch are the forms of definiteness of 
the actual occasior.s in the past may become, in objectif1cation, 
the elements determ~n~g the defin1teness of the subjective 
forms of the present occasion. The identical element effecting 
the connection between object and subject 1s form, the eternal 
object. The ~ of feeling reproduces what is felt. In th1s 
sense the objects may be sa~d to be function~g "relationally." 
For Whitehead, there is th~s partial re-enaction of form 
in each occas~on where the past is synthesized with the present. 
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This mutual immanence of occasions ~s the mechanism by wh~ch 
Vfuitehead expla~ns the continuity of the past with the present, 
e.g. causation, and memory. More important here, the relational 
function of qualities, conformal feelings, and objectification 
all contribute to Wh~tehead's explanation of how order is pos-
sible, how there can be concrete facts of relatedness, prehen-
s~ons and nexus. For Whitehead, any order is described in 
terms of the display of a certa~n pattern of eternal objects 
which is shared, re-enacted, by succeeding occasions. The 
eternal objects are the recurrent types uniformly exhibited 
as ~anent in the processes of realization. They are the 
defining character~stics of that set of occasions. Order, 
relationships between occasions, exist to the extent to which 
certain forms dominate. The reasons for the order are to be 
found in the nature of actual occasions and the ways in which 
they are objectified for each other. 
Although its physical prehens~ons are bas~c and or~ginative, 
the actual occasion need not be merely recept~ve. The occasion 
is not necessarily conf~ned to those poss~bilities g~ven to it 
by its physical inher~tance. An actual occasion is also made 
up of its conceptual appetitions involv~g indeterminate 
possibilities. Each occasion has a "mental pole" wh~ch, in 
conceptual prehens~on, may realize relevant possibilities not 
physically inherited. Conceptual valuation is an aspect of 
each occas~on which lllvolves the assessment of potentialities 
for realization, the grad~ng of potentiality, li1 accordance 
w~th its aim. The teleological character of each occasion is 
central. 
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But mere reiteration of pattern is not the sufficient 
cond1tion for what, for Wh~tehead, is the central aim of the 
occasion, viz. its aim at ~ntensity, intrinsic value. Some 
contrast is needed. The intens~ty a~med at is mainly 
characterized by Vfhitehead as aesthetic, which involves a 
realization of contrasts and novelty under identity, a diversity 
and unity in balanced contrast. In Whitehead's important cate-
gory of Conceptual Revers1on, the real~zation of proximate 
novelties, is due to the aim at complexity as one condition 
for intensity of exper~ence. 
In answer to the question of how unrealized potentialities 
can be relevant, how actual occasions can grasp proximate 
novelties not deriving from their phys1cal prehensions, White-
head maintains that this is accounted for by God's Primordial 
conceptual realization. God prov1des the general relevance 
of abstract potentialities to actual occasions. Apart from 
God's Pr1mordial Nature, the eternal objects would exhibit no 
general order. God does not originate the eternal objects but 
His Primordial Nature does establish their general relevance to 
process. He is the ground of unrealized potentialities and 
hence prov~des for creat~vity the general cond1tions for its 
real~zation. Because of God there is the general fact of 
systematic mutual relatedness in the character of general 
possibility thereby sett1ng the stage for ~ ordered course 
of events. He is the Primordial Limitation upon unbounded 
potentiality wh1ch furn1shes the general cond1 tiona for some 
process of realization. 
God in His full nature also regulates and restructures 
the mutual relatedness of possib1lities in accordance with 
His consequent nature thereby allowing possibil1ties, ideals, 
to be effective to this actual world. God furnishes the lure 
of ideal possib~lities to stimulate the occas1on 1 s particular 
organization of its relevant data. God presents a novelty and 
evokes a response toward ~t. In this sense, God is the source 
of the subjective aim of each occasion. God's aim is not 
toward order ~ ~ but toward the maximum value, intensity, 
realizable by each occasion. 
Although the relational function of eternal objects is 
the mechanism by wh1ch Wh1tehead expla1ns how order and 
connection between occas~ons are possible, it is the subjective 
aim, the ~anent teleological character of the occasions, 
that explains. why this or that order, this or that pattern of 
eternal objects, dominates. The reasons for order are to be 
found in the character of the actual entities which bring to 
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focus all the relevant data ~nto one ~tegral pattern of 
feel1ng. The al.Ill ~s the 11 prmc1ple of select~on'' of the 
actu~l occas1on which br~ngs to unity its complex prehens~ve 
relat~ons. It is the aim at aesthet~c sat~sfaction wh~ch also 
establ1shes the categorial obl~gations wh1ch are, ~n Whitehead, 
aesthetic requ1rements for intensity. The a~m def1nes how the 
forms may ~ngle. 
But the actual occas1ons are no~ only a synthes~s of 
eternal objects, not only a collect1on of abstrac~ characters. 
With its sat~sfact~on achieved, the occasion ~s now a def1nite 
settled fact w~th consequences which condit~on the future. 
The satisfaction represents its completion as an intrins~c 
fact, a concrete un1ty of those conditions set for it by its 
past occasions (physical prehens~ons), those potent~al~ties 
it may realize (conceptual prehensions), and its ow.n creative 
decis~on as an instance of creat1v~ty. 
A more closely analyzed account of vVh1tehead 1 s doctr~e 
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of eternal objects and of the way in which they are and are not 
ordered and related reveals that, for Wh~tehead, the eternal 
objects are essentially possible forms of def1n1teness for 
actual1ty. Eternal objects and actual occasions are fundamental 
to Whitehead's position. We can d~scuss these forms of deflnite-
ness apart from any particular mode of ingression but not apart 
from their general relation to actual1ty -- complete abstractlon 
iS impOSSlble. 
But abstraction is possible and, when abstractly regarded 
as "relational essences," eternal objects do have an analytic 
character. They are capab.Le of d~v~sion into a number of 
d~fferent abstract structures and abstractive hierarch~es. 
The relational essences of eternal objects present us with 
patterns of connection, schemes of rela. tionsh~p, but of only 
unspecified en tit ie s. 
Whitehead would not want us to confuse these abstract 
relations with the relatedness of eternal objects as realized 
deternunants. Eternal objects "m~gle u not in virtue of their 
own natures but only in virtue of the concrescent occasions 
themselves. rt is the subjective aJ.m which determines how the 
forms may mJ.ngle g~ven the general conditions supplied by God 
and the conditions supplied to the occasion by its past occa-
sions. There is no one structure or order intrinsic to the 
eternal objects taKen by themselves. Any particular order has 
its reasons in the prehensive relations among actual entities. 
There alwa.ys might have been other orders. 
247 
CHAPTER III COMPARISONS AND EVALUATION 
1. The Genesis of Order in Experience 
Many of the differences between Blanshard and Whitehead 
in regard to their views of experience are, of course, 
determined by their interests and aims. Blanshard 1 s interests 
are mainly epistemological; metaphysics is called upon only to 
extricate him from difficulties encoun·tered in epistemology. 
Whitehead's interest at this phase in his philosophic develop-
ment is in metaphysics, and his position is that an adequate 
metaphysical scheme should and does account for the traditional 
difficulties encountered in epistemology.1 These differences 
in views and aims are expressed in the place and function each 
gives to immediate experience. 
i. The Function of Immediate Experience for Blanshard 
Blansherd 1 s analysis of immediate experience is an 
analysis from an avowed specific standpoint. What is of 
most interest for Blanshard are those factors in immediate 
experience which exhibit characteristics of the thought 
processes. What is relevant in immediate experience are those 
1. This was Whitehead's conviction even in his early period 
when he felt that the synthesis of the knower and the 
known should be left to metaphysics. Cf. Alfred North 
Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, (Ann Arbor: The 
University or-Michigan Press, 1957}, p. 28. (First 
published in 1920: Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press}. 
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factors which can be used to explain how sense perception 
arises from immediate experience.1 Blanshard is concerned 
to show that immediate experience exhibits characteristics 
which are capable of being ordered. He has an interest in 
immediate experience only in so far as it indicates how the 
ideal of system, or order, is implicit within experience. 
Thinking evinces this order from its rudimentary beginnings 
in perception to its achievement of systematic insight in 
understanding. ~ Nature 2!_ Thought is one total argument 
for this one notion of system or order. 
As we saw above, sensation and feeling as factors in 
immediate experience receive little emphasis in Blanshard's 
early chapters.l The status of sensation is that it lies at 
the "nether limit" of sense perception. Initial experience 
is represented as having various elements, emotional and 
affective, but these elements are given little emphasis and 
function by Blanshard. 
Blanshard is well aware of the complexity to be found 
in immediate experience. He recognizes affective and 
emotional factors with their differing intensities and 
sensations which gain prominence because of their repetition 
in various contexts and relations. But Blanshard does little 
with these elementary differences and structures because, on 
this level, there is no ttperception, 11 ideas, or memory.2 
1. Cf. abo~ P• 6ff. 
2. Cf. above P• 7ff, lOn. 
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The main reason ror Blanshard's lack of emphasis upon 
these factors in sensation is their lack or distinctness. 
On the level of sensation and feeling, we are not taking 
anything for anything and hence are below the level of per-
ceiving. None of these factors are perceived as an instance 
of a universal. In sensation there is no recognition of 
universals as universals. These differences among sensations 
are not distinctions as such and hence lack cognitive 
significance. For Blanshard 
to be different and to be distinguished are not 
the same •••• One cannot distinguish anything 
until one has perceived it as this rather than 
that. • • • Distinctness or-characters from 
each other and the use of univirsals as universals 
have their beginning together. 
Because of Blanshard's emphasis upon distinctness and 
conscious recognition, the function of immediate experience 
in our coming to know is given a small role. In so far as 
an experience is distinct, it is no longer immediate.2 
In other words, Blanshard is well aware of the 
presence of feeling-meaning in immediate experience but 
rejects its significance because it does not involve our 
explicit notice or recognition and the possibility of error.3 
The feeling-meaning, affective and emotional, does not lend 
itself to exhibit the kind of structure thought has as its 
1. Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. I, P• 64. 
Quoted above p. 12.'" 
2. Cf. above P• 13. 
3. Cf. ~·~ P• 70. 
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immanent end. In fact it does not involve "knowledge" at 
all. It is below the level of mediation. Immediate experience 
is that out of which knowledge arises, it is the setting in 
which thought functions. Its function is to be the locus of 
specific factors which serve as "data 11 for perceptual meaning. 
Blanshard's main interest from then on is upon this meaning 
as it shows itself in our conscious perception of objects. 
Blanshard's analysis begins from a conscious, intro-
spective attitude designed to determine the clear, distinct 
elements in experience apart from sensuous, emotional, and 
subjective reactions. His approach is designed to exhibit 
the clear data of sensations which are lifted into focus by 
analysis. Not unlike Plato in his early period, the pr ima.ry 
contrast for Blanshard is between the universal element 
clearly open to the understanding and the sensible world 
which does not "participate" with any exact clarity. 
Because of Bla.nshard' s epistemological approach, he also 
has us begin from the sentient aspect of experience as such 
apart from any assertion or assumption as to the nature of the 
object, i.e. apart from any assertion as to the ontological 
grounds for these sentient experiences. Blanshard' s emphasis 
is upon the meaning of experience in isolation from what the 
experiences are or. By ttexperience" he emphasizes the content 
of consciousness and is careful not to make any commitment as 
to its referent. Later on we find that the criterion of 
reality is determined by something other than factors or 
structures found in immediate experience per ~· 
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ii. The Function of Immediate Experience for Whitehead 
Whitehead's general approach is in opposition to the 
assumptions and procedures of Blanshard. By "inmlediate 
experience" Whitehead includes in one complex both sentient 
experience and the reference of this experience to something 
other. He starts from a broader base, his main point being 
that if a doctrine of connectedness is to be had, immediate 
experience itself must be seen as a derived perspective. 
The connectedness of the immediate present with the past 
suggests categories of connectedness applicable to all 
occasions. 
The criterion of significance or meaning is not our grasp 
of universals and relations as universals and relations: this 
conscious level is already a highly developed abstraction. 
Whitehead refers us to a level below that of the knower-known 
relation characteristic of traditional epistemological 
theories. Immediate experience as illustrated in feeling 
or the prehensive relation is rich in structure and depth as 
Blanshard recognized, but it is here in immediate experience 
and not on the conscious conceptual level that we find the 
requisite connectedness.1 
It is interesting to note in this regard that the 
principles mentioned by Blanshard in regard to the analysis 
1. Cf. above p. 132ff. 
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of experience would be given a different interpretation by 
Whitehead. Blanshard admonishes us not to confuse first 
reactions with first experiences, e.g. the withdrawal of the 
1 hand, a bodily reaction, with the feeling of pain. The 
point that Whitehead wishes to emphasize in his doctrine of 
prehensions is that first reactions~ first experiences. 
The occasion is predominantly a feeling center and its dif-
ferences are made up of the way in which it feels and reacts 
to its environment. The way in which it feels and its vectoral 
character are antecedent to and factors in higher and more 
distinct phases of experience. 
Hence, "prehension" is used in place of conscious per-
caption to denote the primary facts of relatedness of an 
occasion to other occasions which form its past and to 
relevant eternal objects. Conscious perception, an awareness 
of universals ~universals, is a derivative conceptual phase 
from these basic relations. Each occasion is a functional 
activity, a concrescent process of realization whose main 
characteristic is feeling, what Whitehead calls "physical 
2 prehension." 
Both Blanshard and Whitehe~d are adverse to confusing 
what is analytically simplest with what is historically first. 
Both are aware of the danger of taking as their starting point 
1. Cf. above P• 7-8. 
2. Cf. above p. 132ff. 
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isolated sensa and accounting for their relations and their 
organization as a composition externally imposed on these 
isolated units.1 Blanshard goes on to account for their 
various modes of organization in terms of what is implied 
in his analysis of perception, conception, and our attempt 
to understand. Whitehead's point is that Hume's impressions 
are derivative from, are "registrations" of, more primitive 
physical feelings. The diversification of these basal feeling 
processes in immediate experience gives rise to those dis-
tinctions and relations in virtue of which thought operates. 
They are to be seen as abstractions from the experienced 
2 
fact as felt. 
As pointed to above, Whitehead's view of immediate 
experience is similar 1n many respects to F. H. Bradley's 
view. Experience is a felt unity, a diversity in unity, 
containing emotional and volitional factors which remain 
when relational consciousness develops within it. 3 But 
unlike Bradley, Whitehead does not draw the conclusion that 
abstract, relational thought brings us, in every case, if 
taken as reality, "appearance," and that reality must be, to 
4 be consistent, a "supra-relational" whole. Whitehead would 
1. Cf. above P• 8n, 139n. 
2. Cf. above on the origin of conceptual prehensions, p.l63ff. 
3. cr. above p. 133, 166. 
4. Cf. Francis H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 494. 
Part I of Appearance and Reality represents an effective 
argument against the very tendency Blanshard and White-
head are trying to overcome, viz. the early empiricist 
tendency to conceive of the data of consciousness as 
isolated units. Bradley has a very effective way of 
showing that if all the structures and relations are (footnote continued on following page} 
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not go the Whole way with Bradley in his view of relations 
and thought, but Whitehead's appeal to pre hens ion and 
feeling is an attempt to ground relational thought in 
experience. The function of prehension is to establish 
connection, to navoid the disjecta membra provided by 
1 
abstraction. 11 
Whitehead recognized, in his use of immediate experience, 
his resemblance to William James also. 2 Like the latter's 
"radical empiricism," Whitehead's view is away from the 
earlier Humeian conception of experience as made up of simple 
and discreet sensations that had to be put together by infer-
red conceptual relations. Like James, Whitehead's view is 
toward finding relations, structure, and even objective 
reference within experience itself.3 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
brought to experience by abstract relational thought 
which, for Bradley, always involves contradiction, 
then empiricism of this sort does lead to skepticism. 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, P• 234. 
On Whitehead's criticism of BradleyTS view of relations, 
cf. a'b.ove; p. 222n, 235f. 
2. Cf. ibid., P• 231. 
3. Cf. WIII"iam James, Essays in Radical EmPiricism, 
{New York: Longmans, Green-& co., Inc., 1912), 
especially Ch. II. This similarity does not imply, 
as it sometimes seems to do in James' discussions of 
mysticism, that knowledge is of the immediate type 
or that immediate experience, per se, affords us a 
privileged access to reality. ------
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iii. Comparison 
Both Blanshard and Whitehead point to experience as 
in some sense a felt complex wherein perception takes place. 
Both reject as a starting point the view of experience as 
of only bare sense particulars. We are not confined to 
transient particulars, impressions ere not the whole story. 
Both insist that universals, as conditions for recognition 
and relations, are there. 
But because of their two approaches we find that their 
starting points really indicate two meanings of the term 
"experience." 
Blanshard's interest is mainly upon the content of 
consciousness apart from any assertion as to the ontological 
ground for this content. This is to say that Blanshard does 
not in his early chapters make any clear distinction between 
three aspects of experience: (a) the content of consciousness; 
(b) that to which this content refers; and (c) the act of 
judgment.1 Explicit metaphysical assertions about that to 
which this content refers only come later as his epistemological 
account of the relation between idea (content) and object 
becomes explicit. His procedure is to ask, what must this 
content refer to (its "transcendent endn) if our account is 
to be intelligible, if we are to ground perceptual inference, 
1. As we shall see later, Blanshard does not draw a clear 
distinction between (a) and {c). Cf. below P• 268. 
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and if we are to account for the movement and pattern of 
reflection? 
Blanshard's use of immediate experience is to have it 
serve as a locus for factors which can and do serve as data, 
as providing the elements necessary for perceptual recognition. 
That these elements, taken as the content of consciousness, 
exhibit order is indicated in the course of his analysis of 
the process of perception and thinking. Immediate experience 
itself is below mediation -- there is no mediation, no 
ideality, on this level. 
Whitehead's meaning of the term "experience" is much 
broader. Reality and the occasion are in unbroken unity, 
actual occasions are mutually immanent. If we take White-
head's analysis of prehension to be the primary fact, then 
experience in this sense denotes a relation between (a) the 
content of experience (analogous to Whitehead's "objective 
datum") 1 (b) that to whl.ch the content refers (analogous to 
Whitehead' s use of the term (data 11 ) , and ( c) the experience, 
viz. the creative, synthetic activity itself -- the actual 
occasion. All three of these factors are interdependent, 
internally related, and all go to make up the experiencing 
situation. The content of experience, (a), is made up of 
the immanence of external things, (b), and carries a felt 
reference to them.1 At the same time, Whitehead holds that 
1. Cf. above on objectification, p. 14lf. 
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the "experience," (c), v~z. the occasion with its subjective 
form, subjective aim, and 11free 11 decision, plays an active 
role in this total situation although ~t does not create its 
objects, (b). For Whitehead it is not the "content of 
consciousness," the cognitive meaning in separation from the 
sentient experience, which is the prJ.mary fact. 'Nhitehead 
11fu.Lly accepts Descartes 1 discovery that subjective experiencing 
is the primary metaphysical situation which is presented to 
1 
metaphysics for analysis. 11 But this is of course Whitehead 1 s 
"reformed subjectivist principle. 112 
In his general approach to immediate experience, 
~:hi tehead is closer than Blanshard to the general empiricists 1 
tradition in his acceptance of the view that the prJ.nciples 
of explanation are to be found in im.rnediate experience. 3 He 
is closer to the empiricist tradition also in his use of 
irr~diate experience. For Whitehead, in~ediate experience 
functions to criticise abstraction and to correct reflective 
experiencing for distorting or leavJ.ng out some of the factors 
we fmd in experience in all its fullness and richness. 
But :::.s we saw m Wh~tehead' s doctrines of objectification 
and conformal feelings, even physical prehension is not a 
direct experience of what is prehended. Physical 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reali~, p. 243. 
Cf. above pp. 132ff 151. Note how WhJ.te ead ties in this 
principle with his 'principle of relativity" and his 
"ontological principle." Cf. ib~d., pp. 252-253. Cf. 
above also on subjective aim, p:-!89ff. 
Although his view as to the nature of immediate experience 
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is closer to Bradley than to that of the empiricist tradition. 
prehension, feeling itself, is mediated by eternal objects 
1 
and involves a process of "abstraction." Feeling indicates 
a perspective involving elimination, selection, and relations. 
Even on the level of physical prehension, or feeling, eternal 
objects are a part of the metaphysical situation.2 
These above differences in regard to interests and 
procedure have a far-reaching effect upon how Blanshard and 
Whitehead conceive of the genesis of order in experience. 
Blanshard is concerned with the escape from immediacy, 
how to account for the transition from an experienced continuum 
which is fragmentary, felt and indicative of no intelligible 
pattern, to the level of mediation which involves universals, 
perception of things as belonging to kinds. 
Blanshard is interested in a psychological account of 
the different kinds of order in sense perception as evidence 
for one kind of order implicit throughout. In Book I of The 
Nature ££ Thought he is concerned with the order of different 
types which characterize the "objects" of our ordinary percep-
tual experiences. His analysis is designed to reveal the fact 
that within these different kinds of organization there is a 
pattern, an implicit order or connection that these contents 
must have in order to attain intelligibility. 
All these patterns, including especially the preferred 
Gestalten of grouped qualities, 3 indicate a pressure toward 
1. Cf. above on abstraction, p. 148f. 
2. Cf. above on the da ti\79 and subjective ingression of 
eternal objects, p. 147f, 152ff. A comparison of 
the function of universals for Blanshard and Whitehead 
is included in the next section. 
3. Cf. above p. 37. 
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one kind of order. This pressure, nisus, immanent teleology, 
is the mind's ideal, its immanent end given by the mind's own 
nature. 1 The content of consciousness develops in the process 
of definition under the control of an order whose attainment 
would bring intellectual satisfaction. Perceptual inference, 
sense perception, and the assumption of intelligibility itself 
disclosed in ordinary human dialogue is dependent upon the 
fact that this content itself, if developed, carries connec-
tions -- the concrete universal is implicit from the beginning 
and is the assumption underlying every perceptual inference. 
Order is discovered in the content of consciousness in the 
very process of definition. 
In his earlier chapters, Blanshard attempts to remain 
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uncommitted as to the ontological grounds of this order. For 
example, he says that perception is "the first stage in a long 
journey, the first halting endeavor to introduce ~ experience, 
2!. discover .!!! it, a system that will satisfy intelligence."2 
That this order is discovered, is objectively real, is a 
conclusion arrived at through epistemological considerations. 
If ideal knowledge defines reality (and it must for Blanshard), 
and the bridge between idea and object is to be made, then we 
must assume that our embodiment of the ideal of system (the 
1. Cf. above p. 9lf. 
2. Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. I, P• 79. 
Italics mind. Cf:-above p. 6, 33. 
immanent end) is also a closer approximation to the character 
1 
of reality (the transcendent end). 
What Blanshard discards Whitehead, in the main, utilizes 
and emphasizes. The elemental structure of experience, the 
varying intensities, the fact that there is "no democracy 
among sensations," has to be accounted for. This very fact 
presupposes order in the objective data whereby intensity is 
achieved in the subject. 
For example, Blanshard says of the differences in force 
or intensity within which sensations come to us: "To be sure 
we must beware of a fallacy here. The intensity of a sensation 
is not the same th:ing as the perception of it. "2 Whitehead 
would agree that there is a difference but the very fact that 
there are differences among sensations has to be accounted 
for and this account may throw light on the significance 
higher phases of experience give to these sensations. 
For Whitehead, each occasion is an instance of immanent 
teleology, each occasion, with its subjective aim determining 
its self-formation, involves the selection and elimination of 
factors in its own process. It is in virtue of how it does 
so order its data that it is this determinate process, this 
occasion. It is the aim which determines how eternal objects 
1. Cf. above p. 99ff. 
2. ~·~ Vol. I, P• 68. 
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forming general potentiality and past actual occasions 
forming the real potentiality may be synthesized -- how the 
forms may mingle •1 
Ordered experience is not, for \¥hitehead, ~~marily a 
2 product of modes of thought organizing mere sense data but 
is itself a construction. This process of experience is 
ind~cative of an a~m at intensity on the part of each occasion. 
The harmony of feeling exhibited in experience is necessary 
for this intensity. 
Thus we find ~~itehead emphasizing aesthetic categories 
which are not forms of the understanding, i.e. they do not 
owe their being and their universality to conscious, intel-
lectual operations, but owe their being and universality to 
the fact that they are aspects of experience, drops of 
experience primarily to be characterized as feelings, selec-
tive attainments of value. These metaphysical categories 
are fundamental and are discovered through our analysis of 
experience in all its ramifications and not only through an 
analysis of the external world as such (our perception of 
objects). These processes of concrescent feelings arise 
out of the world which they feel and organize themselves 
1. Cf. above, concrescence and subjective aim, p. 189ff. 
2. Cf. above, P• 137. 
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in accordance with the way they feel. The aesthetic 
categories owe their universality to this experiential char-
acter of reality, not to any conceptual character of reality 
as such.1 
1. cr. above, p. 194n, and satisfaction and order, p. 202ff. 
We are here referring to·the categoreal obligations. 
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2. The Function of Universals in Experience 
i. Judged Significance 
"The unity, reality and identity of the universal in 
the particulars is presupposed in every sentence that we 
utter."1 
The use of universals is conceived by Blanshard as 
growing out of the process of making distinctions, and discern-
ing identities as classes. All distinguishing has a pattern 
of relating differences within an identity, ordering the many 
through the one.2 To distinguish anything as itself is to 
classify it and to be, implicitly or explicitly, using generic 
terms. "Distinction, identification and classification all 
occur together; they are indeed the same process looked at 
from different points of view. n3 
Thought from the very beginning involved the use of 
universals. As we saw for Blanshard they are at least 
functionally present even within immediate experience. 
Universals, characters which may be involved and exemplified 
in various ways, must be present if there is to be anything 
which is distinct for thought. The possibility of recognition 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 581. 
2. ~Blanshard's example of the color red, above, p. 62. 
3. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 542. Quoted above p. 62. 
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of likenesses and differences among sensation entails the 
use of universals. Universals were seen to be, along with 
relations, the root conditions of our power to distinguish 
1 
anything as itself. 
Acquisition is at every stage a specification 
of the general. To appropriate means, at the least, 
to identify, and to identify means to find in some-
thing the embodiment of a universal.2 
One implication of this starting point for Blanshard 
is that there is no separation and a virtual identification 
of the sensed content of experience and universals. As we 
saw, sense data and universals are given together. Sense 
data are not sharply distinguishable from or unaffected by 
their context of meaning, the datum is always a fragment of 
a wider whole of meaning, its isolation is an abstraction.3 
What this also means in Blanshards 1 s analysis is not 
only that there is a virtual identification between the sensed 
content and the universal, but that there is a virtual 
identification of the presence of universals and the "given." 
In his analysis, the sensed content is that which is recog-
nized as a "this tt or a "that 11 and to apprehend anything as a 
"this 11 or a "that 11 involves apprehending it as belonging to 
a kind or universal. This data of recognition is the 11 given 11 
at least in so far asit is capable of further intensional 
analysis. 
1. Cf. above p. 8, 13. 
2. Ibid., Vol. I, P• 613. Cf. above, P• l33f , on Whitehead's 
li'S"eof the term "appropriate." 
3. Cf. above P• 22, 30. 
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Blanshard is cautious here as to whether we can draw 
1 
any line between what is given and what is thought. He does 
not deny that the objects of sensation are exclusively 
universals and goes on to say: 11 But while presumably there 
is some line between the given and its extension, we may 
almost as well assume that there is not. 112 For Blanshard 
there is no distinction on this level between the given and 
the extension of the given done by interpretive thought. For 
Blsnshard, to be aware is to be distinguishing and relating. 
Our awareness is already an ordering, an interpretive activity, 
3 
to be characterized as a rudimentary type of thinking. 
Another implication of this virtual identification of 
the sensed content and the universal is that we find that 
Blanshard's distinctions between sensation, perception and 
conception are not hard and fast distinctions. Sense data 
are part of the content of awareness, part of psychical 
experience and are not primarily representative of physical 
objects. Sensations are "ideas" of a rudimentary kind which 
gradually through analysis are seen to have relations and are 
capable of being extended. They are "grounds" for inference 
which have not yet been fully developed and implicated as a 
system of ideas. Perceptual data are only more explicit grounds 
1. Ct. ibid., Vol. I, P• 118. Cf. above p. 29. 
2. Ibid:;-vo1. I, P• 118. 
3. As"We saw in the preceding section, this kind of analysis 
determines the functional role that sensation and feeling 
have in Blanshard's position. Cf. above P• 242. 
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for inference. Conceptual data (ideas) are more definite, 
articulated grounds for inference. 
The distinction between these various forms of awareness 
are ones of degree only. The content of what is grasped by 
either of these modes of awareness is always part of a wider 
meaning and the differences between these modes is in the 
implicit and explicit grasp of this meaning. Or, stated in 
other terma, the difference is between implicit and explicit 
inference, the clarity of the grasp of universal and its 
differences.1 Blanshard makes the transition from immediate 
experience to mediate experience in virtue of the fact the 
universal as grasped in the content of experience is implicated 
with other universals. 2 
Blanshard at this stage needs a system of content, the 
content of experience must be related in such a way as to 
make inference possible because that to which this content 
refers has to be rejected as unintelligible, the reasons for 
this connection between sensations cannot be "objects" to 
which they refer. Inference within the content of conscious-
ness has replaced the function of reference. 
Blanshard's doctrine of the concrete universal is implicit 
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at this stage. From the very beginnings of experience a structure 
1. As we saw, "implicit" means for Blanshard that the universal 
is inseparable from the context of consciousness. This is 
to say that the grasf. of the universal in sensation and 
perception is still 'tied" up with the conditions of its 
genes is • Cf. above p. 14n • 
2. Cf. above p. 31. 
or order is implicitly or explicitly present as a background 
or context to these phases and as an ideal toward which they 
are directed. Knowing is the development of an 11 idea," the 
mind's content, according to thought's immanent end. 
This emphasis upon universals and de-emphasis upon 
sensation and feeling as pointed to in our previous section 
has made it seem that, for Blanshard, universals are the sole 
significant content of our awareness. The content of our 
awareness reveals mere "data" {about which we can say nothing) 
fused with OUr judgnent and thought about the date. in the form 
1 
of distinctions and recognized identities. 
We can carry this one step further. Universals, their 
intensional meanings, play such e. prominent part in Blanshard's 
analysis that it is done at the risk of ambiguity as to the 
function the knower plays in the knowing situation. This is 
to say that the percipient activity, the act of judgment, 
becomes indistinguishable from inference and the relations 
among the content of experience. We have already noted this 
in connection with his definition of judgment which is 
identified with "mind, 11 and then with the "system of ideas," 
the propositional content. 2 Other passages also indicate a 
1. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, P• 198, where Ble.nshard says that 
sensai!Ons cannot be relevant. 
2 • Cf • above p • 1 7n. 
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blurring of this distinction. It is the mental content which 
directs the reference to object. It is my mental content which 
is uindeterminate. ul 
ii. Felt Significance 
For Whitehead, as we saw, an understanding of actuality 
requires reference to a "realm" of ideality •2 Eternal objects 
are an indispensible part of the epistemological and meta-
physical situation in the sense in which an ana. lysis in either 
field reveals elements which are "eternal, 11 which transcend 
occasions of experience. There are uForms of Definiteness, 11 
the "Pure Potentials for the Specific Determination of Fact, 11 
exhibited in the process of becoming. These are the pos-
sibilities for realization whose mode of existence is to be 
conceptually prehended either in "real potentiality," or in 
"general potentiality," or in combinations of these two, viz. 
-hybrid prehensions or complex patterns called nexus. 
Although "ideality" is an integral part of Whitehead's 
analysis, the separation of the ideal and the actual does 
not entail consciousness in the Whiteheadlan sense of ,t~is term. 
As we saw, an act of experience, an occasion, is itself a 
process of abstraction, a form of distinction that, while not 
explicit or conscious, nevertheless involves the function of 
1. The pass age reads: "The reason for this indeterminacy 
in my mental content is that the universal is itself 
indeterminate; indeed, the two indeterminacies are the 
same •• o o The way in which this indeterminate content 
carries the reference to what is beyond is also explained. 11 
Ibid., Vol. I, p. 621. 
2. nr:-above p. 210ff. 
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universals. According to Whitehead, universals 11function, 11 
have dative and subjective ingression, in physical prehensions. 
This is, of course, part of his doctrine of objectification. 
Thus "objectification" itself is abstraction; 
since no actual thing is "objectified" in its 
"formal" completeness. Abstraction expresses 
nature's mode of interaction and is not merely 
menta.l.l 
In Blanshard, where we have distinctions, we have 
consciousness, an awareness of an idea or universal as an 
idea. For Blanshard, the awareness of sensa is at the same 
time at least an implicit awareness of class terms. He then 
confines his attention upon the sensa as universals and what 
they must be in order to ground perceptual inference. In 
consequent analysis, Blanshard notices relations between the 
ideas which indicate a pattern internal to the ideas them-
selves. 
For Whitehead, the sensa are eternal objects but not 
identifiable with mental contents even for the purposes of 
epistemology. Whitehead's uses of the t erma "idea" and 
"ideality" are obviously much broader. He insists upon the 
separation of an idea, a form of definiteness, and our 
consciousness of an idea. 
In this regard, Whitehead considers Locke at one point 
"metaphysically superior 11 to Hume precisely because Locke 1 s 
use of the term "idea" is broader. Instead of confining 
himself to impressions of sensations as mental contents, 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect, 
PP• 25-26. Cf. above P• 140ff. 
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Locke sometimes recognized that ideas are conveyed in by 
the senses as they are determined to this or that particular 
existent. He cites Locke for recognizing that 11poweru is a 
part of our ideas of substance or, to put it is this context, 
Whitehead feels that Locke saw that external things are to 
account for the "ideas" in us. The content of experience 
1 is co.nstituted by the immanence of external things. 
This broader use of the term "idea," as we saw, is 
expressed in Whitehead's distinction between the nformal" 
existence of the actual entity wherein the eternal objects 
are essential to its composition, and the "objective 11 existence 
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of the actual entity, wherein its nature, as a complex of 
realized eternal objects, is to be a datum for creative advance.2 
The "forms" characteristic of the actual entity in its "formaln 
and its "objective 11 existence are the eternal objects. 
Whitehead's doctrine of objectification is a statement 
of how the immanence of external things is possible and is 
central to his position. On the one hand the "ideas," the 
eternal objects, "participate" in nature, that is, they make 
up the real internal constitution of the actual entities. On 
the other hand, the eternal objects are a part of the "objec-
tive existence n of the actual anti ty and make up the datum for 
prehension by future occasions. 
1. Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, P• 28. 
Cf. also above p. 132f, 1651'. -
2. Cf. above, P• 140. Cf. also~., PP• 320f. 
In Whitehead's theory of human perception, he assigns 
great importance to perception in the mode of causal efficacy.1 
Causal efficacy is our mode of awareness of our immediate past 
and is dependent upon the state of the body. It is the recep-
tion of the past as a complex hierarchy of eternal objects 
deposited by that past. In causal efficacy the sense-data 
are forms of definiteness felt through the immediate past of 
the body through objectifications. The eternal objects here 
function relationally as both sensations and as qualities of 
the object.2 The point to note here is that the sensa are 
primarily inherited as qualifications of affective tone 
(subjective form) and that Whitehead's view of causal efficacy 
is grounded upon his doctrines of objectification and conformal 
feeling. 
These doctrines have great relevance to Whitehead's 
epistemological position for it is within this context that 
Whitehead Offers a possible answer to Blanshard 1 s problem 
of the relation between subject and object. The present 
occasion in its concrescence is involved with the real func-
tioning of its past to which it must to some extent conform. 
It must take account of not zoo re sensa but the real facts of 
the past. In this sense, Whitehead is an epistemological 
realist. The data are given. "The process creates itself, 
1. Perception in the mode of causal efficacy is a mode of 
experience which receives virtually no significance in 
Blanshard's analysis. 
2 • Of • above p. 152ff • 
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but does not create the objects ."1 The actual existence of 
the actual occasion in its formal immediacy is independent 
of the "knower." The past occasions are settled. There is 
a real difference between the object (datum)and the subject. 
But Whitehead's doctrine of mutual ~anence and 
ob je ctifica tion balance this. Object and subject are also 
alike. As prehended, the occasions which make up the past 
are prehended in their "objective existence" only. But there 
is no necessary radical distinction between the actual occa-
sions as prehended (objective datum) and the data. The 
eternal objects, which are the forms of the definiteness of 
the actual occasion in the past, in objectification become 
the elements determining the definiteness of the present 
prehender. The identical element effecting the connection 
between object and subject is form, the eternal objects. It 
is the eternal objects which are the forms of definiteness 
characterizing the real internal constitutions of the past 
occasions and at the same time in objectification it is the 
eternal objects which characterize their objective existence 
whereby they pass on these forms of definiteness. In this 
sense, the present actual occasions reproduce the "cause" as 
it exists objectively. These causal feelings make up the 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 181. 
Cf. above p. 147f. 
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1 basis of Whitehead's epistemological position. 
The subordination of consciousness in experience is 
central for Whitehead. Conscious perception is always a 
2 derivative modification of more elemental feeling processes. 
Whitehead would have us make a distinction between conscious 
experience and its underlying physiological conditions whereby 
the occasion is intimately related to its environment. OUr 
1. cr. above where the eternal objects are said to function 
"relationa lly, 11 p. 155 , and the section on the re-
enact ion of Form, p. 156ff • In view of what we have 
read of other commentaries on Whitehead, our interpreta-
tion of his view of perception greatly differs from them 
in some respects. For example, R. Stahl's interpretation 
presents Whitehead as an epistemological monist. He 
maintains that "due to the 'vector' nature of feelings 
it is possible for there to be direct causal action 
between entities •••• In Whitehead both modes of per-
ception, presentational immediacy and causal efficacy, 
give direct knowledge." Roland Stahl, The Influence of 
Berfson on Whitehead. (unpublished dissertation) (Bo~on: 
Boa on University, l950h pp. 77-78. There is certainly 
grounds for this assertion as Whitehead does use such 
phrases as the "direct knowledge of causal efficacy" 
(Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and RealitS, p. 125. 
cr. also his view of sympathy, ibia.,-p: 246.) ut on 
the same page Whitehead describes primitive feelings as 
"feeling of ·derived feeling." Whitehead's emphasis 
throughout on objectification and on the vector character 
of prehension, i.e. its referential character to an ex-
ternal world, does not allow his position to be described 
as that of an epistemological monist. Moreover, the 
initial datum felt is of eternal objects derived from 
the past and not the subjective form of the occasion as 
would have to be the case if we asserted an identity 
between occasions. 
2. Cf. above on Conceptual Reversion, P·l65ff. All . · 
forms of consciousness for Whitehead are the result 
of the integration of "propositional feelings 11 and other 
feelings. Consciousness only comes about as a result of 
the contrast between realized eternal objects and unrealizea 
alternatives grasped by the mental pole of each occasion. 
Grasp of alternatives and negative prehension are central. 
Cf. ~., PP• 243ff, 397f, 407f. 
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observations of a sense-datum presuppose the body of the 
observer and the physical world beyond. Experience grows 
out of this situation of relatedness.l 
Actually, Bla.nshard' s discussion of conscious sense-
perception is in some respect analogous to Whitehead's view 
of perception in the mode of presentational immediacy where 
for Whitehead a great deal of intensification and abstraction 
has already taken place in the mental pole of the occasion. 
Here is where we find clear and distinct data of recognition. 
Here are the impressions of Hume who himself was quite aware 
of the isolation of these data. But Whitehead would stress 
the fact that you are already dealing with abstractions on 
this level.2 
Whitehead defines perception in the mode of presentational 
innnediacy as "perception which merely, by means of a sensum, 
rescues from vagueness a contemporary spatial region, in res-
pect to its spatial shape and its spatial perspective from the 
percipient. 113 It is a synthetic activity involving eternal 
1. 
2. 
This is a restatement of the point made above that 
Whitehead's use of the term "experience" is broader 
than that of Blanshard. Cf. above p. 258f. It is also 
in keeping with our identifying Whitehead as closer to 
the empiricist tradition in so far as Locke and Hume, 
for example, conceive of conscious mental operations 
as a derivative activity. Cf. above on conceptual 
registrations, p. 172ff. 
Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Symbolism: Its Meani~ and 
Effect and Process and Reality, p. 187. "'"1rranShar s-
dlscussion of sensa!!On Is analogous to what Whitehead 
means by "conceptual registration." Cf. above P• 7, 163. 
Blanshard's discussion of our perception of objects is 
analogous to Whitehead's presentational immediacy and 
symbolic reference. 
~., P• 185. 
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objects received via the past are projected onto the present 
as one datum. It is the immediate presentation of the contem-
porary world "by means of our projection of our immediate 
1 
sensations." 
Presentational immediacy is a recurrent theme throughout 
Process ~ Reality2 because of the overemphasis given to it 
in 17th and 18th century epistemological analysis. "The tacit 
identification of perception with sense-perception • • • is a 
fatal error barring the advance of syste:rmt ic metaphysics. 113 
In other words, undue emphasis upon presentational immediacy 
is another case (an important and far-reaching one) of "mis-
placed concreteness." To confine ourselves to presentational 
immediacy wherein we have a presentation of clear sense percepts 
4 
would land us in "solipsism of the present moment." We do not, 
through habit and association, construct the world out of sense 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Sribolism: Its Meaning and Effect, 
P• 13. For example, red s felt in emotional enjoyment and 
only as a result of transmission does it become the clear-
cut sensory datum observed by us. 
Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 54. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures or-Ideas, p. 182. 
The accusation of solipsism may seem-oaa coming from 
Whitehead in view of his insistence that "apart from 
the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, 
nothing, bare nothingness," (Alfred North Whitehead, 
Process and Reality, p. 254) but his subjectivist's 
position-ri a "reformed" one as we saw. Solipsism is 
escaped in light of objectification and the vector 
character of feeling. Whether the contemporary inde-
pendence of elements in presentational immediacy is a 
solipsistic position is another question. The inter-
pretation of presentational immediacy as an abstraction 
involving projected objectification and its need for 
reference to causal efficacy would not support the claim 
that Whitehead in his total view is solipsistic. 
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perception whiCh irrationally comes from unknown causes.1 
This mode of analysis would never succeed in explaining our 
experiential awareness of process, causation, and genesis. 
Presentational immediacy is a latter derivative phase of 
concrescence than causal efficacy. It 1 ifts into obviousness 
terms and relations that were already, in rough form, in causal 
efficacy. It is "an outgrowth from _the complex datum implanted 
by causal efficacy. "2 In the earlier responsive phase of 
causal efficacy, the external is felt as vague, haunting, and 
unmanageable -- ua heavy primitive experience."3 Presenta-
tional irr~ediacy lies in the supplemental phase which lifts 
into distinctness and enhances this vague world of the immediate 
past to important relevance. 4 The relation between these two 
modes is brought out by the fact that bodily efficacy is 
presupposed by presentational immediacy. The feeling of 
5 
"withness" of the body is gotten from causal efficacy. 
1. Cf. Alfred North ?fuitehead, Process ~Reality, p. 481. 
2. Ibid., P• 262. 
3. AI?red North Whitehead, Symbolism: ~ Meaning and Effect, 
P• 44. 
4. Whitehead gives the excellent example of how, upon 
entering a room, we are charmed with a vague aesthetic 
appreciation experience (the forms and coloring of the 
furniture, for example). The senso~ experience of the 
room adds vividness and points to th s activity already 
possessed. Cf. above, P• 166. 
5. For a description of this in relation to visual perception, 
Cf. Alfred No.rth Whitehead, Process and Reali~, p. 260. 
Much more is involved here than designated. itehead's 
discussion of "strains," "transmutation," "projectors," 
all come in here • 
Concentration upon the mode of presents. tional immediacy, 
then, is "misplaced concreteness" in so far as ultimate 
analysis and epistemology are concerned; but ~esentational 
immediacy also makes possible the abstractions of science, it 
makes possible a generalized structure of nature. Extension, 
then, defines "possibilities of mutual perspectives for the 
1 
contemporary entities inter~·" "Extension is the most 
general scheme of real potentiality, providing the background 
for all other organic relations. "2 What we want to find out 
s.s far as technology is concerned lies in the region of causal 
efficacy, what is distinct and vivid lies in presentational 
immedia.cy.3 
iii. Comparisons 
Whitehead is here denying a. fundamental presupposition 
of much of modern philosophy in regard to sense-perception. 
1. 
2. 
Ibid., p. 96. Cf. above p. 222. 
!Oia., p. 105. It would be interesting and, we think, 
rru!tful to compare Whitehead's view of presentational 
immediacy and Hegel's view of the understanding. For 
instance, Hegel says: "The action of Understanding may 
be in general described as investing its subject-matter 
with the form of universality. But this universal is 
an abstract universal •••• Apart from Understanding 
there is no fixity or accuracy in the region either of 
theory or of practice." G. W. F. Hegel, The Logic of 
Hegel, PP• 143-144. 
Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Process~ Reality, p. 257. 
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This assumption is that the perception of clear, immediately 
presented sensa, the data of recognition, is fundamental and 
that causation and connections in general are to be explained 
1 in terms of these clear data. Whitehead would have us reverse 
the importance here. The presented sensa of recognition is 
derivative from causal feeling. The contemporary world is 
important in so far as it symbolizes relations derived from 
percepts in causal efficacy. 
Whitehead makes a statement that summarizes his rejection 
of this presupposition, and, for our purposes, also indicates 
his rejection of Blanshard1 s procedures: 
Owing to its long dominance, it has been 
usual to assume as an obvious fact the primacy 
of presentational immediacy. We open our eyes 
and our other sense-organs; we then survey the 
contemporary world decorated with sights, and 
sounds, and tastes; and then, by the sole aid 
of this information about the contemporary 
world, thus decorated, we draw what conclusions 
we can as to the actual world. No philosopher 
really holds that this is the sole source of 
information. Hume and his followers appeal 
vaguely to 11memory 11 and to "practice 11 ~ order 
to supplement their direct information. 
Whitehead would have directed this at Blanshard also 
saying that Blanshard must resort to getting added information 
1. For example, Hume 1 s explanation of causal connections 
as the association of these sensa. cr. David Hume, 
An Enquiry c(nae)ilUCUhe Human Understanding, L. A. 
"Selby-Bigge e • , . ord: Clarendon Press, 1894), 
Section VII, Part II. 
2. Alfred North Whitehead, Process ~Reality, p. 264. 
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out of the meaning of ''ideas 11 by having them develop logical 
connections which are implicit from the first. 
But at the base of this pre-supposition that presentational 
immediacy is primary lies another assumption: that thought is 
fundamental in experience. Whitehead's remarks about the 
Kantian and Hegelian traditions are relevant here: 
In any metaphysical scheme founded upon the 
Kantian or Hegelian traditions, experience is the 
product of operations which lie among the higher 
of the human modes of functioning. For such schemes, 
ordered experience ii the result of schematization 
of modes of thought. 
For Whitehead, the "objective world," the world of objects, 
is not constructed from subjective experience. The process of 
experience is not one from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. 
The sensa of definiteness of emotion are transmitted to con-
temporary regions. The occasion arises out of a felt world 
and constructs its experience in accordance with how it feels 
(subjective form). 
Unlike Blanshard, the order of impressions does not only 
grow out of the attempt of perceptual experience, conceived 
as a rudimentary type of thinking, to regulate its objects 
into some kind of intelligible pattern. Relatedness, signifi-
cance, are not conveyed primarily by judgment but by feeling. 
Universals are not functioning only as a result of judged 
significance but also as a result of felt significance.2 
1. Ibid., p. 172. Cf. also Alfred North Whitehead, Science 
a:n:<rthe Modern World, pp. 192f. 
2. or: aoove pp. o, 8. 
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There is no disjunction between the "order" characteristic 
of concrescent experience and the "external" world. The kind 
of order determined to the realization of each occasion in 
relation to potentials is the basic order -- the real meaning 
of "togetherness. 111 This particular order is passed on through 
objectification. 
Actuality in perishing acquires objectivity, 
while it loses subjective ~ediacy. It loses the 
final causation which is its internal principle of 
unrest, and it acquires efficient causation whereby 
it is a ground of obligation characterizing the 
creati vity.2 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, P• 288. 
2. ~., p. 44. cr. above on re-eila'Ction of Forms, p.l56ff. 
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3. Universals -- Form and Fact 
i. The Concrete Universal 
If we are correct in our above analysis of Blanshard's 
position, the universal remains as the sole significant 
content in Blanshard's analysis of experience. The distinc-
tion between sensation, perception and conception are only 
differences in the implicit or explicit grasp of the universal. 
Sensations are "ideas" of a rudimentary kind which are made 
explicit by the process of judgment. 
In judgment, thought operates in terms of the development 
of the systematic relations of the intensional meanings of the 
object under consideration. Since every idea involves rela-
tional meanings to something beyond itself which is essential 
(internally related) to this meaning, we expand our meaning in 
order to include these wider meanings we relate the object 
1 thought of to something else within a system. Our definition 
of the object, our assignment of a meaning to the object, fails 
to satisfy us and we proceed to complete this meaning by 
relational addition from without and by relational distinction 
from within -- the 11 ideali ty" is developed in our attempt to 
characterize that to which the intensional meaning refers. 
We start from fragmented experience as a vague content and 
show how reflection develops it into greater clarity. 
1. Cf. above P• 5ff. 
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By far, Blanshard's interest is upon this intensional 
meaning of ideas, the character complex, the definable nature, 
which one is employing in judg:rrant. It is hera that the 
pattern, implicit in perception or explicit in thinking and 
conception, is to be discerned. A description of this pattern 
reveals the immanent end of all thought processes. The justi-
fication for the ontological status of these patterns takes 
the form of an epistemological argument.1 
As we saw, the center of Blanshard's epistemological 
theory is that the two aspects of the idea are inseparable. 
To solve what Blanshard feels to be the primary question in 
epistemology, viz. the relation between idea and object, we 
must conceive of this relation between the content or inten-
sion of the idea and its reference (denotation) as a teleo-
logical relation. The integrity of the object insisted upon 
by the realist and, at the same time, the difficulty in regard 
to error if we identify idea and object, are avoided if we 
conceive of the idea-object relation as a teleological rela-
tion. The idea is the object ~ posse, the content of the 
idea is to be conceived as a purpose, which, if realized, 
expanded, and developed in all its relations, would be its 
object. 2 Blanshard's doctrine of the "concrete universal" 
1. Of. above p. 84ff. 
2. Of. above P• 64ff. 
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is at the center of this argument and is formulated in such 
a way as to account for this epistemological problem.l 
But the doctrine of the concrete universal is an attempt 
not only to answer the problem of the relation between idea-
object but, at the same time, the problem as to how we shall 
conceive of the relation between the universal and its 
differences. 2 This doctrine insists that the universal and 
its differences are inseparable and are internally related. 
In regard to their inseparability, universals are not to 
be conceived as abstract attributes or intensions determining 
classes where genus and species are so externally related 
that they can be considered apart. Universals are not abstract 
properties possessed by "things" in the world which differ from 
these properties. Nor, from the side of universals, is there 
such a thing as a color which is not this color or that color. 
Universals exist only in and through their differences.3 
1. Although, as we saw, there are other reasons for his 
doctrine of the concrete universal. That is, logically 
they are necessary to explain perceptual inferences where 
we get from the ground to the consequent in virtue of the 
fact that we are dealing with an implicative nexus of 
universals. Cf. above p.20ff. Psychologically, the 
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concrete universal accords with the fact that the progress 
of knowledge is a specification of the general idea, is a 
process from the abstract to the concrete. cr. above p.49n. 
2. Cf. above P• 7lff. 
3. Both Blenshard and Whitehead are in agreement on this 
latter point. Complete abstraction is ultimately a contra-
diction. Cf. above 78, SOn • This is a denial of what 
Blanshard takes to be the traditional class analysis. A 
class analYtsis is not adequate to explain the ''mingling of 
the forms. 1 cr. Bosanquet's remark on this score, above 
p. 74. 
But the doctrine of the concrete universal as found 
in Blanshard also insists that the relation of the universal 
to its differences is an internal relation. The universal is 
modified as it is realized in different types and the types 
are modified in so far as they exemplify the universal. 
Universals form systems, not collections, where their elements 
are connected and are not indifferent, unaffected by, their 
content. The universal is not the mere sum of its instances, 
it expresses itself in the parts whose nature it pervades 
and determines. The grasp of the universal carries with it 
1 
a grasp of the species. 
The "concrete universal" is difficult to conceive unless 
we use an analogy here. Blanshard seems to be saying that 
the universal is to its instances as the formation of a plan 
or policy is to carrying out, "expressing," this policy in 
action. Our policy in this sense "determines" the action. 
This analogy is somewhat helpful for it exhibits the poten-
tiality-actuality relation, the teleological relation, central 
to Blanshard' s posit ion. Universals are incomplete themse 1 ves 
(just an "ideal," onlz a plan of action) when undeveloped into 
species and these species are unintelligible so long as they 
are considered apart from their embodiment of the universal. 
1. Cf. above p. 72, 75. 
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The relation of a plan to the action is the potential to 
the actual. The universal is the potentiality of its dif-
ferentiations •1 
But the analogy is not adequate in this regard: 
Blanshard is not just maintaining that ~ develop the implica-
tions of different concepts and some of these implications are 
or are not grounded in our more rudimentary experiences of an 
external world to which these concepts ultimately refer. He 
is maintaining that ~ universal determines its species, the 
development of an idea is a "self-development 11 of an idea. 
What gradually comes to light in The Nature of Thought is not 
only that the universal and its differences are inseparable 
but that the universal itself develops into its 11 object." 
Thus Blanshard says that the species are the form the genus 
must take in order to be at a11. 2 "A species is a genus's 
way of being. "3 
1. Many statements of Blanshard bear out this analogy. 
For example, "the universal ••• is the undeveloped 
schema of its species, which is neither their lowest 
common denominator nor their explicitly set out sum, 
but that which contains them within itself as its 
alternative possibilities." Brand Blanshard, The 
Nature of Thought, Vol. I, p. 590. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, 
P· 6o2.- -
2. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, p. 585. 
3. Ibid-=-;-vol. I, P• 586. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, P• 602-. Cf. 
above p. bo, 79. If, on ep'I'S"t'emological grounds, we 
have to assume the ultimate identity of idea and object 
in order for knowledge to be possible then, of course, 
this position would have to follow. Cf. above p. 84ff. 
There is a great deal of ambiguity in the phrase "the 
idea is the object in posse. 11 T. M. Greene, in his 
review of The Nature-of Thought, points up the ambiguity 
in Blanshara-as to the-ontological status of the objects 
of knowedge, and the relation of the knower to this 
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object. Cf. T. M. Greene, Review of The Nature of Thou~ht, (Journal of Philosophz, Vol. XXXVII,~ 25, December,940}. 
Blanshard's position, as it is developed in his early 
chapters, requires a "concrete" universal for he so blurs the 
distinction between form and fact, conception and perception, 
the logical and the psychological, that universals have to be 
conceived as concrete and efficacious. This can be stated in 
many ways. 
If the sole significant content of experience is the 
universal then the difference between our judgments based 
upon our perception of an external world and our judgments 
based upon conception and inference from these concepts has 
to be accounted for by the universal. Or, stating this in 
another way, if the line between what belongs to me and what 
belongs to the object is drawn within the content of conscious-
ness, then, perceptual reference to objects is of little 
cognitive significance and is replaced not by reference but 
1 by inference within and among these contents. Blanshard 
needs a concrete universal because he has rejected our exper-
ience of objects as a ground for the inference or for any 
connections among things. The "common ground" of that from 
which inference starts and that to which it refers is not 
our felt experience of the external world but inference within 
the connections of concepts.2 
1. These points are in keeping with our analysis of Blanshard's 
narrow view of experience. cr. above p. 256ft. 
2. Here Whitehead would assert that there is a felt difference 
between our thinking about external things and our 
experiencing of those things in the mode of causal 
efficacy. 
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But Blanshard needs a concrete universal in another 
closely related sense. The universal has to take on the 
function of what in other systems would be called the 
"empirical 11 element. In Blanshard' s system, a "fact," the 
"empirical, 11 is not something "outside 11 of our experience to 
which our experience ultimately refers. The "empirical" for 
Blanshard is one interpretation of the content of our exper-
ience in so far as this content exhibits intelligible necessity 
and coherence. 
So we find as Blanshard develops his argument that the 
universals, the system of meaning, take on an increasingly 
active role. Thus in Blanshard's summary statement, he 
maintains that an idea is a "content informed by an impulse 
to become this object. Its nature is hence not fully intel-
ligible except in light of what it seeks to become • 111 
Even earlier in Blanshard's account of the fact that we 
build up funded meanings concerning this or that topic which 
are brought to bear on present perception, we find Blanshard 
talking of dispositions as "agents" where funded meaning takes 
2 
on an active role. 
1. Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. I, P• 473. 
Italics mine. Cf:-above p. 30, 40. 
2. Blanshard 1 s analysis of the active function of the sub-
conscious in invention tends toward the same conclusion. 
Curiously enough, Blanshard is not concerned with how 
the past influences the present and future until his 
analysis of perceptual meaning where his theory of 
"dispositions" is required. Of. above P•lln, 46n. 
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It follows from Blanshard 1 s epistemology and logic that 
the distinction between Form and Fact is not ultimate. If 
the 11Key 11 to .fact, "reality," is indicated in the structure 
of experience, if the criterion o.f "reality" is set by the 
internal logic of the process of the idea, then a concrete 
fact ~s nothing "outside" thought. In the final analysis 
thought ~nd reality are not to be taken as independent series 
and the concrete universal is the medium by which Blanshard 
overcomes the seeming gap between idea and reality (object). 
Blanshard does attempt to answer the objection that 
ideas and real objects differ 1n Kind and that their relation 
can in no way be conceived as the relation of the potential 
to the actual. But in Blanshard's reply to this objection he 
interprets the objection only as a protest that there is a 
d~.f.ference in kind between sensations and images. He answers 
this objection by showing that there is no hard and fast 
d~vision between sensations and ~ages. He does not answer 
possible objections which might not identify the physical 
objects with sensations or sense data.1 
Blanshard also attempts to answer specifically the 
objection that idea and object are d~fferent because of the 
uniqueness and particularity of the latter. Blanshard 
answers this question by ask~ another question: "What is 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 498ff. 
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a unique particular? 11 He then proceeds to show how we must 
go about defining the particular in terms of universals by 
adding on more and more of its intensional meaning, specifying 
its relations until we have exhausted all of its relations 
to everything else. We thus find that particularity resolves 
away into what is at least ideally repeatable. What confers 
1 particularity are the universals. 
In answering to the objection that particulars are 
directly apprehended in sense, Blanshard gives Bradley's reply 
that, essentially, to say so is to assert that there is some-
thing unintelligible, alien to thought, and this is not, for 
both Blanshard and Bradley, an epistemologically adequate 
i 0 2 pos t~on. 
Particularity does mean something for Blanshard as we 
saw.3 He says something that Whitehead would perhaps agree 
with, but interpret differently. 
The particular white is to be distinguished 
from the universal white by the fact that it is 
taken in situ; it is thought of implicitly as a 
focus or raaiating relations. When the white is 
conceived as a universal, it is divested of these 
relations artifically; but when it is thought of 
as this particular white, it is taken as the 
centre Of an inexhaustible web of them, linking 
it to objects innumeiable. This is all that 
particularity means. 
1. Cf. above P• 79ff. This assumes, of course, that 
particularity does not rest on designation but intension. 
2. Cf. ibid., Vol. I, P• 632. 
3. Cf. above p. 79ff. 
4. ~·, Vol. I, PP• 634-635. 
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In short, it is required by the nature of 
thought, and not interdicted by the nature of 
things, that thought should go on to bridge the 
interval between itself and its object, and, 
by compassing both "what 11 and 11 tha t 11 within 
one whole, should override their differences. 1 
ii. The Ontological Principle 
Blanshard 1 s primary epistemological problem is an 
explanation as to how "independent" objects can be known 
through an experience which is essentially distinct from 
them. Whitehead would be in general agreement with Elan-
shard that it is the universal which serves as the medium 
between "object" and ttsubject" -- past occasions are pre-
hended via eternal objects which have become the realized 
determinants of the past actualities. 2 In this sense, 
Whitehead is saying that physical objects and present 
experience involve the same universals. But he does this 
without Blanshard's tendency to reduce both the object and 
the experience of the object to universals. The universals 
are eternal objects, forms of definiteness, which have been 
realized in the past and are realized under a new perspective 
in the present. 
Whitehead would also be in general agreement that con-
nections between particulars, e.g. the causal relation, is 
1. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 632. Quoted above p. 8b. 
2. cr:-above, real potentiality, pp. 14lff. 
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via the universals. The eternal objects, in their two-way 
functioning as determinants of the datum and as re-enacted 
determinants of the subjective form of an occasion, are 
functioning relationally, and are the basis for the solidarity 
of the universe. It is this fact of re-enaction of form, 
inheritance of pattern, which is the basis for the causal 
relation, memory, and physical transmission. Generall~ then, 
it is objectification and re-enaction of form that is the 
basis for the mutual immanence of occasions explanatory of 
1 
"order II -- neXUS and SOCietieS • 
But although the eternal objects in their relational 
roles are the medium of connection, they are not the reason 
for the connections and order. The causal relation is not 
justified by seeing it as an intrinsic and necessary connec-
tion among the forms. The ground of inference is not a 
system of concrete universals in necessary relation to one 
another. Any order has its reasons in the fact that past 
occasions have realized these patterns of possibilities and 
future occasions have some obligation to conform. 2 For 
Whitehead, any order or pattern is exhibited in the eternal 
objects only by virtue of their realization by actual entities 
(including God). Eternal objects obtain their status and 
their patterns by reason of the fact that they are forms of 
1. Cf. above, re-enaction of forms, pp. lbbff. 
2. cr. above, conformal feeling, pp. 150ff. 
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definiteness which have been realized or are relevant for 
realization by actual entities. 
Whitehead would have us understand that re-enaction of 
form is only the explanation as to how order is possible and 
not the explanation as to why this or that particular order 
arises or is repeated. The reasons for order are not intrinsic 
to the forma. The ultimate reasons why order obtains is to be 
found in actual entities. "All relatedness has its foundation 
in the relatedness of actualities. "1 
Whitehead says something later on in Process and Reality, 
in speaking of Hume, that would be directed toward Blanshard 
in this regard. 
When Hume passes on to complex impressions 
and ideas ••• he fails to distinguish sufficiently 
between (i) the "manner" (or "order") in which many 
simples constitute some one complex perception, 
i.e. impression or idea; and (ii) the efficacious 
fact by reason of which this complex perception 
arises; and (iii) the mere multiplicity of simples 
which constitute the complex perception in this 
definite manner.2 
To some extent, Blanshard' a analysis of "the thing and 
its architecture" in his Chapter III is so given to an 
analysis of (i) in the above passage that he neglects (ii) 
and (iii). The efficacious reason for complex perceptions 
in Blanshard's following chapters has to be accounted for 
by 11dispos it ions. 11 Efficacy is accounted for by attributing 
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. ix. 
Cf. above p. 157n. 
2. Ibid., P• 199. 
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agency to the 11 ideas. 11 For Whitehead, the efficacious fact 
is always an actual entity.l 
Whitehead would have us take his ontological principle 
seriously. Actual entities are the only reasons. There are 
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no agencies apart from actual entities in process of concrescence 
expressive of the ultimate creativity, apart from this basic 
concrescent activity giving rise to the mutual immanence of 
these entities, and apart from God as the principle of con-
cretion.2 
But~ as we saw, intrinsically inherent in the metaphysical 
situation is the "realm" of ideality.3 The ultimate principle 
is creativity,4 but sheer creativity and novelty without "form," 
without potentiality, are meaningless. Actuality must have 
some definiteness of form, for the structure of the actual 
entity lies in the fact that it is this realization of these 
forms of definiteness. The permanence of the actual entity 
depends upon its realization of these forms which, in its 
objective immortality, are passed on to future actual entities. 
As we saw immediately above also, the eternal objects are, in 
1. Cf. above p. 226ff. 
2. Cf. above pp. 17lff, 189ff. 
3. Cf. above p. 260ff. 
4. cr. above pp. 142, 187. Whitehead likens his ultimate 
principle to Aristotle's notion of "prime matter" but 
divested of any connotation of passivity. cr. ibid., 
pp. 32, 46. Actuality is not to be conceived as-a-
substance with qualities but a process of formation, 
concrescence, an act of "experience" arising out of 
data. Cf. ibid.,P. 65. "Its 'being' is constituted 
by its 'becoming.'" ~., pp. 34-35. 
Whitehead's doctrine of objectification and mutual immanence, 
explanatory of the relations between actual entities.1 
Whitehead is careful to point up his position in regard 
to the status of eternal objects. Their mode of existence is 
to be potentials. Eternal objects do not exist as themselves 
actual. They do not exist in an independent realm but only 
2 
as ingredient in actual entities. Stated in another way, 
"potential" implies potential for actualization. Their 
complete abstraction from any actuality is impossible. There 
must be some relevance. 3 A pure potential is "pure" only in 
the sense of being a potentiality capable of being grasped 
apart from its realization in any particular actual occasion. 
According to Whitehead's "principle of relativity" complete 
abstraction is self-contradictory. Both Blanshard and 
4 Whitehead are in agreement here. 
1. cr. above p. 140ff. 
2. Cf. above P• 222ff. Just as God's primordial 
nature is not actual taken by itself. 
3. Hence, as we saw, Whitehead holds that the notion of God 
is a metaphysical requirement as a condition for the 
relevance of unrealized eternal objects and as a condition 
for novelty. Cf. above p .17lff. 
4. Cf. above p. 222ff. Note how the principle of 
relativity is another way of denying the traditional 
notion of substance as "requiring nothing but itself 
to exist • 11 This notion implies tba t there is no intrinsJ.c 
relation between your ultimate metaphysical principle and 
the world. Cf. ibid., p. 79. 
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iii. Comparisons 
There is a striKing similarity between Blanshard 
and Whitehead in that they are both asking us to conceive 
of the relation between the universal and its instances as 
a tale ological one. The "~dea 11 is to 1 t s 11obje ct 11 what 
potential~ty is to actuality. Blanshard interprets this 
teleological relation in terms of an idea as a "potentiality 
which this object would actualize, a content inforr1ed by an 
impulse to become this object. ul Whitehead would 1n terpret 
this relation in terms of an 11 1.dea," or eternal object, as 
a potentiality which an actual entity may realize. A "con-
tent, 11 an "idea," becomes an "object" only derivatively 
through its realization~ actual entities. 2 
Whitehead's doctrine of "the translucency of realization" 
of eternal objects maKes it clear that eternal objects do not 
realize themselves, eternal objects are determinants. They 
have their lndi vidual essences which make each of them unique 
as this form of def~niteness. The "translucency" of the 
eternal object refers to the fact that its mode of ingression 
into actual occasions makes no difference to its individual 
essence. Eternal objects reta1.n their identity amid change, 
remain unaffected by their realization into actuality.3 
1. Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. I, p. 473. 
2. Cf. above p. 18~fr:- --
3. Cf. above on individual essence, p. 212ff. The failure 
to see this character of eternal objects corresponds to 
the third distinction in the above passe.ge. Cf. above 
p. 293. 
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What is indeterminant about the eternal objects is 
their relation to actual entities. The "mingling" of the 
forms only takes place by virtue of their realization by 
actual entities. An "idea, 11 a potentiality, does not realize 
itself except perhaps only metaphorically. A potentiality 
"becomes an object" only in the sense that actual entities 
realize forms thereby becoming "objects" qualifying future 
actual entities.1 Eternal objects are the recurrent types 
exhibited in the plurality of concrescent processes having 
no intrinsic patterns apart from the process. We find these 
patterns in our analyses of these processes. 
But this has to be qualified in regards to \Vhitehead 1 s 
position. Eternal objects do have an "analytic" character. 2 
This is to say that there is a sense in which the eternal 
objects as real potentialities exhibit a structure, do have, 
as Blanshard would say, a "range." In abstraction, they do 
exhibit grades of complexity, abstractive hierarchies, 
transitive relations. We can start from a complex set of 
eternal objects and, by analysis, discern relations between 
these eternal objects. But here we remain on the level of 
possibility. Whitehead would have us understand that the 
analysis of eternal objects only discloses other eternal 
1. As we saw, the fact that the eternal objects are indeter-
minant in regard to their relation to actual occasions, 
the fact that they "tell no tales" as to their ingression, 
Whitehead holds is the ground of empiricism. cr. above 
on the origin of conceptual prehensions, p. 163ff. 
2. Cf. above P• 218. 
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objects.1 Expressing this in another way, Whitehead's 
doctrine of "the isolation of eternal objects 112 states that 
the relations of eternal objects may not involve the individual 
essence of eternal objects. The relations of eternal objects 
are expressible without reference to their individual essence 
but only with reference to their natures as relata. The 
eternal objects may be "significant" of other eternal objects 
but indeterminant in regard to their relation to actual 
occasions. 
Eternal objects do come in contexts, in hierarchical 
patterns, do have a "range" that can be analyzed apart from 
any particular actual entity. But this systematic mutual 
relatedness is not intrinsic to the forms. The sensa do 
come in complex patterns but these patterns are derivative 
abstractions from the relatedness of actual occasions in 
concrescence. Abstract relational thought does tell us 
something and does not necessarily indicate a "mere appear-
ance." Thought is an attempt to grasp, make distinguishable, 
these formal structures which may be exhibited in concrete 
fact. 3 
But Whitehead would want us to make a clear distinction 
here between these discernible formal structures, these 
abstractive hierarchies, and the concrete relations among 
1. Cf. above on relational essence, p. 217ff.cf. also p. 239. 
2. Cf. above P• 215. 
3. Cf. above p. 22lf. 
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the actual entities. This is to say that there is a 
relatedness of eternal objects considered merely as relata 
and there are concrete relations among the forma as realized. 
The latter relatedness involves the individual essence of the 
eternal objects and takes place in each concrescent occasion.1 
For Blanshard, all relations are universals so when he, 
in the framework of his assumptions, looks for particulars 
they are nowhere to be accounted for. One of Blanshard's 
assumptions is that a particular was to be defined as a "sub-
stance, 11 that is, an entity which has no necessary relation 
to other particulars. Hence, for Blanshard, particulars 
would be "unintelligible," for intelligibility means primarily 
relating the object thought of to something else within a 
system. So a particular for Blanshard can only be a set of 
universals in situ. Blanshard's analysis of particulars 
implies that when you assert that there are many individual 
things you have to go on to infer that there can be no 
connections among these things. 
For Whitehead, qualities and relations are not merely 
universals but are "ingredients in 11 actual occasions. In 
agreement with Blanshard, relations are not merely rationes 
cognoscendi but are a constitutive part of that which 
individuates. The individuality of the actual entity is a 
real focus of radiating relations dependent upon its felt 
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1. Cf. above on concrescente, p. l96ff. Cf. also Whitehead's 
distinction between relations and contrasts, above, p. 222n. 
relations. This, as we saw, was especially the case in 
regard to eternal objects as subjective forms. Here the 
qualities are modes of feeling which enter into the real 
internal constitution of the subject. How that occasion 
feels that datum determines what that occasion is. The 
1 eternal objects really characterize the process. 
But, in contrast to Blanshard, being ingredient in 
actual occasions, the eternal objects can also function as 
a medium, connecting one individual with another. "Particu-
lars" do enter into the description of other "particulars • 11 
Whitehead's doctrine of prehension as concrete facts of 
relatedness and his doctrine of objectification are designed 
to show how this is possible. 2 
Whitehead would not have us eliminate the category of 
substance altogether as Blanshard tends to do in his denial 
3 
. of particulars. He, like Blanshard, is asserting that the 
notion of a particular is unintelligible if we conceive of 
it as isolated and self-sufficient. But instead of attempting 
to explain particularity as a class of qualities, he replaces 
this notion with his doctrine of actual entities as creative 
activities attaining satisfaction.4 
1. Cf. above p. 152ff. 
2. Cf. above on prehension and relational function of eternal 
objects, p. 138ff. Cf. also above p. 23lf. 
3. Cf. above pp. 79, 83n. 
4. Cf. above on satisfaction and order, p. 204ff. Cf. 
especially p. 204. • w. Christian has an excellent 
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chapter on what Whitehead accepts and rejects about the 
traditional category of substance. Cf. William A. Christian, 
An Interpretation of Vfllitehead's Metaphysics, Chapter 5. 
The actual entity is a real fact of qualitative feeling, 
a selective concrescence of feeling, which is a real fusion 
1 of diverse eternal objects with a diversity of status, not 
a collection of abstract characters. In each actual entity, 
the realization of the individual essence of the eternal 
objects imposes a real unity upon the forms realized giving 
rise to a novel determinateness. 2 
As we saw,3 this concrete unity is tele·ological for it 
is its aim which determines how the forms may mingle. It is 
an "act of experience" which Whitehead often characterizes 
as an aesthetic experie nee with its "sat is fact ion, 11 "internal 
unity," "intensity," "intrinsic value,n "tension and balance."4 
This view of the actual entity may not be far from the con-
crete unity of internal relations that the absolute idealists 
attempt to describe in their "concrete universal." Whitehead 
himself says, in reference to Process ~ Reality: 
Indeed, if this cosmology be deemed successful, 
it becomes natural at this point to ask whether the 
type of thought involved be not a transformation of 
some main doctriges of absolute Idealism onto a 
realistic basis. 
1. cr. above p. 200n. 
2. cr. above on real Individuality, p.l98ff. 
3. cr. above on concrescence and subjective aim, p.l89ff. 
and immanent teleology, p. 192ff. 
4. cr. above p. 204. 
5. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Realitl, p. viii. The 
absolute Idealism referred to here-is that of Bradley's 
position. "Bradley's 1 inclusive whole' is the connected-
ness of which we are in search. 11 Alfred North Whitehead, 
Adventures of Ideas, P• 232. Cf. above p. 20ln. 
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For Whitehead there is not just one actual entity, 
the Absolute. Each actual entity is a complex pattern of 
uni versels which have been actualized, realized. "Reality" 
is not a description of the internal development of the forms 
toward concreteness. There is a real fusion of ideal and 
real, potentiality and actuality, in each occasion. 
Hence, the PTinciples of order are not in the forms 
per se. "Order" for Whitehead refers to the patterns of pre-
1 
cess. Any "order," any particular relatedness of one actual 
entity to another is determ~ned by the actual entities them-
selves. Any order iS dependent upon the sustaining of certain 
uniformities or repetitions of patterns on the part of the 
actual entities. "Order" is constitutive, it arises out of 
the actual entities' modes of actl.vity, the way in which they 
2 include and exclude possibilities. Actuality is a limitation 
upon the infinity of eternal objects and limitation implies 
some kind of definite ordering. The "laws of nature" are 
derivative from these orderings, they are the dominant char-
acteristics inherited over wide societies of actual entities. 
One of the several consequences from this conception of 
3 laws as ~anent is that, s~nce law depends upon the ind~vidual 
characters of the actual entities, as the characters change so 
1. Cf. above on satisfaction and order, p. 20lff. 
2. Cf. above p. 23lf. 
3. Cf. ibid., Chapter 7. 
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will the laws. Contrary to Blanshard's position, there is 
no logic which governs the eternal objects in the actual world. 
However, there is an immanent teleology toward the highest 
intensity and value realization on the part of the actual 
entities. 
1. cr. above p. 209, 229ff. 
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4. Final Statements and Comparisons 
1. Blanshard's Position 
Blanshard's analysis of experience begins from 
"experience 11 ta.ken as the content of consciousness whlch 
serves as a locus for factors, data, necessary for perceptual 
recognition. His major concern is an explanation of how we 
get from this sensed content to the perceptual recognition of 
things; hence little emphas 1s or function is given to the 
affective and emotional factors in experience. 
This sensed content, which is lifted into focus by 
judgment and analysis, is conceived by Blanshard as a nexus 
of universals, a system of intensionality which "grounds" 
perceptual inference and is capable of beco.mlng more and more 
developed in the process of perception and judgment. We do 
not start from isolated sensa; there are modes of organization 
implied in our attempt •.. to understand. The order of fnPres-
sions grows out of the attempt of perceptual experience, 
.. 
conceived as a rudimentary type of thinking, to regulate its 
:-
experience into some kind of intelligible ~attern. Our 11 idea 
" 
systems," which are the result of our interpretation and com-
prehension of that to which our experience refers, are seen 
to exhibit more and more of a systematic structure. 
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This movement of thought toward coherent, intelligible 
order which is implicit in perceptual inference forecasts the 
~anent end of all thought processes. The kinds of organiza-
tion implied in perceptual inference are the proto-types of 
the kind of order thought has as its end. Thought contains 
implicitly its own criterion of truth independent of any 
antecedent criteria, the norm is implicit in the drive of 
the intellect toward completion. 
In his description of this process, Blanshard draws no 
line between the "given" and its extension, i.e. the systematic 
organization of this experience by the judgmental activity. 
The "given," the sensed content, is always organic to a funded 
order of meaning, universals, implied in the interpretive 
activity. The result in his analysis of experience is that 
the universal becomes the sole significant content of our 
experience. 
For Blanshard, there is no real distinction in kind 
between our judgments based upon sense-perception and our 
judgments based upon inference -- in fact, these processes 
are one and the same. There is nothing about the data which 
is different from the inferences we draw from them. The 
referential character of experience is replaced by inference 
within and among the contents of experience. The usual 
bifurcations between such terms as the "formal" and the 
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"empirical, 11 "analytic 11 and "synthetic," "necessary" and 
ttcontingent," and even "truth" and "falsity" are rels.ti ve 
to a completed system of knowledge whose general conditions 
are known through the demands of reason. A "fact 11 is always 
an interpretation of these contents in accordance with this 
ideal. 11Fact 11 is a stage within the development of the idea; 
complete fact, truth, means the stage which would be reached 
if the idea were fully articulate. "Error" is the tension 
or difference between this ideal order and our partially 
incoherent knowledge. 
Blanshard's emphasis upon the regulatory function of 
thought in regard to experience places hLill squarely in the 
Kantian tradition. "Order" is bound up with the forms and 
conditions of knowing or understanding. This order is not 
merely a generalized description of the operation of tnought 
but is normative and definitive for the correct use of 
thought. Since it is normative, these conditions are regula-
tive as to what entities are to be allowed and their condition 
of relatedness. 
But, of course, going beyond Kant, reality is not the 
ding-~-sich, it is not something different from this coherent 
development of the 11 idea.u 11Reality 11 is what the transcendent 
end would be if this 11 ~dea 11 were developed to its systematic 
completion. "Order," being legislative and normative for 
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thought, must also be constitutive of things. Offering an 
epistemological argument that Blanshard feels avoids the 
difficulties in saying the relat~on of the idea to the object 
is resemblance or correspondence, he holds that idea and 
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object are not independent series but are related teleologically. 
The idea is the object 1n posse and if developed the idea would 
be lts object. 
At the center of this argument is Blanshard's doctrine 
of the concrete un~versal. In Blanshard's conception of the 
universal and his resulting analysis of the particular, he is 
trying to avoid two traditional philosophical problems: the 
epistemological problem of the radical separation of idea and 
object which, for Blanshard, leads to skepticism in regard to 
knowledge; and the closely related metaphysical problem of 
trying to avoid the traditional concept of substance as an 
independent, featureless substratum. 
In Blanshard's doctrine of the "concrete universal," 
where the distinction between form and fact, conception and 
perception, the universal and its ~stances, is only a matter 
of degree, the universals, the forms, have to take on func-
tions usually attributed to the Facts. The universal has to 
be seen as concrete and efficacious. 
In the course of Blanshard's argument, this is precisely 
the consequence. Universals now have an ~plicit structure, 
ideas develop and exhibit intrinsic patterns. Universals 
also, in the course of Blanshard's argument, take on an 
active character. The causal relation becomes the relation 
of logical entailment and conversely logical entailment 
becomes an existential relation. 
The result is that facts become form "concretized." 
The realm of fact, its particularity, becomes absorbed into 
the realm of form, becomes defined in order to support the 
necessary relations of the system. Experience becomes 
formalized in order to conform to an ideal of intelligibility. 
Because of his definitions of order and intelligibility, 
Blanshard is in a sense describing how the universe must be. 
This is to say, given certain epistemological problems, 
given a definition of intelligibility, then the structure of 
the universe, at least in outline, is deduced. Fragmented 
experience, inference, natural law, are shown to have certain 
intrinsic connections by being absorbed into abstract thought 
and relations. Order is present and implicit and is. 
Blanshard's problem is to explain concreteness. You must 
seek the facts in the forms. 
ii. Whitehead's Position 
Whitehead's analysis of experience starts from a broader 
base than that of Blanshard and is in opposition to the 
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assumptions and procedures of Blanshard. Whitehead emphasJ.zes 
many of the aspects of ~ed1ate experience discarded by 
Blanshard. H~s doctrine of prehensions is an attempt to go 
beyond the traditional subject-object relation characteristic 
of epistemological analyses and return to a "reformed 
subjectivist's principle." ImmedJ.ate, felt experience is 
made up of the immanence of entities independent of that 
experience and carries a felt reference to these entJ.ties. 
The basJ.s of experience is "given" and it arises out of 
this initial situation of interrelated prehensive relations. 
Tbe 11subjectn is always a respons:tve center within this nexus 
of relationships constructing its own nature in accordance 
with the manner in which J.t feels (subjective form). It is 
its manner of feeling the pattern of eternal objects given 
by its past and the novel organic pattern derivative from this 
concrescent activity that is created. 
Our awareness of universals as universals characteristic 
of Blanshard 1 s starting point is seen as a derivative concep-
tual phase from these more basic physical prehensions. The 
diversJ.fication of these feeling processes in immediate 
experience itself gives rise to those distinctions and rela-
tions in virtue of which thought operates. Relations are 
fundamentally experiential rather than seen to be a product 
of conceptual operations and :tnference. 
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Whitehead's position is a denial that we start from 
clear, presented sensa as data of recognition and that con-
nectedness is to be explained in terms of these. Whitehead 
de-emphasizes mentality as prior and legislative to experience 
and emphasizes that the higher phases of experience arise out 
of and are derivative from more basic feeling processes. 
Thought's function is to elucidate the character of the felt 
relations themselves as symbolic of that to which this 
experience refers. In contrast to Blanshard's assumption 
of an identity of idea and object, Whitehead would say that 
what we know consists of individual things having character-
istics which make our reference to these things possible. 
This de-emphasis upon mentality as prior and legislative 
represents a rejection of the Kantian tradition, of which 
Blanshard is a part. For vVhitehead, ordered experience is 
not the result of the schematization of modes of thought. 
The order of experience does not grow out of modes of thinking 
which attempt to regulate its objects into some intelligible 
pattern. The data includestfuterown interconnections of a felt 
kind. Experience itself is a construction in accordance with 
how the subject feels (its aim). The ultimate reason for 
order is not a cognitive ideal but the aim at intensity, 
intrinsic value, in the satisfactions of each actual entity. 
Hence we find, in accordance with his categorical scheme, 
310 
311 
Whitehead emphasizing aesthetic categories which do not 
owe their being or universality to ~onscious intellectual operations. 
Although 11 J.deality" is an integral part of Whitehead's 
analysis, he interprets 111.deality" in a broader sense than 
Blanshard. The eternal objects are ttforms of definiteness" 
and are necessary elements even at the lowest level in 
physical prehension. As with Blanshard, particulars are 
given via the medium of universals. Eternal objects are the 
medium of connection among actual entities; they function 
relationally in objectification. But despite the importance 
of eternal objects for Whitehead, they are only the medium of 
connection. Whitehead does not tend to reduce the object 
experienced and our experience of the object to universals. 
Moreover, the eternal objects are not the reasons for 
the connections. Whitehead, unlike Blanshard, attempts to 
maintain the balance between fact and form by his ontological 
principle. Any order among the forms is not the l.mmanent 
development of "1.deality 11 but is a result of their realization 
by actual entities. Any persistent pattern of forms is 
derivative from their re-enaction by actual entities. The 
orderliness of nature is a result of the fact of the achieve-
ment and display of characters throughout the events. 
Actuality and potentiality require each other. The 
relation here between the eternal objects and the actual 
entities is, as by Blanshard, conceived of as a teleological 
relation. But Whitehead makes it clear that eternal objects 
do not realize themselves snd, in this sense, a "concrete 
universal" is a contradiction in terms for Whitehead. Eternal 
objects transcend actuality, they remain unaffected by 
their ingressions. Their analysis only reveals other eternal 
objects -- only possibility. Whitehead 'YO-:.lld have 1:1 . .s 1:::.u.tw a 
. 
clear distinction between the discernible formal relations 
among the for.ms, the relatedness of eternal objects considered 
only as relata, and the concrete relatedness which comes about 
in each concrescent occasion. 
But the latter represents the real m1ngling of the 
forms. Each actual entity represents a particular concrete 
internal unity of its relations to all the others; they are 
real matters of fact. The universe is 1118de up of these many, 
concrete, novel occasions. "Order" 1s the dominance of 
patterns of eternal objects being realized by actual entitios. 
We should seek the forms in the facts. 
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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to present a comparative 
analysis of the conceptions of the relation of experience 
to order in Blanshard and Vlhitehead and the consequences 
which ensue for their general philosophical pos1tions. 
The analysis 1s particularly concerned to account for 
(l) the way in which they conceive of the genesis of order 
1n experience; (2) their conceptions of the function of 
universals ~n experience; and (3) the relation of Form to 
Fact 1n their total v1ews. 
1. The Genes1s of Order 1n Experience 
Blanshard's analysis of experience results 1n his 
emphas1s upon the content of consciousness wh1ch serves as 
a locus for factors, data, necessary for perceptual recog-
nition. This sensed content, which 1s lifted 1nto focus by 
judgment and analysis, 1s for Blanshard a nexus of universals. 
The order of impress1ons grows out of the attempt of per-
ceptual experience, conceived as a rud1mentary type of think1ng, 
to regulate these sensa 1nto some kind of intelligible pattern. 
The order in experience is bound up with the conditions for 
knOwing. The result of Blanshard's analysis is that little 
function is given to ~ed1ate exper1ence and feeling. 
Universals are the sole significant content of our experience. 
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Whitehead's analysis of experience starts from a 
broader base and is in opposition to the assumptions and 
procedures of Blanshard. In the main, what Blanshard dis-
cards Whitehead emphasizes. Felt experience is itself 
referential and has a structure. This is expressed in 
Whitehead's doctrine of prehension. Our awareness of 
universals as universals characteristic of Blanshard's 
starting point is a derivative conceptual phase from more 
basic feeling processes. This emphasis upon feeling and 
de-emphasis upon conscious intellectual operations represents 
for Whitehead a rejection of the Kantian epistemological 
tradition of which Blanshard is a part. For Whitehead, the 
order of experience does not grow out of modes of thinking 
which attempt to regulate its objects into some intelligible 
pattern. The data include their own interconnections of a 
felt kind. The ultimate reason for order is not a cognitive 
ideal but the aim at intensity, intrinsic ~lue, in the 
satisfactions of each actual entity. Whitehead, in accordance 
with his categorical scheme, emphasizes aesthetic categories 
which do not owe their being or universality to conscious 
intellectual operations. 
2. The Function of Universals in Experience 
For both Blanshard and Whitehead, the repeatable 
aspects of experience, traditionally called 11uni versals, 11 
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are a major part of their posit ions • Sine e, f or Blanshard, 
they are the sole significant content of experience, this 
results in his view that order must be intrinsic to the 
universals. Inference within the content of experience, 
conceived as a nexus of universals by Blsnshard, replaces 
the reference of this content to external objects. Blanshard 
emphasizes the pattern of the sensa, their implicit structure, 
in such a way as to conceive of both the object and the 
experience of the object in terms of universals. 
Although "ideality" is an integral part of Whitehead's 
analysis, he interprets "ideality," the eternal objects, in 
a broader sense than Blanshard. But there is a striking 
similarity in that, like Blanshard, the eternal objects 
function as the medium for connection and order. Whitehead's 
doctrine of objectification is an account of how this is 
possible. 
3. Form and Fact 
Both Blanshard and Whitehead conceive of the relations 
between the universals and the object teleologically. 
The center of Blanshard's position is the concrete 
universal. In Blanshard 1 s conception of the uni verse.l and 
his resulting analysis of the particular, he is trying to 
avoid two traditional philosophical problems: the epistemo-
logical problem of the radical separation of idea and object 
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which, for Blanshard, leads to skepticism in regard to 
knowledge; and the closely related metaphysical problem of 
trying to avoid the trad1tional concept of substance as an 
independent, featureless substratum. 
A consequence of the doctrine of the concrete un1versal 
in Blanshard is that the universals take on an increas1ngly 
active character in the course of his argument. The result 
is that facts become form 11 concretized. 11 The realm of fact, 
its particularity, becomes absorbed 1nto the realm of form, 
becomes defined in order to support the necessary relations 
of the system. Experience becomes formalized in order to 
conform to an ideal of intelligibility. Because of his 
definition of order and 1ntelligibility, Blanshard's problem 
is to expla1n concreteness. You must seek the facts in the 
forms. 
Whitehead attempts to ma1ntain the balance between Fact 
and Form by his ontological principle. Any order among the 
forms is not the immanent development of "1dealityu but is 
a result of their realization by actual entities. Any 
persistent pattern of forms is derivative from their re-
enaction by actual entities. The orderliness of nature is 
a result of the fact of the achievement and dis play of 
characters throughout the events. 
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Each actual ent1ty represents a particular concrete 
internal unity of its relations to all the others; they are 
real matters of fact. The universe is made up of these many, 
concrete, novel occasions. 11 Order 11 J.S the domJ.nance of 
patterns of eternal objects be1ng realized by actual entJ.ties. 
We should seek the forms in the facts. 
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